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The idea for this thesis, as well as the opportunity to observe cases in court, arose
out of a Scottish Office funded research project, which monitored and evaluated
the use of s.s. 141/346 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 as inserted
by s.36 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) (Scotland) Act 1985. This
legislation introduced restrictions curbing the use of sexual evidence in sexual
offence trials. The results of this research were published as a Scottish Office
publication, namely Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. (1992) Sexual History
and Sexual Character Evidence in Scottish Sexual Offence Trials Edinburgh, The
Scottish Office Central Research Unit Series. The following year, a book on the
research was published as Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. (1993) Sex
Crimes on Trial Law and Society Series, Edinburgh University Press.
This thesis has a rather different focus to the Scottish Office funded research and
is entirely my own work. However, of necessity there is some overlap with the
published research. This is particularly the case with Chapter Four of this thesis
which outlines the precursors to and the intentions of the Scottish legislation.
The use of this material, albeit written and presented in a different form to that in
the published research has been agreed to by both of the other authors, Beverley
Brown and Lvnn Jamieson.
Dr Bevei/ley Brown MDr Lynn Jamieson
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ABSTRACT
This is an empirical research study of contemporary court room practices in Scottish sexual
offence cases where the complainer is a young female under the age of 17 years old. The
data was collected primarily by means of in-court observation of 94 sexual offence cases
heard in courts across Scotland over a three year period. The data includes both contested
criminal trials where evidence was led, and also 'guilty plea' cases where the accused pled
guilty in advance of a trial and no evidence was led, but where there was a plea in
mitigation by the defence on behalf of the accused.
This study explores how the question of young female sexuality is perceived in the court
room. Sexual offence cases involving young complainers constitute a key site for
investigating a series of ambivalences about the sexuality of young women and girls,
wherein it is simultaneously seen as a source of danger and a focus of protection.
Specifically, the study is concerned with the use of sexual evidence. It describes the trial
processes of examination and cross-examination, and the giving of evidence by young
female complainers. In particular, it documents the ways in which sexual evidence is
introduced by means of representations that draw on images of female sexuality. By so
doing it shows the ways in which ideas about young female sexuality pervade the court
room in the processing of sexual offence cases.
In searching for the ideological basis of contemporary court room rhetoric in such cases,
the study locates the late 19th century as a time when prevailing ideas about young female
sexuality became incorporated into legislation which raised the female 'age of consent' and
created a set of statutory sexual offences which, virtually unchanged, forms the
cornerstone of contemporary sexual offence legislation in Scotland..
In addition to documenting sexual evidence, the study is also concerned with the use to
which such evidence is put in the trial. Centrally, it examines the relationship between the
images of young female sexuality to the crucial legal questions of the relevance,
admissibility and deployment of evidence, and the substantive elements of the sexual
crimes and offences which are the subject of the criminal trial. Currently, Scottish
legislation limits the use of sexual history and sexual character evidence concerning the
complainer, unless such evidence is deemed relevant to issues in the trial and it is against
this development that the use of such evidence is assessed.
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This study examines the depiction of young female complainers1 (aged 17 years and under)
in criminal trials for sexual offences in Scotland. It is concerned with the question of their
sexuality, and specifically with the ways in which it is invoked, developed and deployed in
the trial by the use of images that draw on stereotypes and stories of (young) female sexual
behaviour. At one level it seeks merely to document these images of young female
sexuality that float - and are secured - through legal rhetoric in the court room. At this
level, the thesis describes the trial process of examination and cross-examination, and the
giving of evidence by young female complainers. It is thus a study of contemporary court
room practices in sexual offence trials. But, centrally, it is concerned with the use to which
evidence is put in the trial, and seeks to examine the relation between the images of young
female sexuality to the two, inter-locked, legal questions of, on the one hand, the
admissibility and deployment of evidence, and on the other hand the substantive elements
of the various sexual crimes and offences which are the subject of the criminal trial. The
most crucial of these legal questions is that posed by the question of sexual character
evidence and the way that it is applied to particular issues in the trial.
A main concern of the thesis is with the ways in which evidence about the young female
complainer - in particular information about her character, her lifestyle, her reputation and
specifically her sexuality - is elicited and the ways that information is deployed in the court
room to construct a particular picture of the complainer, and the manner in which she is
presented in relation to the sexual offence which forms the substance of the charge. The
thesis examines the way in which constructions of the complainer draw on prevailing social
stereotypical images which pretend to represent typical or ideal characteristics of young
female sexuality. Opinions and behaviour based on the implicit assumptions which
underpin gender stereotypes are to be found in many social spheres and - as will be argued
here - conventional and exaggerated stereotypes of (young) female sexuality and the
generalisations which they embody are also to be found in the court room. As Sharpe
1 'Complainant' in England and Wales
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(1976) has pointed out in a different context, social stereotypes of female behaviour are
based on intangible and abstract ideas which make analysis and discussion of them
elusive.2 Similarly, Lees (1993) has argued that gender stereotypes are difficult to pin
down to any specific content that could be shown to be false because of the ambiguity with
which they are used and the refusal to allow any exceptions.3 In the court room gender
stereotypes and their symbolic use are prevalent, although it appears that there is not one
stereotypical image of female sexuality present, but several. Furthermore, they are not
fixed and immutable images, but often ambivalent and floating, and thus in part they
demonstrate the characteristic intangibility referred to by Sharpe (1976).4 However, in the
court room the floating stereotypical images that are present are captured and channelled by
legal rhetoric and gain significance through their application to particular evidential issues
in the trial. It is important to state that these images are multifunctional in that they may be
applied - most commonly by the defence, but also at times by the prosecution - to a
number of different, yet inter-linked evidential issues during the course of the trial. Thus
whilst the basis of the stereotypes remain intangible, their application to key evidential
issues in the trial provides one possible explanation for their prevalence in the court room.
This thesis examines the process in which, in a trial, these floating images are pinned down
by and channelled primarily through the legal concept of sexual character and applied, in
particular to the crucial issue of consent, but also to the issues of the reliability and
credibility of the complainer. In this way it is a study of the way in which particular sexual
ideologies, presumptions and images about young female sexuality and behaviour underpin
and infuse the evidential process in sexual offence trials.
Several writers have shown that the social construction of young female sexuality involves
the construction of difference (Sharpe, 1976; Jackson, 1982; Lees, 1993). The construction
of difference operates on two levels. On one level, difference is constructed on the basis of
gender wherein the sexuality of girls is subordinate to that of boys. This gender difference
is articulated as, for example, 'it is natural for boys to enjoy sex, but not for girls.' But on
another level, difference is constructed between girls. As Lees (1993) states:
2 Sharpe, S. (1976) 'Just Like a Girl ' How Girls Learn to be Women p.66-70
3 Lees, S. (1993) Sugar and Spice : Sexuality and Adolescent Girls p. 58
4 Sharpe (1976)
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"The construction of female sexuality involves the construction of a
difference between slags and drags: sexuality, presumed to be
promiscuous in nature, is not natural for all girls/women but only
resides in the slag."5
It is the dichotomisation between girls - that is, between those who are chaste and those
who are promiscuous which is of prime interest here. These are the basic conventional
stereotypes of young female sexuality, that of the innocent and pure 'good' girl who
requires to be protected from the dangers of sex, and the promiscuous and loose 'bad' girl
who constitutes a danger from which others should be protected. As many feminists have
argued, the use of binary opposites such as good/bad do not merely construct an
understanding of difference, they also construct different values by which such differences
are viewed (Smart 1995). The polarisations of 'good' and 'bad' which underpin images of
girls who do and girls who don't is echoed in the concept of 'character'. On one level,
character is a means through which individuals are socially constructed. Characterising an
individual is a method of identifying and labelling that individual. However, character is
also a recognised legal concept, again underpinned by the polarisations of 'good' and 'bad',
and is used to suggest certain distinctive qualities or propensities in an individual, such as a
disposition towards certain sorts of conduct. Within the context of sexual offence trials,
legal rhetoric constantly reproduces this dualistic frame of reference of 'good' and 'bad', of
vulnerable sexuality and threatening sexuality, through the concept of sexual character. In
the court room, sexual character is the cipher through which the meaning of female
sexuality is constructed, and the meaning is conveyed through the use of stereotypical
images.
Sexual offence trials provide a key site for investigating a series of ambivalences about
young women's sexuality - as a latent but ever present dangerous potential; as an object of
vilification; or as the focus of protection. This thesis explores how young female sexuality
is perceived in the court room; it attempts to ascertain whether it is viewed in the same way
as adult female sexuality, or whether it possesses some specificities of its own. Although
this is, in essence, a study of contemporary court room practices it includes an overview of
the legal position of young women and girls in relation to their capacity to consent to sex,
5 Lees (1993)
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and then continues with an historical account of the nineteenth century statutory sexual
offence legislation governing sexual behaviour of young women and girls which, virtually
unchanged, informs contemporary sexual offence statutes in Scotland. Investigation of the
historical background to contemporary statutory sexual offence law locates the dominant
ideology in relation to the sexuality of young women and girls at the time of the creation of
the statutes and provides a further source of information and to some extent an explanation
of the ideological basis for the courtroom rhetoric that is typically deployed in
contemporary sexual offence trials.
The Formulation ofResearch Questions
My interest in images of young female sexuality within the context of sexual offence trials
was particularly focused by the development of law reform in the mid 1980's when
Scotland introduced legislation which limited the use of sexual evidence concerning the
complainer in sexual offence trials.6 This is evidence concerning a complainer's sexual
experience or character, and may be either general evidence concerning a 'type' of person or
may be evidence which refers to particular events in that person's past. Such legislation is
commonly known as 'shield' legislation, so called because it 'shields' complainers in sexual
offence trials from intrusive or unnecessary questioning about their personal lives, and has
been introduced in several jurisdictions around the world over the last twenty years or so.7
In most of the jurisdictions in which reforms have been introduced, the workings of the
'shield' legislation has been the subject of evaluation and analysis.8 Similarly, the Scottish
legislation was the focus of a Scottish Office funded research project9 which examined the
6 Namely s. 141 and s.346 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 as inserted by s.36 of
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985.
7 In Canada, some Australian and North American states, New Zealand and England/Wales
(ss2 and 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976)
8 see , for example, Adler, Z. (1987) Rape on Trial ; Temkin, J. (1987) Rape and the Legal Process
9 The 'Sexual History Evidence Project' conducted at the University of Edinburgh 1987-1990. This research
had two main aims; the first was to monitor the use of the legislation and examine how questioning and
evidence concerning the complainer's sexual history and sexual character was being used under the new
provisions. The second aim was to assess the effectiveness of this legislation in securing it's objectives. The
research findings were published as Brown, B. , Burman, M. and Jamieson, L. (1992) Sexual History and
Sexual Character Evidence in Scottish Sexual Offence Trials : A Study of Scottish Court Practice under
SS.141A1141B and 346AJ346B of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 as inserted by the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s.36
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use and effectiveness of the 'shield' legislation. I was a member of the research team, and
the germ of the idea for this thesis arose whilst I was conducting this research. 10
The reform represented by the 'shield' legislation was the culmination of a lengthy period of
discussion and consultation conducted by the Scottish Law Commission. This stemmed
from a concern with the problematic consequences of sexual evidence, and a number of
quite different reasons were given throughout the period of deliberation and drafting for
restricting the use of evidence concerning a complainers' sexual life. Briefly - because the
formulation of the problems is something to which I shall return to discuss in more detail
later in the thesis - these were the problems of the distress caused to the complainer by
embarrassing questioning; the possibility that offenders were evading justice due to the
unwillingness of victims to report sexual offences to the police because of fear of the court
room ordeal; and the possibility of overly light sentencing due to the potential that sexual
evidence may have for influencing a jury. The other reasons which were given for
restricting sexual evidence concerned issues of evidential principle. These were, first, the
dangers of inferring a complainers credibility on the basis of her sexual conduct; second,
the invalidity of using a complainer's sexual character in order to show a predisposition to
consent; and third, the possible conflation of sexual character evidence and consent by a
jury.
The Scottish legislation, like that of other jurisdictions, does not totally prohibit sexual
history and sexual character evidence, but lays down certain conditions and procedures for
introducing such sexual evidence if it fulfils certain specified conditions. However, the
Scottish legislation has a number of distinctive features which distinguish it from other
forms of 'shield' legislation found in other jurisdictions. It is in fact unusually wide-ranging
10 It is important to state from the outset that the Scottish Office funded research was not concerned directly
with the investigation of sexual offence trials involving young complainers, rather it had a somewhat different
focus being concerned primarily with the use of the 'shield' legislation more generally. In addition, it was not
immediately clear when commencing The Scottish Office research, that sexual evidence and/or the 'shield'
legislation would feature all that greatly in trials involving young complainers, and there was a general
implicit presumption, both by policy makers within the Scottish Office who funded the research and, to a
degree, by the research team, that the research would be more concerned with rape trials involving adult
complainers.
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in terms of the sexual crimes and offences which fall within its remit.11 Because of this it
applies in both the High12 and the Sheriff13 courts in Scotland. It is not restricted to rape
and rape-related offences, but covers a much wider range of sexual offences, many of them
defined either formally or informally in terms of the (young) age of the victim. In these
sexual offences, it is the age of the victim which, effectively, constitutes the crime.
Interestingly, there is very little discussion in the debates or discussions leading up to the
passing of the legislation concerning why those sexual offences which specifically apply
when young victims are involved are also covered by the legislation. Rape trials involving
adult women were cited throughout the discussions as the paradigm instance, hence it was
difficult to avoid the impression that the inclusion of other sexual offences, in particular
those that specifically involve young victims were simply added-on. The inclusion of
sexual offences which involve young complainers within the remit of the 'shield' legislation
presupposes, in the first instance at least, that the problems that were perceived by the
reformers to be posed by the use of sexual character and sexual history evidence in the
investigation of complainers' sexual lives might potentially be found in sexual offence trials
which involve young complainers. Whilst this possibility was not explicitly stated in any
of the debates and discussions which preceded the passing of the legislation in which the
'problems' of sexual evidence were formulated, sexual offences which involve young
victims, by their very inclusion in the remit of the legislation are implicitly problematised
in the same way as sexual offence trials involving adult complainers. Thus an initial
research question for the thesis was whether evidence which constituted undue questioning
about complainers' sexual lives was in fact being used in sexual offence trials involving
young female complainers and, if so, what form the sexual evidence took in such trials. A
second, and related, question was whether the 'problems' of sexual character and sexual
history evidence as perceived by the law reformers and which informed the design and
drafting of the 'shield' legislation were present in trials involving young female
11 It includes both heterosexual and homosexual offences, thus the complainer may be male as well as
female, as indeed may be the accused.
12 This is the highest level of court of the first instance in Scotland. Rape trials always take place in the High
Court. Trials are presided over by a judge with a 15 person jury (known as solemn procedure).
13 This deals with crimes and offences which are less serious than the High Court although some borderline
charges may be dealt with at either level. The Sheriff Court includes both the possibility of a trial presided
over by a sheriff with a jury (known as solemn procedure) or trial by sheriff sitting alone (summary
procedure)
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complainers. If so, were these the 'same' problems as those in trials involving adult female
complainers or were they different in some way ?
Although the scope of the 'shield' legislation is unusually wide, it does not cover the crime
of incest or any of the offences under the Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986
which relate to breaches of trust and authority.14 Furthermore, such charges are often given
as alternatives on the indictment to crimes and offences which in fact are covered by the
legislation. This is particularly so in relation to rape and offences under the Sexual
Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 and it is not at all uncommon to find sections of this Act
given as alternatives to incest on the indictment. This could have much to do with factors
such as the strength of the available evidence and sentencing limits, however it also gives
rise to the possibility that there may be similarities in the type of evidence that may be
introduced in such cases. The exclusion of incest offences from the ambit of the 'shield'
legislation was therefore somewhat anomalous. This prompted a third research question,
that of whether trials for incest offences which involved young complainers demonstrated
the use of sexual evidence, and if so, what form this evidence took in such trials.
However, it was not the sole intention of this research to merely monitor sexual evidence
or measure the use of the 'shield' legislation in sexual offence trials involving young
complainers. A central theme and puzzle which quickly emerged was the focus on the
complainer's consent to sex when consent is technically not at issue in such trials. This is
because, in Scots law (as in English law) girls below a certain age do not have the capacity
to consent and, for older girls, even where they do have the capacity to consent, that
consent is rendered irrelevant.. How and why this focus on consent occurs is another key
concern of this investigation.
14 Although one submission did specifically recommend the inclusion of incest, discussions with legal
practitioners and those responsible for drafting the legislation revealed the view that the omission of incest
and incest related offences was probably due to an oversight. This oversight may be amended, however as
following the publication and dissemination of the Scottish Office funded research into the workings of the
legislation, the Government is considering bringing forward proposals for extending the provisions of the
legislation to incest and clandestine injury crimes (another sexual offence to which the legislation did not
apply), as stated in the White Paper entitled Improving the Delivery of Justice in Scotland : The
Government's Proposalsfor Reform, 1994
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Research Questions
To sum up, the main sets of research questions which this thesis tries to address are as
follows. One set of research questions concern the construction of images of young female
sexuality which pervade sexual offence trials and their relationship to legal-evidential
issues in the trial. A second set of research questions cohere around the 'shield' legislation,
and specifically whether evidence which constitutes undue questioning about complainers'
sexual lives is in fact being used in sexual offence trials involving young female
complainers and, if so, what form the sexual evidence takes in such trials; whether the
'problems' of sexual character and sexual history evidence as perceived by the law
reformers and which informed the design and drafting of the 'shield' legislation are present
in trials involving young complainers. If so, are these the 'same' problems as those in trials
involving adult complainers or are they different in some way ? A third set of questions
concern the predominance of the issue of consent in sexual offence trials. Why is the issue
of consent being used ? What effect is it aimed at producing ?
A Word About Age
One of my first research tasks for this thesis was to define what I meant by 'young' female
complainers. Parameters had to be set. A second task concerned whether to include only
those sexual offences which specifically involve young complainers, for example, the age-
defined statutory offences, or to also include those sexual offences which could be applied
in cases where the victim is an adult, such as rape, attempted rape and indecent assault.
These first two tasks were tackled together. I did not want to restrict the research to only
those cases involving young children, nor extend it beyond where the significance of
'young' may become lost. The legal age of consent to sex for females in Scotland is 16
years, and in Scots law some sexual offences are defined in terms of the age of the victim,
such as the age-related statutory offences which refer, for example, to sexual offences
against girls aged under 13 years; against girls aged under 16 years; and indecent behaviour
towards a girl aged between 12 years and 16 years.15 However, whilst I did not want to set
an arbitrary age-limit, I did not want to be bound to the letter of the law, either. I wanted to
'snare' those cases involving young complainers which fell outside of the age-limits defined
by the statutes, and also include rape and rape-related offences usually associated with
15 s.s. 3, 4 and 5 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976
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adult victims. This would provide some comparison in terms of different types of sexual
offences, and would widen the scope for investigation into the use of sexual evidence. Thus
I decided on an age-limit of 17 years. This would enable me to include all of the offences
against children and younger teenagers, but would also allow the inclusion of cases
involving 'young' complainers which fell just outside the age-limit as set by the statutory
offences and age of consent law.
Literature
An initial search of the literature revealed that there is relatively little written on images of
young female sexuality and their relation to the central legal questions that are at issue in
the context of sexual offence trials, nor on the issue of girl's consent to sex. It seems that
literature in this area falls between several stools: that is, literature which focuses on the
construction and social control of female sexuality within the law (for example, Edwards,
1981; Smart 1989); the mainly feminist literature which documents the ordeal of victims in
sexual offence trials (Adler, 1987; Estrich, 1987) ; the substantial body of child protection
literature which focuses on child sexual abuse (Rush, 1980; Ward, 1984; Driver & Droisen,
1989); the criminological literature on young women as offenders (Carlen, 1985, 1988;
Hudson, 1989; Gelsthorpe, 1989); and the literature on the sexuality of young women
(Jackson, 1982; Lees, 1986, 1993;). Whilst there has been a growing body of sociological
literature which has the sexuality of young women as its focus this has not, as yet, taken up
the role played by constructions and images of young female sexuality in sexual offence
trials.
Much of the literature on rape trials focuses on the experience of adult women victims. In
rape trials, the victims of such offences are often subjected to extensive questioning not
only about the events which led up to the alleged offence, the offence itself, and the
aftermath of the offence, but also - and controversially - about aspects of their personal and
sexual lives. It has been well-documented that the legal process, and the necessary
standards and requirements of evidence are as traumatic for the victim of a sexual offence
as the initial victimisation (Adler, Z. 1987, 1988; Chambers & Miller, 1983, 1986). This is
true as much for the younger victim of sexual offences as it is for adult victims. As Adler
(1988) points out, for younger victims the court apperance may create secondary
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victimisation on a considerable scale.16 The formal atmosphere of the court room and the
evidential requirement to relate the details of the alleged offence, the confrontation with the
accused and the ordeal of cross-examination contribute substantially to the trauma of the
trial situation. When the accused person is a member of the young person's family, this
trauma may be exacerbated as children in this position are also likely to experience conflict,
confusion and guilt.17
The issue of the consent to sex of young girls appears to have received relatively little
attention from legal writers. Sex with children is prohibited in law, and this is due primarily
to the perceived potential for harm and exploitation. Of course, legal texts give legal
definitions and offer a explication of the legal criteria involved in consent, but the issue of
the meaning of consent in the commission of sex with girls and young women rarely is the
subject of analysis. As a result, the stature and meaning of consent and its implications for
the use of evidence in sexual offence and incest trials tends to disappear because it is often
subordinated to an understanding of rigid legal criteria.
Whilst it is well-recognised and documented within feminist literature, for example, Berger
(1977), Adler (1987), Chambers & Millar (1986), Estrich (1987), Temkin (1987) that the
issue of consent tends to be a crucial issue in rape trials involving adult women, and that
such trials tend to be dominated by arguments which focus specifically on whether or not
the complainer in fact consented, there is no indication that the same applies in trials
involving young complainers. The meaning of young girl's consent to sex has not been
the subject of much detailed discussion within feminist literature. This was puzzling
precisely because the issue of consent, in particular presumptions of 'automatic' or
generalised consent along the lines of that outlawed by law reform in many jurisdictions
around the world, has been the subject of much critical feminist attention where it relates to
adult women. Legal rhetoric and jurisprudence has inextricably bound up the question of
consent with the rape of adult women, and thus feminist discussion of the issue of consent
to sex stems largely from feminist accounts of rape. Such accounts have tended to focus on
the question of male/female power relations, and largely take the form of critiques of male
16 Adler, Z. (1988) 'Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse : a challenge to the status quo' in Maguire, M. &
Pointing, J. Victims ofCrime : A New Deal ?" p. 139
17 Morgan, J. (1988) 'Children as Victims ' in Maguire, M. & Pointing, J. (eds) (1988)
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sexuality. For example, Smart (1989) speaks of women in rape trials being found "guilty of
consent." She depicts the rape trial as a process whereby women's experience on a number
of levels (their sexuality, their bodies, their unwillingness to have sex) is 'disqualified' and
phallocentrism is 'celebrated'.18 Specifically, women's experience is denied and disqualified
by a process in which rape is transformed throughout the trial into 'normal sex'. For Smart
(1989) the legal consent/non-consent dyad which is often the pivot of the rape trial is
problematic in terms of women's subjective experience of sex. In a rape trial, a woman
must show beyond all reasonable doubt that she was unwilling to have sex and that she
did not enjoy it. But the 'telling' of a rape story may reveal ambiguities which fail to meet
the legal criteria of non-consent. At the same time, a rape trial reaffirms a phallocentric
view of sex (natural male sexual need and female sexual capriciousness) which disqualifies
women's experience of sexual assault.19 Adler (1987) also points to the way in which
women can be found 'guilty of consent' in rape trials. She shows how a woman's experience
of sexual assault is denied and invalidated and her lack of consent is rendered immaterial
in the trial by the use of 'common sense' notions of male and female sexuality.20
Theoretical work from feminist writers in the area of child sexual abuse began to be
published in the early 1980's, for example Rush (1980), Nelson (1982), Russell (1986) and
Driver and Droisen (1989). Personal accounts from incest survivors also began to appear,
for example, Ward (1984) and Spring (1987). Where this literature refers specifically to
young victims, it tends to do so in terms which raise awareness of the numbers of children
who experience sexual abuse, and about the social and emotional harms of the experience,
and the need for children to be protected from such harms. Where the issue of consent to
sex with regard to young girls has been given some attention is in relation to child sexual
abuse within the family. Here, the question of consent is addressed from a social work
protectionist/welfarist perspective that is concerned with the exploitation of the child.
Underlying such views is the notion that sex between adults and children is inherently
harmful in itself. Children require protection from harm due to their immaturity and
ignorance, but also they require protection from the perversity of premature carnal
indoctrination. Emily Driver (1989), for example, maintains that absence of consent is
18 Smart, C. (1989) Feminism and the Power ofLaw chapter two
19 ibid, p.35
20 Adler, Z. (1987) Rape on Trial plO-11
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crucial to the definition and understanding of child sexual abuse because it allows a clear
stand to be taken on the exploitation of the child. Thus she is in favour of a general, blanket
lack of consent, rather than a situation in which consent is negotiated on each individual
occasion. This mirrors in many ways the legal position as it is represented in age of
consent law. For Driver (1989), lack of consent stems from the child's relative ignorance of
the implications of adult sexuality and from absence of any real choice in a relationship
where children are forced to rely on adults for their well-being.21 This absence of choice
arises because children lack the knowledge and the freedom to give or refuse their consent
independently. David Finkelhor (1979) takes a similar stance, positing that a main
argument against sexual relations between adults and children is that "the fundamental
conditions of consent cannot prevail in the relationship"22 precisely because children are of unequal
status to adults.
Recent years have also seen the emergence of writings on the investigation of child sexual
abuse from the perspective of multi-agency investigative practice where there has been
increased attention on the ability of young people to recall and describe events (Conroy,
Fielding & Tunstill (1990), Waterhouse & Carnie (1990), and Burman & Lloyd (1993).
There has also been a growing body of work on the evidence of children from the
perspective of prosecutorial practice, such as that by Murray & Gough (1991), and Dent &
Flin (1992) which is concerned with the testimony of children in criminal trials and the
competency of the child witness in the court room.
Contribution of Thesis
This thesis makes an original contribution to the body of feminist work that is concerned
with the way that female victims of sexual assault are treated by the law and in the criminal
justice system. This study is in effect a study of the social construction of sexuality, and
specifically about the ways in which the sexuality of girls and young women is construed
and spoken about in court room discourse. Thus it also makes a contribution to the corpus
of writings on the sexuality of girls and young women. The thesis documents the ways in
-' Driver, E and Droisen, A. (eds) (1989) Child Sexual Abuse : Feminist Perspectives p4
22 Finkelhor, D. (1979) 'What's Wrong with Sex between Adults and Children?' American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry vol 49, 4
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which ideas about female sexuality get produced and reproduced in the legal system, It is
about the ways in which assumptions, myths, images and stereotypes of female sexuality
inform court room rhetoric about patterns of sexual behaviour and sexual morality and, in
particular, about the ways in which these presumptions and myths are used to sustain the
idea of appropriate behaviour by young women and girls.
Research Methods
The Field Work
This section briefly sets out the two research methods utilised in the collection of data for
this thesis. Full details of the research data and findings are contained in Chapter Five. The
first, and main method, involved in-court observation of sexual offence and incest cases
which involved young female complainers under the age of 17 years. Observation of a total
of 92 cases was carried out in Sheriff and High courts across Scotland during 1988 to 1990.
Although sexual offence trials are open to the public, the court is cleared when the
complainer takes the witness stand. Permission was obtained from the court authorities to
attend cases and remain in court during the complainers evidence. Permission was also
sought to remain in court in each individual case from the complainer via the prosecution.
Detailed notes of the proceedings were taken throughout the trial, and as far as possible the
proceedings were recorded verbatim. The notes were transcribed and then coded and
analysed using the Ethnograph computer software package which is designed to assist
analysis of qualitative data.
The Interviews
During my time in the courts, I had many opportunities to speak to those who work in the
courts. Whilst attending trials, it was often possible to have informal conversations with
court officials, defence lawyers, procurator fiscals23, advocate deputes24 and defence
advocates, either after the trial or during periods of recess. Thus it was often possible that
any queries I had regarding court procedure, or any specific or general legal detail could be
answered by them there and then. But in order to learn more of their attitudes and
23 Procurator fiscals are qualified solicitors employed as Crown servants who prosecute on
behalf of the Crown
24 Advocate deputes are practising advocates who examine all cases reported to Crown Office
with a view to solemn proceedings and who prosecute cases in the High Court
13
perspectives and hence more of what informed their practice in sexual offence trials
involving young complainers, I wanted the opportunity to speak to them in a more focused
way, particularly about some of the research findings which had arisen from the period of
court observation. A sample of 33 legal practitioners (judges, sheriffs, defence advocates,
advocate deputes, fiscals and defence lawyers) who had experience of sexual offence trials
had been drawn and had agreed to be interviewed as part of the Scottish Office funded
research. It is important to state that the interview questions for that research did not focus
on young complainers in any way. I conducted 28 of those semi-structured interviews, and,
with the agreement of the other members of the research team, I included in the interview
schedule some questions specifically designed to explore issues relating to young female
complainers. This series of interviews comprise the second research method employed.
Document Analysis
The research included scrutiny of nineteenth century law reports, and contemporary legal
texts. It also included the scrutiny of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 and
associated legal commentaries of the time, and the more recent s.36 of the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provision) (Scotland) Act 1985 as well as the Parliamentary debates and
the consultation documents of the Scottish Law Commission which accompanied its
passing.
Summary of Chapter Contents
Chapter One focuses on the question of consent to sexual relations and the way that it is
posed in Scots law in relation to young people. It describes the status of young people in
terms of their capacity to consent and explores the rationales for non-consent which inform
thinking in this area. The chapter also includes an historical account of the nineteenth
century statutory sexual offence legislation governing sexual behaviour of young people.
Chapter Two provides a brief outline of the sexual crimes and offences that formed the
basis of the research, that is, those sexual offences covered by the legislation and those
incest offences which were included - and notes some characteristics of the law in relation
to these offences .
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Chapter Three describes some of the principles of advocacy and some general legal and
procedural features of the Scottish adversarial system, with a particular emphasis on the
rules of evidence. It focuses on the link between the exercise of due process in the criminal
court room and the use and function of evidence in criminal trials. It thus provides a
context for the empirical research findings .
Chapter Four traces the developments that led to the 'shield' legislation, and examines the
problems of sexual history and sexual character evidence that the 'shield' legislation
intended to address as a means of introduction to the possible problems that may be
encountered in sexual offence cases involving young complainers.
Chapter Five sets out the main characteristics of the sexual offence cases that formed the
research data and details of all cases, with charges, verdict and sentence.
Chapter Six reports the results of the observation of contested trials. It focuses on the
processes by which sexual character is ascribed to the young complainer, and in particular,
the way that this is done in the trial through the evocation of images and stereotypes of
female sexuality.
Chapter Seven also contains research findings, but is primarily concerned with the
construction of the consenting young complainer, and specifically with the way in which
the issue of consent is used in relation to key evidential issues in the trial.
Chapter Eight draws on research data from contested trials and from guilty plea cases and
also from interviews with legal practitioners to provide an analysis of the pleas in
mitigation in sexual offences trials involving young complainers which were given in order
to obtain a lesser sentence.
Chapter Nine summarises the research study, draws together the main research questions
and looks at some of the implications of the focus on female sexuality and the use of sexual
evidence.
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Appendix I consists of details of each observed case and supplies details concerning the
court at which the case was heard, the age of the complainer, the charges, verdict and
sentence.




AGE AND NON-CONSENT : LAW S TWO RATIONALES
This chapter focuses primarily on the questions of consent and non-consent to sexual
relations and the way they are posed in Scots law in relation to girls and young women. In
the case of girls below a certain age, non-consent to sex is a matter of law rather than a
matter of fact. An examination of consent and non-consent as it relates to young women and
girls is an important place to begin any consideration of the construction of young female
sexuality in the court room. This is because consent either explicitly or implicitly constitutes
one of the main fulcrums around which much of the legal argument in the trial takes place.
The complainer's age in relation to the age of consent is a defining factor in the way in which
an alleged offence is defined and hence argued in the trial. (Non) consent is often a key
evidential issue, yet as will be argued later in this thesis, the focus on consent is somewhat
paradoxical in trials involving young complainers. Furthermore, in the court room ideas and
conceptions about childhood and appropriate sexual behaviour tend to cohere around the
issue of consent.
The first part of the chapter introduces the two rationales which underlie and inform thinking
in relation to consent and young people. The rest of the chapter explores these underlying
rationales in more detail, by focusing first on the law in relation to the competency of young
people in legal matters, and second by focusing on the social and political developments of
the last century which presaged changes to the status of girls and young women in relation to
their consent, and which led ultimately to the raising of the female 'age of consent'. The 19th
century is where the current statutory provisions regarding sexual offences had their genesis,
and many of the present laws regulating sex with girls and young women were framed
during this time, in a social and moral climate quite different from that which prevails today.
Consent and Non-Consent
Consent is a major factor in sexual offences, although it is most usually associated with the
crime of rape where it is bound up with the definition of the crime. Although the meaning of
the term remains "unexploredby the courts"1 a minimum condition of consent in sexual matters is
that the person concerned must understand the nature of the act that has been committed
upon them. Legal writers2 also point out that this entails understanding not only the overt
1 Gane, C. (1992) Sexual Offences
2 ibid.
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physical act, but also having an understanding of the wider context of the act, which goes
beyond the physiological dimension. What is required is a full appreciation of its implications
as a sexual act.
In order to be valid, consent must be freely given. That is, it must be given in the absence of
fear or threats. To properly consent, one must have what amounts to a free, informed and
unconstrained choice in the matter. Being forced to consent out of fear or harassment is not
the same as having a free and informed choice. Neither is simply allowing intercourse to
take place as the woman may allow intercourse out of fear, or may be unable to resist.
In sexual offence trials, the issue of consent is treated in court as a question of fact - did she
consent or did she not consent ? Consent is a crucial factor in rape trials - the prevailing
definition of which is genital penetration of a woman by a man against the woman's will.
Consent to sex on the part of the complainer is an absolute defence to a charge of rape; where
it is proved that sex between the complainer and the accused was consensual, the accused is
deemed innocent of the charge and acquitted. The verdict of guilt or innocence often rests on
the proving of non-consent, hence consent is often the most crucial deciding factor, and one
that lies at the heart of the trial. Because of this, a claim by the complainer that sex took
place in the absence of her consent is often the one aspect of her testimony that is most
vociferously challenged by the defence during the trial. Non-consent is a necessary
(although, on its own, not a sufficient) condition for a conviction on a charge of rape, and in
a rape trial, it must be shown that sexual intercourse took place without the woman's
consent. It is important to note that there is no onus on the accused to prove consent on the
part of the woman. Rather, in the trial the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the woman
did not consent.3
Yet there are some categories of victim who are deemed incapable of giving a true consent to
sex, either because of their status, or their state of consciousness at the time that the sex
occurred. These categories include those who are drugged or intoxicated - if one is
unconscious one does not have a will ; those who are restrained or rendered incapable; the
mentally handicapped and the mentally ill - who lack the mental capacity to consent; and
children under the age of puberty who are precluded from having a consent because of their
young age. In all of these circumstances, any apparent consent that they may give will not
count as proper consent, freely given.
3 A relatively recent ruling (1982) validated that an accused who at the time of sexual intercourse reasonably
or merely honestly believes that the woman consents cannot be convicted of rape, even though the woman did
not consent in fact, Meek v HMA 1982 SCCR 613
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In the deliberations leading up to the passage of the Scottish 'shield' legislation consent was
posed as a problematic, yet key, issue in relation to the use of sexual evidence. Whilst the
reformers specifically wanted to prohibit any suggestion that because a complainer had sex
with A or B she would 'automatically' consent with C, they were also of the view that the
question of consent may sometimes be a relevant issue justifying the admission of sexual
evidence. In particular, they conceptualised recent sexual relations between the complainer
and the accused as relevant to consent; and sexual relations with someone other than the
accused as sometimes relevant to a defence of 'mistaken belief in consent'. The situations and
circumstances where the reformers envisaged that consent may be relevant were all concerned
with the crime of rape involving adult complainers. There was no discussion of consent in
relation to young complainers. One 'obvious' reason for this may be that, because young
girls are under the 'age of consent' then such discussion would be redundant. But the
absence of any discussion concerning young complainers and consent still appears somewhat
odd, given the inclusion of those sexual offences which specifically involve young
complainers within the remit of the legislation.
Young People And Their Consent In Sexual Matters
In law, the question of consent to sex is differentially applied on the basis of age, and hence
young people hold a different status to that held by adults in relation to their ability to give
full and informed consent to sex.4 In Scots law, young people are considered not to have a
proper consent in relation to sexual matters. This lack of consent stems from two distinct
bases. One, a basic legal incapacity due to young age, is found in the common law. This can
be termed the impossibility of consent. The second basis, found mainly in statutory law, can
be called the irrelevancy of consent, and springs from a welfarist doctrine of child
protection. Both rationales render consent by young people invalid. Although offering what
can be seen as largely contrasting perspectives on young people's lack of consent in sexual
matters, the two rationales appear to have some points of convergence, most notably in
relation to the underlying set of reasons which inform them, and also in relation to the
perceptions of childhood knowledge and understanding and childhood sexuality which
underpin them. However, these points of convergence may well be illusory, a result of
looking at the rationales through opaque modern glasses which may serve to blur any
inherent tensions and contradictions which may exist between them, or simply the will to
rationalise law as it currently exists. The possibility that modern accounts tend to align the
4 Other categories of people who do not have a true consent in relation to sexual matters are the mentally ill
and thementally handicapped, and those who have been drugged or intoxicated.
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two rationales, suturing them together rather than acknowledging any ambivalences and
points of difference will be explored throughout this chapter.
The Impossibility of Consent
The first and most fundamental basis of non-consent, impossibility due to young age, rests
on the doctrine of non-competence. This is a much older strand of non-consent than that of
irrelevancy, and hence is found mainly in common law. Non-competency due to age covers
far more than sexual matters, and is not simply confined to sexual consent. The achievement
of competence in a wide range of legal matters is directly linked to the attainment by a child
or young person of a specific age. In a general sense, the legal status of children and young
people in Scotland can best be understood in terms of a developing series of age-related steps
or cut-off points which mark the transition of the child through various stages, each one
bringing with it more legal rights and responsibilities, and allowing the child different
degrees of competency and capacity in the eyes of the law.
Nor is competency in legal matters a concept that is found only in relation to criminal law.
Indeed it is in other areas of law that the child's transition through degrees of competency is
most noticeable. For example, in Scots civil law prior to 1991 there was a core distinction
made between two main categories of young persons. These were 'pupils' (girls under 12
years old and boys under 14 years old) and 'minors' (girls between 12 years and 18 years,
and boys between 14 years and 18 years). "Pupils' had no capacity to undertake any legally
binding acts, such as making a will or entering into any contracts; however, they could be
passive holders of, for example, property rights.5 'Minors' did have an active legal capacity
but required the consent of a parent or guardian to enter into any legally binding acts. As
from 1991, young people have to have attained the age of 16 years before they can enter
into a legal contract (although there are some exceptions to this, such as giving consent to
medical treatment, and consent to adoption).6
Under common law, children under the age of puberty (i.e. boys under 14 and girls under 12
years) are considered not competent to consent to sex. The common law 'age of consent' has
its origins in Roman law under which young people (of both sexes) were considered to be
the 'property' of their parents until they reached the age of 25 years, during which time they
could be 'sold off' into marriage. The Romans recognised puberty as an age in which young
people could become sexually active (and reproductive). Puberty was also the age at which
5 Clive, E. (1987) 'Children's Rights in the Scottish Civil Law' in Murray, K., & Wilkinson, J.E.,
Children's Rights in a Scottish Context National Children's Bureau, Scottish Group
6 These changes to the civil law were implemented by the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 which
also abolished the usage of the concepts of pupillarity andminority
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young people could legally marry. Girls were seen to physically 'mature' earlier than boys7 -
and hence the age differential. Puberty then was the age at which young people gained the
competency to consent to sex in Roman law. The Roman 'ages of puberty' have survived
into contemporary Scots law, although the principles behind them have been somewhat
eroded. Currently, it is not the parental property aspect which is the central concern in terms
of a young person's consent to sex, rather it is because their consent is considered to be not
fully or properly informed due to their young age. In a way then the older rationale for non-
consent has been given a cognitive basis. In other words, a child under the age of puberty is
deemed not to have sufficient maturity or understanding to consent to sex. Children are seen
to lack the knowledge and experience to make a properly informed decision about the subject.
This rationale is thus often presented as one of protecting those who are physically or
psychologically immature from premature sexual experience. In many ways, this signals a
fundamental shift from the property concerns articulated in Roman law towards a more
contemporary concern with the protection of the child (and arguably indicates an influence
from the welfarist concerns originating in the 19th century). Thus currently, even where a
child under the age of puberty consents to sexual relations 'in fact', this is ignored in law,
precisely because of the child's young age.8
As stated earlier in this chapter, legal writers also point out that consent in sexual matters is
conditional upon the person concerned having a full understanding of the nature of the act
that is committed upon them. What is required is a full appreciation of its implications as a
sexual act. It is presumed that children lack this depth of fuller understanding because of their
age and immaturity. Here the emphasis is on having a psychological or cognitive
understanding of the meaning of the sexual act and the implications of the sexual act. There
is a second set of related considerations implicit here, which relate to the validity of a child's
'consent.' Is consent really freely and independently given by the child ? Children may be
easily influenced by adults to take part in sexual relations, perhaps because of a habit of
obedience, or, to take Driver's (1989) point, because they are reliant upon adults for their
well-being, or because 'they do not know any better' and for each or all of these reasons,
their 'consent' to the sex is therefore legally ignored.9
To sum up, puberty brings with it a recognition, in the eyes of the law, of the capacity to
consent in sexual matters and it thus becomes possible for a young person who has reached
the age of puberty to consent to sex. To reiterate, girls obtain this capacity two years earlier
7 And possibly constituted an earlier profit in the marriage market as they could be sold off at a younger age
8 Gane, C. (1992) Sexual Offences
9 Driver, E. (1989) 'Introduction' in Driver, E. & Droisen, A. (eds.) Child Sexual Abuse p.4
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than boys, that is at 12 years as opposed to 14 years (although it should be noted that this
applies only to heterosexual and not to homosexual relations). However, although girls
achieve this capacity to consent to sex at age 12, statutory intervention in the last century10
rendered post-pubescent girls' capacity to consent to sex irrelevant until they reach 16 years.
Here we see the two rationales meeting up. In effect the common law prohibition on sex with
girls under the age of puberty was extended to older girls (between 12 and 16 years), and the
question of post-pubescent girls to consent to sex was fundamentally and significantly altered
by the passing of legislation. Whether the two rationales sit well together is another question
which will be pursued later in this chapter.
The logic of incapacity can also be seen in terms of committing sexual offences. In terms of
perpetration, children also become responsible for criminal acts when they reach a certain
age. By s.70 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, the minimum age of criminal
responsibility in Scotland is 8 years (for both males and females). This is two years younger
than the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales. Interestingly in Scotland, unlike
England and Wales1 \ there has never been any age under which male sexual potency is
presumed impossible, so it is entirely feasible that a boy who has reached the age of criminal
responsibility (that is, 8 years) can commit the crime of rape.12 Hence, a male (of any age,
as there is no presumption, as there is in English law, that a boy below the age of 14 years
cannot achieve penetration) who has sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 12 years
commits the crime of rape (he also commits the overlapping statutory offence of 'unlawful
sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 years').13 This is so because of the fact that girls
under the age of puberty are seen to be legally not competent to consent, nor of having a
properwill in the matter at all.
The doctrine of competence also underpins the giving of evidence in testimony. Scots law,
in many ways, is viewed as somewhat less restrictive than the law of England and Wales in
terms of the legal rights and responsibilities of children and young people, particularly in
regard to their competence to give evidence in criminal trials. The rules on children as
10 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885
11 Until recently, in England and Wales, this was 14 years. However the Sexual Offences Act 1993 lowered
the age to 10 years.
12 However, it is relatively rare for a child to be prosecuted for a crime in Scodand because s.31 of the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 forbids the prosecution of any child under 16 years without the Lord Advocate's
permission, which is generally refused unless the offence is particularly serious. Most crimes and offences
committed by children are dealt with by the Children's Hearing System, a legal structure for dealing with
cases where children have offended or been offended against, which was brought into effect by the passing of
the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.
13 Although in practice this charge appears to be brought only when the girl is over 12 years and under 13
years.
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witnesses cannot be seen in isolation from the general system of criminal procedure, and
differences in the history of the Scottish legal system have produced a markedly different
system of criminal procedure from that of England and Wales. Developments in Scots law
since the 19th century, in particular, have contributed to what could be described as a 'liberal'
Scots attitude towards the competency of children.14
Unlike the position in most other countries, where children below a certain age - usually 7 or
8 years - are not permitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings, in Scotland there is
currently no such restrictions. Up until the 19th century, Scots law did, however, view the
competency of the child witness somewhat more restrictively. Before then, it was a
comparatively rare event for children to give evidence in criminal trials. This was primarily
due to two prevailing rules. First, all witnesses in a criminal trial were bound to give
evidence on oath, and, because all 'pupils' were forbidden to take oaths,15 girls under 12
years and boys under 14 years were effectively disqualified. The second rule declared that
children were incompetent as witnesses in proceedings for which their parents were
involved.16 There was yet another archaic and restrictive rule, however, which treated as
incompetent the evidence from any female witness, young or old, in a Scots court of law.17
The modern Scottish rules on children's evidence are primarily based on common (or case)
law, rather than on statutory legislation, as is the case in England and Wales. During the
1700's a series of cases took place18 where the court decided to hear the unsworn evidence
of young children (or 'pupils'), and, thereafter it became possible for children to give
evidence in Scottish courts without taking the oath. In the mid 19th century, by means of the
Evidence (Scotland) Act 1840, the rule disqualifying children from testifying against their
parents was abolished. However, the Scottish courts never placed exaggerated value on
evidence preceded by oath, and, by and large, Scottish courts over the years have taken a
rather pragmatic view of the competency of the evidence of child witnesses, as the following
quote by the institutional writer Dickson writing in the 18th century suggests :
"... in criminal cases, where the facts are usually simple, and justice requires a
full investigation , children, however young, may be examined on facts within
their comprehension, although they may not be old enough to understand the
nature of an oath. Under this rule, children of 4 and 5, 6, and 7 years of age have
14 See for example, Dent, H. & Flin, R. (1992) Children as Witnesses
15 Stair (1693) Institutions of the Law of Scotland (DM Walker ed. ) b.4 tit.43 sect.7
15 ibid, b.4 tit.42
17 ibid, b.4 tit.43 sect 9
18 See Hume's Commentaries vol.2 (1844 edition)
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been admitted; and it is the daily practice to examine witnesses who are still in
pupillarity."10
Currently in Scotland, all persons who are capable of making themselves intelligible to the
court are competent as witnesses.20 Those who have a sufficient understanding of the nature
of an oath, are required to take the oath; and for those who do not have a sufficient
understanding, the requirement of an oath is dispensed with. There is a competency
requirement in that a child will not be accepted as a witness, even unsworn, unless he or she
is able to demonstrate a sufficient understanding of the truth, and is able to give an
intelligible account of what happened. Provided that the child demonstrates sufficient
understanding of the truth to enable him or her to give evidence, then that evidence will be
admitted. It is amatter for the presiding judge or sheriff whether the competency requirement
is satisfied. He or she decides by a preliminary questioning of the child whether that child has
the capacity to give an account of what happened, and a sufficient grasp of the truth to enable
him or her to give evidence. There are no set or prescribed questions to determine a child's
ability, rather it is a case of free judicial discretion as to the content and form of questioning
that takes place. From court room observation of such cases in this study, it was found that
such questioning was often very brief, consisting of just one or two questions. It was also
evident that judges and sheriffs employed a variety of questions to ascertain whether a child
was competent, ranging from the rather cursory "do you understand what is meant by speaking the
truth?" and "do you know the difference between telling the truth and telling lies?" to the far more
inventive (but possibly confusing for the child) method of constructing little scenarios to test
whether the child recognises the difference between the truth and lying, such as "when you do
something naughty at school, and the teacher asks you whether you did it and you say that you didn't, is that
right or is that wrong ?" .
Some current Scots textbooks on evidence suggest that there is a (rebuttable) presumption
against a young child being competent to give evidence21 but the Scottish Law Commission
in a Discussion Paper in 1988 stated;
"... nowadays many judges tend to approach the question of competency from the
other end... [by assuming] that a child is primafacie a competent witness but
may, upon a preliminary conversation with the child, reach the conclusion that
the child is either incapable of giving intelligible evidence or is not yet able to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and so is unable to tell the
truth."22
10 Dickson on Evidence (3rd edition) edited by PJ Hamilton Grierson 1887 p.852
20 This includes the mentally handicapped
21 See, for example, Walker, A.G. & Walker N.M. (1964) The Law ofEvidence in Scotland
22 Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 75 para. 2.3
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The current practice in the Scottish courts is that children of both sexes over the age of 14
years take the oath, whilst children under 12 years give evidence unsworn. It is a matter for
judicial discretion as to whether children between the ages of 12 and 14 years give evidence
sworn or unsworn, depending on their level of understanding23 which again is usually tested
by means of preliminary questioning. There is no arbitrary age laid down by the courts below
which a child is not permitted to give evidence, and children as young as two and three years
old have testified in criminal trials.
Theoretically, once admitted, the evidence of a child ranks equally with that of an adult.
There is no legal obligation on the presiding judge or sheriff to issue any special warning to
the jury as to any supposed difficulty in accepting evidence from children24 and it is therefore
amatter for the jury to decide whether they believe the child's evidence or not. In general,
the Scots rules on admitting evidence from children appear, on the whole, to have given rise
to relatively little criticism or public debate.
It can be seen that the doctrine of non-competence underpins the position of children in
relation to their legal capacity to take oaths and give evidence in court. Similarly, this doctrine
lies behind young people's non-consent to sexual matters. Both stem from the common law
wherein young people progressively gain legal competency in a wide range of matters,
whether that is the capacity to enter into a contract, marry, retain property or consent to sex,
as they grow older.
The Irrelevancy of Consent
The second basis on which consent is rendered invalid has arisen out of legislative
intervention, which has been largely policy-related. Over the years, this has resulted in the
creation of a number of statutory sexual offences. In the 19th century a whole new
conception of the non-consent of young people was introduced and soldered on to the
existing common law rationale of incapacity by means of a major piece of reforming
legislation. Introduced at the end of the last century, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of
1885 heralded the beginning of a complex and intricate approach to the problematisation and
criminalisation of sex between children and adults on the one hand, and to the issue of
consent on the other. In effect the 1885 legislation raised the age of consent to sex for girls
from 12 years (the age of puberty) to 16 years.
23 Spencer, J.R & Flin, R. The Evidence ofChildren : The Law and the Psychology (1990)
24 Sheriff Kearney, The Evidence ofChildren - The Scottish Dimension (1989)
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In the following section, I consider some of the social and institutional developments of the
mid-late 19th century and, by so doing, trace the main concerns that contextualised the
statutory intervention which effected the raising of the age of female consent and criminalised
sex with post-pubertal girls. Neither the impetus for, nor the implementation of the 1885 Act
was imposed by the state alone. Both the formulation and the deployment of the Act entailed
a complex interaction between social, institutional and political ideological imperatives of the
latter part of the 19th century.25
The 19th Century andMoral Crusading
The provisions of the 1885 Act which raised the age of consent stemmed directly from a
number of social and moral concerns, articulated throughout the second half of the 19th
century, which centred on the protection of (mainly working-class) young girls from the
sexual advances of (mainly upper class) older men. Smart (1989) describes these concerns
as constituting a moral panic about the threat to young girls, which could not only harm
young girls but also threatened the contentment of family and social life.26
Although it has been argued that it is impossible to generalise over Victorian attitudes to sex
over the period as a whole, and several writers have challenged the assumption of a unitary
Victorian sexual culture and a single repressive standard of sexual behaviour,27 in many
ways, the Victorian era was characterised by intensive moral crusading around issues of sex
and sexuality. Overtly, there was an emphasis on sin and decorum, and the exclusive
promotion of reproductive adult marital sexuality rigidly confined within the private sphere of
the family. Divorce was considered scandalous, prostitution involving young girls and
juvenile masturbation by young boys demanded immediate eradication, and there was a rigid
differentiation between male and female sexuality. The double standards of Victorian sexual
politics have been well-documented, however, and it is not proposed to reiterate those
arguments in any detail here. The 19th century constructs of sex and sexuality were
articulated through a powerful moral discourse which in many ways has come to signify this
historical period. Foucault (1981) argues that by the middle of the 19th century throughout
Europe sexual matters had become characterised as much more than sporadic activities to be
condemned or tolerated, but rather sex had become something which needed to be regulated
or managed for the 'good of all'.28 For this reason, Foucault distinguishes the Victorian
25 The 1885 Act also outlawed homosexual acts between consenting male adults, and sanctioned stricter
surveillance and control of places where prostitution took place
26 Smart, C. (1989) Feminism and the Power ofLaw p.52
27 See for example, Hyam, R. (1992) Empire and Sexuality : The British Experience; Pearsall, R. (1969)
The Worm in the Bud
28 Foucault, M. (1981) The History of Sexuality
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period from that of other historical periods that preceded it, as a time where sex and sexuality
were made a focus of scientific concern, a time of the emergence of "a science of sexuality",
which in turn precipitated an "obsessive preoccupation with and codification of sex".29 A main feature
of the Victorian sexual-scientific codification was its particular focus on that which was
considered to be dangerous. The sexuality of children, and young girls in particular, was
perceived as one such source posing physical and moral danger, and which required
regulation and control.
Simultaneously, during the 19th century there was what Walkowitz (1982) termed a "new
enthusiasm" for state intervention into the lives of the poor and "unrespectable" lower classes.30
This intervention stemmed from social concerns, such as housing conditions, and was not
directed solely at concerns of a sexual nature. During this period, groups bent on moral
reform, raised concerns over the levels of extra-marital pregnancy, the dangers of juvenile
masturbation, and the evils of prostitution and demanded legislative redress.
As a result of such campaigns, the mid-late 19th century was a time characterised by a
proliferation of policy-directed legislation, and a number of statutes were passed which
addressed what were perceived to be pressing social problems. By so doing, prevailing
sexual and social ideology became embedded in subsequent laws and social policy. It was
mainly in the latter half of the 19th century that a new concept and state of childhood was
formally acknowledged in law. Moral reformers were particularly concerned with protecting
the sanctity of childhood, and mounted a systematic campaign aimed at rooting out practices
(predominantly associated with lower class areas and families) that were considered
injurious (either potentially or directly) to children (and hence to the future population at
large). The demands for increased legislative protection for children by the moral reformers
of the time interlocked with their accusations of negligent parenting practices amongst the
lower classes and the unrespectable poor.31 The perspective of moral reformers and social
purity groups that emerged throughout the 19th century was underpinned by a particular
ideology which placed trust in the possibility of the reelaiinability of those who had morally
fallen. However, distinctions emerged between those who were deemed to be deserving and
undeserving poor, and only the former group were viewed as potentially reclaimable. As far
as the reformers were concerned, poor working class parents in particular regularly
jeopardised and often violated the interests of their children in a multitude of ways. For
example, this was considered to occur due to lack of (sexual) discretion between adults in
29 ibid.
30 Walkowitz, J. (1982) Prostitution and Victorian Society Introduction
31 ibid, chapter two
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cramped and overcrowded households, and their perceived lack of interest in preventing early
sexual experimentation between young children, but also through the child's general
association with adults who were considered to be 'bad' role models. There was a concern
that not only did parental behaviour and social conditions combine to jeopardise childhood
innocence, but also these same factors contributed to the premature emergence of nascent
sexuality in children and young people. Middle class reformers found working class laxity at
extreme odds with their own conceptions of sexual morality, and strongly and vociferously
agitated for more repressive restrictions designed to safeguard childhood innocence,
particularly in relation to young girls. Gorham (1978), for example argues with respect to
those advocating moral reform that
"[w]hereas their own daughters were ... both protected and controlled, in the eyes
of the reformers poor girls of the same age experienced neither the benefits of
protection nor the constrictions of control." 32
However, the middle class vision of unsullied childhood was just not present in lower class
families. Hence, the reformist quest was the construction and imposition of a particular
construction of childhood (of which more later in this chapter). Few children actually
measured up to the imposed standards of innocence and purity and were hence seen as
requiring protection, which in turn, justified increasing social and legislative interventions.
This was also a time of the emergence of some public concern about intra-familial incest,
although there was at first a reluctance to legally acknowledge the incestuous threat within the
Victorian family.33 This reluctance was in part due to the difficulties in policing the private
sphere, although doubts were expressed about the potentially deleterious impact of
widespread public discourses on such sensitive matters.34 Debate in Britain concerning the
extent to which allegations of inter-familial incest were true or false had been stimulated by
the publication in 1857 of a study by a professor of forensic medicine at the University of
Paris.35 There followed a preoccupation with the temptations and practising of incest, and
lower class families in rural areas and urban quarters in particular were suspected of
"dubious proximity, a history of debauchery, anti-social primitiveness, or
degenerescence - of practising incest." (Foucault 1981:pl29)
3 2 Gorham, D (1978) 'A "maiden tribute ofmodem Babylon" re-examined : child prostitution and the idea of
childhood in late Victorian England' Victorian Studies 21, 3, Spring, p374
33 Evans, D. (1994) Falling Angels? - the material construction of children as sexual citizens' The
International Journal ofChildren's Rights 2: 1-33
54 O'Donovan, K. (1985) Sexual Divisions in Law pi02-104
55 Tardieu, Ambroise (who was also the Dean of the Medical School at the University of Paris)
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Despite raised concerns there was some resistance to the introduction of legislation which
specifically dealt with sexual abuse within the family, largely stemming from an insistence
that such acts did not occur. Although the basic principle that young girls should be protected
from sex was set by the 1885 Act, the legislative response to 'the problem of incest' did not
occur until over two decades later in 1908.36
Nonetheless, the general protection of children and young people became ever increasingly
the focus of state interventionism and public policy formulation. The policies underlying the
protection of children - not just from the dangers of sexual abuse within the family but also
from parental neglect and 'bad association' - had as a main objective the withdrawal of
children from families that were suspected of practices that (physically, morally or
psychologically) endangered children. For example, the Infant Felony Act 1840 established
the right of the courts to remove children, if it was considered to be in their interest, from the
custody of parents who had been found guilty of felonies; similarly, the Industrial Schools
Amendment Act of 1880 enabled courts to remove children shown to be living with depraved
or disorderly persons and to place them in industrial schools. A series of Poor Law statutes
strengthened the courts' powers to monitor and curtail parental authority.37
The "Protean Problem " ofProstitution
Additionally there was increased official concern over what was described as the "protean
problem of prostitution" which had visibly increased quite considerably during the 19th
century, particularly in garrison towns and ports, and in cities such as London where it was
estimated that there were more brothels than schools or charities.38 Prostitution was seen to
pose a particular threat as a form of dangerous sexuality undermining the social fabric and,
sustained by a social ideology which held the 'common prostitute' to be the literal and
figurative "conduit of infection to respectable society", prostitutes became a focus of social fears.
The social problem of prostitution became an increasingly lively public issue which led
eventually to the passing of a series of statutes, the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866
and 186939 which were designed to control and contain prostitution.40
3 6 This came with the Punishment of Incest Act in 1908
37 The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1889 vested parental rights in guardians where the child was deserted or
offended against or where parent was in prison; the Poor Law Amendment At of 1899 allowed for testing of
parental fitness.
38 Hyam, R. (1992) Empire and Sexuality : The British Experience p.60
39 The Contagious Diseases Act was first passed in 1864, and then modified in the subsequent statutes of
1866 and 1869. The ostensible aim of these Acts was to curtail the spread of venereal disease amongst enlisted
men in garrison towns and ports largely in the south of England and Ireland. For a full discussion of these
Acts, the public controversy that surrounded them, and the successful feminist campaign to repeal them, see
Walkowitz, J. (1982) Prostitution and Victorian Society
40 It is perhaps interesting to note that social purity groups were against this legislation, largely because the
Acts did not abolish prostitution, but presumed its continuing existence.
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The late 19th century was also a time of heightened moral concern over child prostitution.
The sexual abuse and exploitation of children - in particular young girls - emerged almost as
a side issue of the public campaign against prostitution. But it quickly gained prominence as a
widespread problem and gained momentum as a public issue. The social purity campaigners
focused on youthful sexuality as a form of dangerous sexuality to be controlled and
repressed, and in a sense, this particular preoccupation almost eclipsed that with older
women prostitutes. In 1835 the London Society for the Protection of Young Girls was
founded out of a concern that young girls were being lured into brothels by unscrupulous
procurers and brothel-keepers at a young and impressionable age. Towards the end of the
century, a newly-formed purity group emerged, the National Vigilance Association (NVA)
and joined the swelling ranks of social purity campaigners. Around this time a somewhat
odd alliance was formed between several charities, journalists and politicians and this
extremely vocal group began to agitate for the female age of consent to be raised, as a
counter-measure against the rising numbers of girls and young women who were perceived
to be entering prostitution, working on the street and in brothels. Underlying this was the aim
of criminalising those men who 'took advantage' of girls who, due to their young age, were
not "considered responsible for the disposal of their own person."41 The National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) also began agitating for the age of consent to be
raised.
Social purity campaigners also drew attention to the reputed 'white slave' trading of young
girls from Britain into prostitution on the Continent. The uncovering of a traffic in young
women from Britain to licensed brothels in Belgium was constructed into a sensational
scandal of young innocents being lured into prostitution by false entrapment.42 In 1881 the
House of Lords Select Committee on the Protection of Women and Girls was set up to
inquire into the state of the law relating to the protection of young girls from "artifices to induce
them to lead a corrupt life".43 Over the summer of 1881 the Committee, chaired by Earl Cairns,
heard many accounts from lawyers, magistrates and police officers of young women who
had been kidnapped or decoyed under false promises of marriage or 'respectable'
employment to the Low Countries and then forced into working in brothels. Several
witnesses gave accounts of female placeurs who sought "not common prostitutes but girls who
41 Parliamentary Debates Third Series 1884-1885 vol VII [297] 943
42Walkowitz's detailed research however debunks the conception of large numbers of sexually inexperienced
women being lured under false pretences to overseas brothels. (1982) Prostitution and Victorian Society
43 Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords to inquire into the state of the law relating to the
Protection of Young Girls from artifices to induce them to lead a corrupt life, and into the means of amending
the same (1881) (448) IX. 335
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were not leading immoral lives"44 and lured them across to Europe with promises of employment
as a nursery maid or governess. Not only did this constitute a moral outrage, but the Select
Committee stated that it also constituted a "violation of parental authority" in that several of the
young girls were of an age in which they were still under the authority of their parents. The
publisher and vigilance campaigner Alfred Dyer was one of the witnesses who reported to the
Select Committee on cases of young women who had been forced or tricked into prostitution
in Belgium and France. His later publication of some of the written testimony of those he had
spoken to and letters he had received from other young women in similar circumstances did
much to fuel the campaign. Fears over 'white-slavery' melded well with those over child
prostitution, and this 'new' scandal was appropriated by the reformers in their battle for
legislative intervention for sexual offences and procurement.
The Select Committee were not only concerned about the 'white slave' trade. In the course of
their deliberations they also explored the extent to which "juvenile prostitution" occurred in
London, and one can detect an early indication in these discussions that they were
considering a statutory intervention which would render consent irrelevant. It is also clear
from their Report that their concern was not with the protection of young prostitutes who
they considered 'beyond rescue' (unlike the purity campaigners who believed in
reclaimability) and who displayed a "reckless and hardened condition ofmind"45 Rather it was with
the protection of those 'young innocents' who "have not got significant prudence and knowledge of
the world to defeat the purposes of designing men"46 The concern was therefore with the innocent
rather than the fallen. This distinction between those girls who were rescuable and, perhaps
more importantly, were deserving of rescue and those which were not, is a very significant
dichotomisation, and is something which will be picked up in later chapters.
Another major concern of the Select Committee was the extent to which child prostitution in
London took place with the consent of parents (as opposed to the situation alluded to earlier
where violation of parental authority was thought to be an issue). The Select Committee
heard evidence that
"prostitution takes place with the knowledge and connivance of the mother and
to the profit of the household mothers facilitate the debauchery of the
children"47





It was contended that mothers 'sold off' their daughters to procurers who put them to work
'on the street'. The implication of course is that, rather than protecting their daughters, such
mothers were actively contributing to their downfall. Allusions to "a bad home influence" were
frequently made. In the same interventionist vein as earlier reformers, the Select Committee
in their concern that mothers were consenting to their daughters defilement appeared to
incorporate as an objective the prevention of parental practices which endangered young girls
in this way.
The issue of prostitutes being 'on the street' and, unlike their European counterparts, not in
brothels, was also a major consideration. One witness to the Select Committee had testified
that on one summer night at 12.30 am there were over 500 young girls prostituting
themselves between Piccadilly Circus and the bottom ofWaterloo Place.48 The concern was
with the potential that this visibility had for leading other young girls into temptation, again
echoing the desire to protect the innocent from the debaucheries of the fallen. Whilst there
were undoubtedly young girl prostitutes on the streets in cities such as London and
Liverpool, Walkowitz (1982) has argued that their numbers were grossly exaggerated,
mainly through the propagandist efforts of the purity campaigners.49
Raising the age of consent was also a consideration in the discussions about the visibility of
"the shifting population" of girls on the street. The question of consent was posed as a means
by which juvenile prostitution, a dangerous (and visible) form of sexuality (and one which
was in the forefront of the public mind given the furore around the earlier Contagious
Diseases Acts) could be criminalised. It was thought that criminalisation would act as a
deterrent (not it seems for young girls to enter prostitution) but for the procurers and the
men who paid for their services and also for those parents who consented to their daughters
becoming prostitutes. The raising of the age of consent was a route to criminalisation of sex
between girl prostitutes and older men. Because many of the (most visible) young prostitutes
were in their early teens they had reached the age in which, under the existing common law,
they could consent to sex (that is, they were above the age of puberty). Lor that reason it
was recognised by the legislators that the sexual intercourse involved "did not amount to rape."50
By rendering that consent irrelevant, however, sex with young women could be effectively
outlawed. After hearing the evidence put before them by all witnesses, the Select Committee
Stated that "the evidence given established a conclusive case of the necessity of raising the age of
consent."51 The Select Committee also took evidence from witnesses concerning the question
48 ibid. p.433
40 Bristow, E.J. (1977) Vice and Vigilance : Purity Movements In Britain Since 1700
50 Hansard Parliamentary Debates Third Series 1884-1885 vol. VIII [300] 687
51 Debate on Bill in Committee 1883 {Harvard Parliamentary Paper [286] 1391
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which age was appropriate. It was their eventual view that the age of consent should be 16
years. It is interesting to note however that at one stage that Select Committee considered
extending protection to girls up to the age of 18 years "as the period between 16 and 18 years is one
of especial temptation". It is not entirely clear whether it is the girls or the older men who were
especially tempted.
The Report of the Select Committee was taken up with much enthusiasm by the purity
reformers. Quite suddenly, their age-of-consent campaign received a massive boost and
much favourable publicity from a rather salacious journalistic expose written by W.T. Stead,
a London journalist of the time. In July 1885, the Pall Mall Gazette published in serial form
'The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon' which was Stead's detailed account of how he had
posed as a debauche and bought a 13 year old girl (with a certificate of virginity) from a
London abortionist. Although he had not "used the girl for the purposes for which she was purchased",
he was arrested, prosecuted and jailed for procurement.52 Stead's rather melodramatic
expose conjured a scenario of predatory, male aristocrats buying innocent young virgins
from disreputable procurers, who had lured them into prostitution under false pretences.
Stead described the transactions as common place and easy to effect.53 The publication of the
series and Stead's subsequent imprisonment electrified public opinion and provoked
hysterical consternation about the plight of young girls. Across London, there were public
demonstrations to denounce criminal vice and to demand the passing of legislation which
would criminalise sex between adult men and young girls and which would raise the age of
consent for girls to 16 years.54
Such extensive middle class agitation, which involved feminist campaigners and purity
groups joining forces with religious, charitable and welfarist groups, resulted in (youthful)
female sexuality being put firmly onto the public policy and legal agenda. What is interesting
here is the way in which the 'revelations' of the period - the proliferation of child prostitutes,
the emergence of concerns about incest and the white slave scandals - which were
'uncovered' by the reformers were formulated as distinct rationales for the introduction of
specific legislation.55 The introduction of legislation was presented as the obvious and logical
solution to these social problems. Indeed it was declared that "The whole subject is thoroughly
ripe for legislation." 56
52 Bristow, E.J. op. cit.
53 Gorham op. cit..
54 It was estimated that in Hyde Park, a massive crowd of 250,000 gathered, see Bristow, E.J. (1977)
55 The Incest Act was finally put into place in 1908 in England/Wales, although there were several
unsuccessful attempts to pass the Bill criminalising incest from the last years of the 19th century
56 Hansard Parliamentary Debates Third Series 1884-1885 vol. VII [299] 198
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Having decided on a legislative solution, there was, throughout the 1880's, considerable
debate concerning what form such legislation should properly take. Legislation which raised
the age of consent was the popular choice of the people and this was recognised within
Parliament, although a small minority of MPs thought that some form of extension of the
Contagious Diseases Act would stem the tide of young prostitutes. There was much debate
concerning the most appropriate age for consent, and 15 years, 16 years and even 18 years
were put forward at various times. There were several attempts to pass the Criminal Law
Amendment Bill and each time it floundered mainly over the issue of age, and what were
considered to be the implications of setting, for example, 15 years over 16 years. For
example, in relation to the question of age, Lord Mount Temple maintained that 15 years
was "far too low an age for girls to exercise independent responsibility " and thus too low an age "at
which the consent of girls should be considered a justification for their seducers."57 It was his view that
the age of consent should be set at 16 years. This was a view shared by Lord Norton who
put forward a set of principled reasons why the age of consent should be brought in line
with other areas of law relating to children. He cited the fact that the Court of Divorce
adopted a 16 year limit as it dealt with custody of children up to the age of 16 years; the Court
of Chancery retained special guardianship up to 16 years; Boards of Guardians were legally
responsible for children up to 16 years and,
"
... therefore according to general principles of our law the discretion of a girl
under 16 years should not be thought sufficient to permit her the unprotected
disposal of herself."58
Underpinning this view is a concern that young girls were vulnerable and requiring of
protection but also were unable to exercise any independent responsibility or discretion for
themselves.
"Many of the poor children were in such a state of misery that it would be
scarcely possible to protect them efficiently. But there were others not in that
state, yet who were in danger of being made the victims of vice, and were
incapable of protecting themselves; and these girls, at all events, ought to be
protected by law. The law ought to step in in such cases and make it dangerous
for anybody to take advantage of their youth and inexperience for wicked
purposes, and so to condemn them to a life of absolute misery."59
Most of those that held the view that girls were incapable of protecting themselves also
maintained that girls under 16 were incapable of knowing the meaning or the consequence of
57 ibid. vol. V [297] 943
58 ibid. vol. V [297] 942
59 ibid. vol. V [299] 208
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sex, "at 16 a girl is manifestly a child, a person of tender years" 60 This appears a welfarist inflection
of competency as it harkens to the incompetency argument which underlies the common law
rationale of non-consent, and hence signals a coming together of the two rationales.
However, it was also in the debates about age that the issue of agency on the part of young
girls was discussed. Several members averred that young girls were not as innocent as
painted
"Consent might be given by a girl of tender years for several motives. In the
first place, it might be given because presents were offered to her [or]
because the girl did not actually know what would happen But consent
might be due also to natural causes"61
'Natural causes' were later elucidated as "sensual passion" on the part of the young girl. This
was not thought to be a common occurrence however. Furthermore, it was also contended
that if a girl had "sexual knowledge and passion" then it "was the result of unusual precocity" on her
behalf.62 This equation of sexual passion and precocity was however, later to have far
reaching implications.
The most vocal objection to the raising of the age of consent were couched in terms of the
implications that it may have in terms of "opening the doors to extortion by young girls and procurers
of innocent men."63 It was thought that men might be induced to yield to the temptations of
young girls "who might use the powers of this Bill for purposes of obtaining money" Clearly there was
a concern that, following intercourse, men would be the victims of blackmail or extortion by
underage girls threatening to report them to the police for committing an offence under the
statutory provisions. There was a perception that young prostitutes would try to trap men in
this way. This of course added another dimension to what was seen to be the increasingly
complex relationship between premature sexuality and other forms of immorality.
Furthermore, those that held the view that young prostitutes would use legislation to
blackmail men also vociferously raised doubts about the presumed 'innocence' of young
girls, preferring instead to see them as fallen and beyond rescue. In formulating the
legislation, some MPs wanted to insert a clause which stipulated that the provisions would
apply only to those girls who were not " a common prostitute or person of known immoral character."
64 and so formally distinguish between those girls who were deserving of the law's
protection and those who were not.
60 ibid. vol. VIII [300] 773
61 ibid. vol. VIII [300] 716
62 ibid. vol. VIII [300] 718
63 ibid. vol. VII [299] 204
64 Hansard. Parliamentary Debates Third Series 1884-1885 vol. VIII [300] 705
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Despite the misgivings voiced by some of the MPs in the Parliamentary Debates at this time,
during the latter half of the 19th century the protection of young girls from sexual exploitation
and coercion became a major social concern, and was one of the fundamental underlying
principles of the statutory formulations. At this time, there were also powerful scientific and
moralistic arguments around concerning dangerous sexualities which, together with the
public sentiment echoing throughout the campaigns, profoundly affected the way in which
the issues became legally defined and statutory law emerged.
Public campaigning for social purity and moral reform played an important role in the
eventual formulation of the 1885 Act, in that it attained royal assent as the culmination of a
lengthy, and at times quite vociferous series of public and parliamentary debates focusing on
a perceived need to protect young and vulnerable (primarily working class) girls from the
dangers of premature sex and exploitation at the hands of ruthless adult exploiters.65 By
raising the female age of consent, the ensuing 1885 legislation appeared to respond to the
demands of reality.
The 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act
The 1885 Act effectively extended the existing common law prohibition on heterosexual
relations with girls beyond the age of puberty (12 years) to make it a statutory offence to have
sex with a girl under the age of 16 years. The female 'age of consent' was thus effectively
raised to 16 years.66
The 1885 statutory provisions essentially created a series of sexual offences of 'unlawful
sexual intercourse'(sometimes referred to as statutory rape) and 'unlawful sexual behaviour'
(that is, sexual behaviour which falls short of penetrative intercourse) defined in terms of the
age of the victim. It also put into place a number of provisions concerning the procurement of
young girls for prostitution and the suppression of brothels. Most of the provisions of 1885
concerning 'unlawful' sex with girls under 16 years are now encoded (in a very similar form)
in the current Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 (see Chapter Two for details of these
offences). The 1885 Act is thus the foundation of the contemporary statutory provisions
regulating sex between adults and young women. The basis of the age-defined 'unlawful
sexual offences' of today remains largely unchanged from the 19th century and, currently,
whilst the law does not suggest that a girl over the age of 12 years is incapable of consenting
to sex, it is maintained that her consent remains legally irrelevant until she reaches 16 years.
65 House of Lords Select Committee on the Protection of Young Girls (1881-1882) British Parliamentary
Papers , Vol. 5
66 There is no age-of-consent statutory legislation covering male heterosexual involvement
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Essentially this means that whilst the law recognises her consent 'in fact', it is not considered
to be relevant.
In practice, then, one needs to take into account both the older common law and the statutory
'ages of consent' to understand, on the one hand, current practice in terms of how child sex
is charged under Scots law but also, on the other hand, to understand how the issues of
consent and non-consent are posed. Sexual intercourse with a girl under 12 years is
automatically charged as rape, simply because she does not have the capacity to consent
(common law basis). A girl over that age has the capacity to consent, but this is seen as
irrelevant until she reaches 16 years (statutory basis). Sexual intercourse with a girl over that
age but under 16 years who consents 'in fact' will prevent the crime of rape (which is
dependent on a lack of consent), but not the statutory offence of 'unlawful sexual
intercourse'. In such a case, the girl's consent does not fully exculpate an accused, but rather
it serves to distinguish the crime of rape from the statutory offence of 'unlawful sexual
intercourse'. Where the sexual intercourse takes place without the consent of the girl, then
the charge would, of course, be one of rape. Technically then consent and non-consent
should not be at issue in a criminal trial for a statutory sexual offence where the complainer is
a female under the age of 16 years. The fact that consent does assume a position of
importance and significance in such trials will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
Protectionism and the GenderDifferential
Several writers, in an examination of the specific laws relating to sexual behaviour, have
pointed to the ways in which such laws embody a manifestly paternalistic concept of female
sexuality.67 In many ways the 1885 Act exemplifies such an approach, as it was informed
by a particular doctrine of childhood and adolescent sexuality, with a very marked sex
differential, which was not entirely incidental. It reflected certain social attitudes and
opinions and perspectives about female sexuality, and in particular the vulnerability of young
girls, as opposed to young boys, to sexual exploitation. Historically, girls have been - and
indeed continue to be - treated quite differently from boys in terms of laws prohibiting sex.
There is a marked and inherent differential in the 'protection' offered by the law according to
the sex of the young person. Although girls achieve puberty two years earlier than boys, the
absolute prohibition on sex with girls was extended under the legislation until they reach 16
years. For boys, the common law prohibition does not extend beyond puberty, that is 14
years. It is, however, important to note that this applies only in relation to heterosexual sex,
67 See, for example, Edwards, S (1981); Female Sexuality And The Law ; Smart, C. (1981) 'Law And The
Control Of Women's Sexuality' in Hutter, B & Williams, G. (eds.) (1981) Controlling Women
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as until recently, homosexual relations between males were prohibited unless both were over
21 years.68
Thus the raising of the age of consent applied only to girls, who were (and still are) seen to
need protection, either because of ignorance or vulnerability or foolishness.69 Genital sexual
intercourse in particular is a sexual activity which has long been considered harmful for girls,
and this is so for a number of distinct reasons. Sex at an early age was (and still is) regarded
as potentially harmful for young girls, not least because of their potential fertility. Girls were
seen as more in need of the protection of the law, they were perceived as more vulnerable70
and, because of their potential fertility, more in need of protection from the plight of early
pregnancy. The 1885 Act, in many ways, epitomised the morality of the age in which it
was passed, in that it assimilated the prevailing ideas and presumption about the sexuality and
relatedly the sexual vulnerability of young girls into statutory law, and as such moved
beyond mere protectionism.
By raising the age of consent to 16 years, the Act created a potentially anomalous situation
with regard to the age of consent and the age of lawful marriage for females. It was stated
earlier that under the older common law, girls gained the competency to consent to sex at 12
years old. This was also the age of lawful marriage. The criminalisation of sexual behaviour
with girls under 16 years of course had implications for those situations where the girl was
legally married. To remedy this anomaly, the word 'unlawful' was added to the statute to
differentiate between 'lawful' sex (that is, within marriage) and 'unlawful' sex (that is,
extramarital sex), and thus created an exception of sex within marriage where the girl was
under 16 years.71 It was not until 1929 that the age of puberty and the age of lawful
marriage for girls were finally disentangled, when the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1929 raised
the age of lawful marriage to 16 years.
This differentiation between what counted as 'lawful' and 'unlawful' sex adds more fuel to
the argument concerning the legislator's preoccupation with that type of sex which was
socially disapproved. The focus on 'illicit and dangerous sex' reflected deeper concerns
about appropriate sexual behaviour of young girls. Sex withinmarriage, even if the girl was
under 16 years was entirely acceptable. Outside marriage it was dangerous and unacceptable
68 So it could be said that the idea of protection applied there also, and it would be reasonable to assume that
the law's intention was to protect those under this age from those above this age.
69 O'Donovan, K. (1985) Sexual Divisions in Law p. 104
70 Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offences The Age OfConsent In Relation To Sexual Offences
Cmnd 8216 (1981) paras 1 Iff
71 Today, if a girl below the age of 16 years is validly married under a foreign legal system, then it is not
'unlawful' for her husband to have sex with her in Scotland
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and therefore criminalised. It was not so much that young girls had to be protected from sex,
it was sex of the wrong kind - or rather - sex within the wrong type of relationship, that is
extra-marital sex for money with older men .
Youthful Sexuality and the Contradictory Discourses ofVulnerability and Threat
Although the raising of the age of consent was designed to deter men from having sex with
young girls, one of the effects of the legislation was to increase the number of young (mainly
working class) girls who became subjected to forms of moral vigilance, which could in turn
lead to their removal from home and placement in reformatories or industrial schools.72 As
Smart (1989) points out the protectionism afforded by the Act had its disadvantages.73 Not
only did this form of protectionism result in closer surveillance of young girls which could
lead to their own incarceration, but as Smart (1989) emphasises this surveillance gave rise to
invidious effects in terms of the way that the sexually violated girl came to pose a particular
problem. Smart identifies the approach embodied in the 1885 Act as one which combines a
recognition that children need to be protected from sex with an ambivalence towards those
children who are the victims of sexual assault.74 She characterises the approach as one
which elevated the ideals of purity and innocence in childhood, yet viewed the 'defiled and
knowing' child as an anathema and embarrassment.75 A dichotomy is set up between those
who are innocent and those who are not. Those who are not innocent are seen as morally
damaged, without the protection of innocence, and therefore forfeit the protection afforded
by the law. Smart (1989) maintains that bound up with the very motivation to protect
incorporated by the 1885 Act, are doubts that all young girls deserve this protection.76 One
of the consequences of the 1885 Act then was that it resonated with prevailing socio-cultural
forces to create and sustain the 'problem' of the sexual child. So what we seem to find
embodied within the legislation are in fact two forms of protectionism in relation to young
girls - one form of protectionism which aims to protect the asexual, innocent child from the
perversity of the sexual; and the other which has as its aim the protection of the innocent
from contamination by the problematised 'sexual child'. The focus would come to be on
distinguishing between young girls.
This dualism can also be traced through the discourse of childhood sexuality that dominated
in the 19th century. The moral crusades constructed young women and girls largely as the
victims of the unrestrained lusts of debauched men. Young female sexuality when it featured
72 Walkowitz, op. cit. chapter two





in these considerations was usually cast as passive rather than active, yet even in this dormant
state was apparently seen as a perpetual source of temptation to men. Much has been written
about western discourses on the sexuality of children, which are characterised by what
appear to be inherently contradictory statements.77 Within these discourses, children are
presented as simultaneously sexual and asexual, simultaneously innocent and provocative,
simultaneously sexually vulnerable and sexually threatening. The twin - yet contradictory -
issues of the dangerous sexualities of children and the notion of purity and innocence of
young girls were rather swiftly taken up into the legal process following the revelations by
Stead. That children are simultaneously asexual and sexually latent, innocent but at the same
time violable is formally acknowledged in the 1885 legal statutes.
As previously stated, the 1885 legislation was informed largely by a social and moral climate
that idealised the image of children, and particularly young girls, as naturally innocent, pure,
unsullied, untarnished, passive, and most importantly, asexual. Children were not supposed
to be sexual at all. They were supposed to be sexually passive and without sexual desires.
This was a view founded on a stereotype of a specific construction of sexuality - one based
on a popular narrative of asexual innocence and chastity and virtuousness. Innocence -
especially sexual innocence - was celebrated and equated with virtuousness. Children were
seen to be vulnerable, innocent of the sin of the world, and therefore required to be protected
and shielded from the realities of sex until they were more of a suitable age. Innocence was -
and still is - a powerful and emotive symbol which provoked public revulsion and concern
about the prostitution of young girls. The 1885 legislation also recognised (adult) male
sexuality as the main threat to the innocence and purity of children, and there was a stress on
the particular sexual vulnerability of young girls as opposed to young boys. It is evident from
the Parliamentary debates, that 19th century sentiment posited a strong relationship between
the doctrine of protectionism and the image of the innocent female child. The intention behind
the legislation was stated as a
"desire to see crime of whatever character adequately punished, and the innocence
ofchildhood carefully and rigidly protected. "7 8
Yet at the same time, there were strong contradictions inherent within this somewhat
sentimental Victorian view of the innocent, asexual child. There were references made in the
Parliamentary discussions to the 'dangerous' sexual potential of young girls, as referred to
77 See, for example, Jackson, S. (1982) Childhood arid Sexuality ; Bell (1993) Interrogating Incest:
Feminism, Foucault and the Law
78 Hansard Parliamentary Debates Third Series 1884-1885 vol. VII [299] 204
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above. A close reading of the 1885 Act and the debates and commentaries79 that led up to its
passing also suggest an interpretation of the reasoning behind the raising of the age of
consent. It seems clear from the legal commentaries, and also from the wider social and
ideological preoccupations of the time, that the legislators did in fact consider post-pubertal
girls to be potentially sexually self-determining (at least more so than girls under 12 years).
Some legal commentaries on childhood and sexuality not only averred that the two should be
formally separated until such time as sexual maturity be assumed to have occurred (i.e. after
reaching the age of 16 years) but they also implied that this separation was somehow
unnatural and contradictory - young girls being regarded as capable of sexual behaviour.
Indeed the evidence of this as it occurred in relation to child prostitution had sparked the
public debate in the first place. According to this parallel view, exposure to sex was
dangerous in that it could arouse the demonic child that lay quiescent within and unleash the
sinful urges that lay just beneath the surface. Linked to this was the view that a premature
sexual event would automatically bestow sexual knowledge and endow the child with sexual
experience, which in turn would create the possibility for further sexual exploitation. The
resultant picture is of the child - and in particular the young girl - as a mixture of asexual
passivity and riotous promiscuity. As stated by Jackson (1982) in the 19th century there
was a perceived need to protect the child from others at the same time a need to protect others
from children.
In some ways the contradictory picture of the innocent yet potentially sexual child is not
unlike some stereotypical depictions of adult female sexuality, which embody a somewhat
similar dichotomy of women as Madonna/Whore. One of the prevailing notions in the 19th
century was a wide cultivation of the view that women and children are incapable of sexual
response, yet simultaneously constituting a sexual threat and danger. William Acton, for
example, viewed women to be, on the one hand 'not much troubled' by sexual feeling, yet
on the other to be filled with insatiable sexual desires. Anne Dickson (1985) describes these
contradictory ideas - between Woman as Evil and Woman as Chaste - thus :
"One the one hand, sex was envisaged as the devil's dynamite, a constant powers
in man's genitals, ready to be kindled in an instant by the tempting wiles of a
woman. Or, on the other hand, the devil (and sexuality) was believed to reside in
a woman's flesh: women's bodies were vehicles of evil, carriers of an evil force.
Either way, women had to be avoided at all costs."
Similarly, some contemporary feminist literature on child sexual abuse has also highlighted
the ways in which children, especially young girls, are understood only by reference to this
79 For example, those legal commentaries which are to be found in The Scottish Law Reporter 1884- 1886,
and The JournalofJurisprudence 1885, Edinburgh, T & T Clark
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wicked/innocent dichotomy, where childhood is idealised as a time of innocence and the
sexual child is seen as contaminated. As Kitzinger (1988) points out innocence is a
problematic concept because it is itself a sexual commodity.80 To pick up on Smart's (1989)
point about the 1885 Act combining a recognition that children need to be protected from sex
with an ambivalence towards those who are the victims of sexual assault, the romanticism of
childhood innocence has the effect of excluding those who do not conform to the ideal of
innocence. The sexually 'knowing' child may not only forfeit her claim to protection but,
also, she may be stigmatised due to her loss of innocence. The sexually experienced girl is
transformed into the problem which needs regulation.
On the one hand then there are the two rationales of non-consent which inform legal thinking
about sex with young people. These rationales offer a set of distinct yet related reasons for
the prohibition of sex and also set the parameters within which sex with young women
becomes legally acceptable. Consent to sex by young women is technically invalid until the
'age of consent' is reached. Thereafter, to recall the 19th century phrase a young women
becomes 'mistress of her own person.' The two rationales also underpin the definition of all
of the sexual crimes and offences that relate to young people, and thus resound in the trial
situation where the definition of the crime is crucial, not only as a means of (legally)
categorising what took place, but also because each component of the crime or offence must
be addressed by evidence.
These rationales rest rather uneasily together, stemming as they do from quite different
concerns regarding young people and sex. The twin yet contradictory discourses of
vulnerable and threatening young female sexuality which to a large extent inform the second
rationale, that of irrelevant consent, are reflected in the statutory formulations that resulted
from the introduction of a 'new' basis of non-consent. As a result some tensions are set up,
occurring particularly around the (what appears to be a deliberately divisive) notion of
deserving and undeserving complainers (which do not seem to have a parallel under the older
common law prohibition). Despite the welfarist principles which, purportedly, guided the
'age of consent' legislation, one ultimate effect is the faciliation of a standard of
differentiation, based on sexuality, by which some girls' are deemed worthy of the law's
protection and others are not. The way in which these welfarist principles get transformed by
law into legal mode in the court room, and the resultant focus on sexuality in the trial
situation is pursued in this thesis.




THE SEXUAL CRIMES AND OFFENCES
This short (somewhat legalistic) chapter identifies the relevant sexual crimes and offences
which will be referred to throughout the following chapters, and notes some characteristics of
the law in this area.
Scots law governing 'sexual' crimes and offences is a blend of common law and statutory
provisions. The range of present laws are primarily the result of judicial decisions made in
the High Court and statutory amendments to the common law which have taken place over
the last 100 years. In general, legislative interventions were prompted by changes in attitudes
to sexual matters, and additions and modifications to the law in this area have taken place in a
largely piecemeal way over the years. With some notable exceptions1 the resultant body of
law has evolved in a diverse and somewhat unsystematic manner, leading not only to a very
wide spectrum of 'sexual' crimes and offences, but also to a fair degree of overlap between
common law and statutory law. Whilst there are some key differences between Scots and
English law both at the level of common law and statute, and in terms of legal principle and
court practices, there are some sexual offences which share some similarities. This thesis
concerns the Scottish law and court practice, and so particular attention is paid to Scottish
characteristics. Notable differences between Scots and English law will be indicated where
appropriate.
Currently, Scots law recognises a range of crimes and offences which could be classified as
'sexual'; ranging from rape, sodomy and incest, to 'purveying' pornography, soliciting for
prostitution, exhibiting obscene works, and making indecent telephone calls.2 These
offences take place in different contexts, incorporate an extensive variety of situations and
entail different forms of behaviour. The 'sexual' element may differ markedly in each; not all
involve actual sexual activity; some involve the exercise of power; some involve sexual
exploitation; some involve the degradation and humiliation of the victim; still others involve
what is termed the 'corruption of public morals'. The range of 'sexual' crimes and offences
differ not only in the form of behaviour which constitutes the offence, and the circumstances
in which it may occur, but also, crucially, in the legal consequences for the perpetrator.
1 For example, the Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986
2 See Gane. C, (1992) Sexual Offences for a full and comprehensive account of the law concerning sexual
offences in Scotland.
43
Although the following point was made by the Howard League for Penal Reform in relation
to the law in England and Wales, it applies equally to that of Scotland:
[the] law makes no formal distinction between 'sexual' offences and other
offences. How one differentiates is therefore largely a matter of individual choice,
and the criteria for classification are open to debate.3
Many different sorts of acts are seen as criminal, but there are no real formal distinctions
between different categories of offences so, for example, making an indecent telephone call
is, in some sense, just as much a criminal offence as rape. The differences are the level of
procedure under which crimes and offences are prosecuted, the level of court at which
crimes and offences are tried, and the maximum penalties that can be imposed.
The Importance ofSex
The gender-specificity of certain sexual offences is an important means of classifying types
of sexual offences. In general, sexual crimes and offences prove the exception to the rule that
the criminal law is predominantly gender-neutral and does not usually have any regard to the
sex of either the victim or the perpetrator. Although in some sexual crimes and offences the
sex of either party does not form part of the definition of the crime, either explicitly or
implicitly, in other instances, the sex of one, or both, parties is crucial. In this sense, many
offences exhibit a sex-specific bias. In some cases, it is the sex of the victim that is
important, for example, rape necessarily entails a male perpetrator and a female victim, given
that rape is defined as penile penetration of the vagina and, as such, is a gender-specific
offence.4 Some sections of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 can only be committed
on women or girls, whilst others can be committed by either males or females. There are
other offences where the sex of both parties is crucial in that the offence may only be
committed by one sex with, or against someone of the same, or opposite, sex. For example,
the incest-related offences specifically entail sexual intercourse and therefore can only be
committed between a male and female. Indecent assault and indecent behaviour, however,
can be committed by a male upon a female or another male, or by a female upon a male or
another female.
Consent in Sexual Offences
Consent is another major factor in the classification of types of sexual offences. Offences can
be divided into those activities which are illegal because one of the parties involved does not
3 Howard League for Penal Reform (1985) 'Unlawful Sex'Report ofa Howard League Working Party
London p7.
4 Although women can be charged with 'art and part' in rape
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consent, and those where the parties do consent. The latter category includes those offences
involving certain kinds of sexual activity between men and women, and between men. In the
former category of offences, which primarily consists of those offences which involve sexual
violence perpetrated by men against women, such as rape and indecent assault, consent is
often a crucial issue in the trial.
Most of the sexual crimes and offences which are introduced in this chapter (and which form
the basis for discussion throughout the following chapters) are those which typically involve
young female complainers,5 and to which the Scottish 'shield' legislation applies. As
outlined in the Introduction, the 'shield" legislation has a very wide remit in terms of the
sexual offences to which it applies. Some of these offences, for example, unlawful sexual
intercourse are age-specific and relate only to young victims. Others - like rape - are not, but
apply to both adults and children. In addition to those sexual offences covered by the
legislation, the incest-related offences are also included here for the reasons given in the
Introduction. To reiterate what was stated in the Introduction, even though incest offences are
not covered by the legislation,6 a) they commonly involve young complainers; b) there are
possible similarities to other sexual offences in the type of evidence that is introduced in the
trial, and; c) they are frequently used in the indictment as alternatives to other sexual offences
- in particular rape and statutory age-related offences - which are covered by the legislation.
Because many of the crimes and offences discussed here apply equally where the complainer
is an adult, and are not exclusively used where the complainer is a young person or child,
they will be grouped here according to whether they apply equally to adult and young
complainers, and whether they are specifically used where young complainers are concerned.
Non-Age Specific Sexual Crimes and Offences
1. Common Law
Most of these sexual offences are older common law offences, the definitions of which have
been built up through case law.
^ Some of the offences detailed here are gender-neutral in that they apply equally where males and females are
involved
6 The Government is considering bringing forward proposals to extend the provisions to cover incest and
clandestine injury. See the The Scottish Home and Health DepartmentWhite Paper Firm and Fair: Improving
the Delivery ofJustice in Scotland 1993 p 70
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1.1 Rape
As stated earlier, rape is generally considered the paradigm instance of sexual crime. It is
regarded as the most serious sexual crime and consequently carries a maximum sentence of
life imprisonment. The crime of rape can be committed upon any female, regardless of her
age. It is an exclusively heterosexual crime involving penile penetration of the vagina to
however slight a degree and not necessarily involving the emission of semen.7 Forcible
penetration of the vagina by a part of the body other than the penis, or by some object, does
not constitute rape, but instead is classified as indecent assault, which has a lower maximum
penalty. Similarly, anal or oral sex is not rape, but is usually charged as indecent assault.8
From the 1700's Scots legal texts described rape as "the knowledge of a woman's person ... against
her will and by force"9 although in some cases the requirement of force could be modified to
include threats or drugging.10 Evidence of force was necessary to prove that rape had
occurred, hence "the resistance must... be continued to the last; so that it is by main force only and terror
that the violation is accomplished."11 Up until the 19th century, rape was generally described as
a violent act committed against a resisting woman, and a key test in the court room was the
way that the woman resisted her attacker.
Modern Scots law governing rape is based on the decisions made in two 19th century cases.
In Fraser12 the accused had intercourse with a woman by pretending he was her husband,
and was charged with rape and with "carnal knowledge of a married woman by pretending to be her
husband". The court agreed that a crime had been committed, but the court rejected that it was
rape because the woman had consented, albeit her consent was obtained fraudulently. It was
said in Fraser that the essence of rape was that intercourse was obtained "without a woman's
consent", but, according to Gordon (1978) the decision in Fraser can also be explained by
reference to the absence of the use of any force by the accused.13
A second 19th century case attempted to move away from the requirement of force and the
emphasis on the presence of a will to be overcome to an emphasis on the absence of consent.
In Charles Sweenie, the accused had sexual intercourse with a sleeping woman and was
7 This is an important difference between Scots and English law. Recent legislation in England has extended
the crime of rape to include 'male rape' and penetration by objects other than a man's penis,
8 Barbour v HMA 1982 SCCR 195
9 Hume I 303
10 Gane, (1992)
11 Hume 1302
12 HMA v William Fraser [1847] Ark. 280
13 Gordon, GH, (1978) The Criminal Law ofScotland p885
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charged with rape and of having "carnal knowledge of a woman when asleep, and without her
consent."14 The court held that he had not committed rape, and ruled that, in the case of a
sleeping woman, she cannot express her will and, although she does not consent, there is no
rape because intercourse is not achieved 'against her will'. Nonetheless, the court decided
that it was a criminal offence to have intercourse with a non-consenting woman even though
(because she is sleeping) it cannot be said that intercourse took place 'against her will'. Thus,
if a man has intercourse with a sleeping woman when she is unaware of his presence or his
intentions, then she has shown no unwillingness, no force has been used to overcome
unwillingness, no rape has been committed.15 The court in Sweenie reiterated that force was
an essential part of rape and defined force as "any mode of overpowering the will without actual
physical violence, such as the use of threats or drugs."16
The ruling in a 20th century trial,17 where two men were charged with having 'carnal
knowledge' of a woman whilst she was unconscious from the effects of alcohol, was
somewhat analogous to that in Charles Sweenie in that the court held that what the two men
had done was not rape, although it was a criminal offence which the judge termed
'clandestine injury'. Here, again, the same logic applied in that the offence was not
considered to be rape because it did not take place 'against her will'. However, where drinks
or drugs are deliberately administered to a woman in order to have intercourse with her, then
that does constitute rape,18 although it must be proved that the unwillingness of the woman
was overcome by the deliberate administration of the drinks or drugs.
In modern Scots law, rape is still defined as sexual intercourse with a woman "forcibly and
against her will".19 It must be shown that the woman's resistance was overcome, and that she
did not consent to intercourse. Thus force clearly still remains a key test of rape, although
the degree of force required is a question of fact in each individual case. As well as actual
force such as physical violence towards the woman, force can also include what is known as
constructive force, such as certain types of imminent threats to the woman or a third party
(such as her child) or , and drugging her with drink or drugs.20 The phrase 'against her will'
means that positive or implied non-consent must be shown. It must be shown that the
woman's will was overcome. Where the woman is not in a conscious state, there is a need to
14 HMA v Charles Sweenie (1858) 31vv 109
15 Jones, TH & Christie, MGA, (1992) Criminal Law
16 ibid.
17 HMA v Grainger and Rae
18 HMA v Logan 1935 JC 100
19 Stallard v HMA 1989 SCCR 248
20 Gane, C. (1992)
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show that she was unwilling to have intercourse with the accused prior to becoming
unconscious.
The law regarding rape within marriage in Scotland was recently amended, so that a husband
who is living in the same house can now be charged with raping his wife. In the 1700's, the
institutional writer Hume21 expressed the view that a husband is immune to a charge of rape
of his wife. This view was supported by later legal commentators.22 Two cases in the 1980's
went some way to overturning this long-held view when two husbands were convicted of a
charge of raping their respective wives, although, in both cases, the men were not living with
their wives at the time of the rape.23 It was in 1989, however, that a husband was convicted
of rape whilst living with his wife, and a husband's immunity in marital rape was finally
revoked in Scotland.24
As stated in the previous chapter, in the case of girls under 12 years old (the age of puberty
for girls in Scotland), rape can be committed without any overcoming of the girl's will. This
is because a girl of that age is incapable of consenting or having a proper will in the matter at
all.25
1.2 Indecent Assault
Indecent assault has not received much attention from Scots legal commentators. According
to one contemporary commentator, this is possibly because it has long been regarded as an
aggravated form of common assault, rather than a specific sexual offence (Gane 1992). As
the term suggests, it is an assault accompanied by circumstances of indecency. It is a rather
broad general offence, and encompasses a wide range of criminal behaviour. Although what
is required is an assault of an 'indecent' character, the Scottish courts appear to have offered
no definition or explanation of what actually constitutes 'indecency' in the context of indecent
assault. Although, as Gane (1992) also points out, the courts tend to take a practical
approach, with regard to all of the circumstances, when deciding whether an assault is
indecent. Like any other form of assault, indecent assault must entail some form of 'attack'
on the victim, although this need not be an overt physical attack, and it does not necessarily
connote that the accused had to overcome any resistance on the part of the victim. Thus there
need not be any physical contact, and an 'attack' could conceivably entail threatening
21 Hume i. 306
22 Macdonald, 119; Alison, i. 218
23 HMA v Duffy 1983 SLT 7; HMA v Paxton 1985 SLT 96
24 Stallard v HMA 1989 SLT 469
25 Gordon (1978) p.889
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gestures.26 Indecent assault is aggravated where the victim is a child. The offence may be
committed by a member of either sex against a member of either sex.
Although indecent assault has a wide application, it may, in many circumstances, according
to Gane,27 be the only available charge that properly reflects the gravity of the accused's
conduct. Given that the definition of rape is restricted to genital penetration, a range of other
serious sexual assaults involving other types of penetration are excluded from the definition
of rape, and these are charged as indecent assault.
1.3 Assault with intent to ravish
This rather archaic sounding offence is, like indecent assault, essentially an aggravated form
of assault. However, unlike indecent assault, it can only be committed by a male against a
female, in that it requires an intention to have penile intercourse with the victim. Again, this
offence is aggravated if the victim is a child. This is a distinctively Scottish offence, there is
no English equivalent.
2. Statutory Law
Currently, statutory sexual offences are encoded in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976.
The current Act consolidated almost all of the provisions of Scots law relating to sexual
offences, specifically that introduced for the first time in the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment
Act which applied to England and Wales and Scotland, and subsequent modifications to the
1885 Act which were made in 1922, and 1951. Prior to the 1885 Act, there was very little
statute law relating to sexual offences in Scotland. Any statutes which existed were very old,
such as the Incest Act 1567, or were largely in disuse. For example, brothels were regulated
by a statute introduced in 1476 which stated that "common women be put at the end of the town
where least perell of fire is",28 and "fornication" had been dealt with by what Hume termed "a full
an anxious statute of James VI".29
2.1 s.2 Sexual Offence (Scotland) Act 1976 'Procuring by threats'
This provision had its genesis in the 1885 Act, and was introduced as a means to stem what
was perceived at the time to be a rising tide of prostitution. It appears as s.2 of the current
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act in a slightly reworded form and provides that it is an offence
if any person:
26 Gane (1992)
27 Gane (1992) p.53
28 1476 c74 quoted in JournalofJurisprudence 1885 (29) Edinburgh, T & T Clark
29 Hume 1302, quoted in JournalofJurisprudence: 1885 (29)
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a) by threats or intimidation procures or attempts to procure any woman or girl to have
unlawful sexual intercourse in any part of the world;
b) by false pretences or false representations procures any woman or girl to have any
unlawful sexual intercourse in any part of the world;
c) applies or administers to, or causes to be taken by, any woman or girl any drug, matter or
thing, with intent to stupefy or overpower so as thereby to enable any person to have
unlawful sexual intercourse with such women or girl.
Age does not enter as an element in this offence at all, and it is clear that it can be committed
by a male or a female procurer. The maximum penalty for the offence is two years
imprisonment under solemn procedure, and three months under summary procedure.
There appears to be no case law in Scotland on the meaning of this section of the Act,
although Gordon (1967) states the view that the relative English law would be followed.30
However, it is clear that intercourse must be "unlawful", which essentially means outwith
marriage. It would appear that no offence occurs unless intercourse actually takes place.
2.2 s.8 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 'Abduction with intent to have sexual
intercourse'
This is essentially the statutory near-equivalent of the common law offence of abduction with
intent to ravish, albeit much narrower in that it applies only to unmarried women under 18
years. In this, it reflects a concern with the preservation of property rights over a woman's
property.31 The older common law offence applies to a female of any age, irrespective of her
marital status. S.8 provides that it is an offence to take an unmarried girl under the age of 18
years away from her parents or guardian in order for her to have unlawful sexual intercourse
with a man. The woman must be 'taken' from her parents, and the fact that she consented is
no defence. This offence may also be committed by someone other than the man with whom
it is intended that the woman or girl have intercourse. The offence carries a maximum penalty
of two years imprisonment on solemn procedure, and three months on summary procedure.
2.3 s.9 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act ' Unlawful detention offemale'
S.9(l) provides that it is an offence to detain a woman or girl against her will in any premises
with intent that she may have unlawful sexual intercourse with any man; and that it is an
offence to detain a woman or girl against her will in a brothel. This can be committed by a
30 Gordon, (1978) p.854
31 Gane, (1992) p.67
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male or a female and carries a maximum penalty of two years on solemn conviction and three
months on summary conviction. However, there appear to be no reported cases in Scotland
on the application of this section.
Age-Specific Sexual Crimes and Offences
In Scots law there is an absolute prohibition on sexual relations with children of either sex
below the age of puberty (which is 12 years for girls and 14 years for boys). Statutory
provisions extend the common law prohibition on sexual relations with girls (not boys)
beyond the age of puberty to make it a statutory offence to have sexual relations with a girl
under the age of 16 years.
3. Common Law
Although sexual offences relating to children and young persons are more commonly
associated with statute law, there remain a number of common law offences which
specifically apply to young complainers. However, apart from rape, the common law sexual
offences which apply to young female complainers do not involve penile penetration, but can
be classified more generally as sexual assaults.
3.1 Indecent Behaviour
It is a crime at common law to indulge in indecent behaviour towards children under the age
of puberty, with or without their consent. Indecent behaviour is aggravated by the
relationship between those involved, for example between parent and child, or between
teacher and pupil. Indecent behaviour covers a wide range of 'indecent' conduct towards
children, and includes the specific offences of 'lewd, indecent and libidinous practices and
behaviour' and 'shameless indecency'.
3.1.1 Lewd, Indecent and Libidinous Practices and Behaviour
An offence at common law, lewd and libidinous practices covers a wide range of indecent
criminal conduct towards children below the age of puberty. (Both males and females can
commit this offence. There is no need for actual physical contact, the offence may involve
the accused indecently handling the child, or inducing the child to handle the accused. Gane
(1992) contends that knowingly engaging in indecent conduct, such as sexual intercourse, in
the presence of a child may also constitute lewd and libidinous practices.32
32 Gane, (1992). p.74
For girls over the age of puberty and under the age of 16 years, this prohibition on lewd and
libidinous practices is extended by a statutory measure, s.5 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland)
Act 1976 (see under Statutory Law).
3.1.2 Shameless indecency 33
Shameless indecency can apply to a wide variety of criminal behaviour, from showing
indecent films to young girls to engaging in sexual acts in front of others. It need not involve
sexual activity or actual physical contact. It does, however, have its origins in offences
relating to lewd and indecent practices towards children, and has been used by the courts to
cover a variety of situations. According to Gane (1992), there are three types of shameless
indecency, those involving sexual relations; those involving an affront to public decency; and
those which are likely to or are intended to deprave and corrupt public morals.34
Shameless indecency can take place in public and in private, and can be committed by a male
towards another male, as well as by a male towards a female. (There appear to be no cases of
shameless indecency between females.)
4. Statutory Law
Intercourse with a girl under the age of 12 years is charged as common law rape. In addition,
non-consensual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years is also common law rape.
However, currently it is a statutory offence to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a young
woman under 16 years even where she does consent. When this extension was introduced
by the 1885 Act it was entirely new, as hitherto in Scotland a girl over 12 years was regarded
as "mistress of her own person".35 Prior to 1885, it was not an offence to have intercourse with a
consenting girl who had reached the age of 12 years, that being the age of puberty. The
current statutory provisions are contained in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976,
which, as previously stated, consolidated almost all of the provisions of Scots law relating to
sexual offences. The statute creates a number of quite specific sexual offences which apply
when the victim is a young women or girl under 16 years of age.
33 Shameless indecency is not specifically included under the list of offences covered by the Scottish shield
legislation, although it is commonly considered indecent behaviour.
34 Gane, (1992) p. 143
35 Lord Craighall in HMA v Watson 1885 in The Scottish Law Reporter vol. XXIII October 1885 - July
1886
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4.1 s.3(l) Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 'Intercourse with girl under 13 years'
This provides that it is an offence to have or attempt to have unlawful sexual intercourse with
any girl under the age of 13 years. It appears to be the practice, in terms of prosecution, to
use this section only where the girl is over 12 years and under 13 years. In other words, this
seems to apply only to 12 year old girls. As previously stated, sexual intercourse with a girl
under 12 years (that is, under the age of puberty) is usually charged as common law rape.
The maximum penalty for this offence is life imprisonment; an attempt to have unlawful
intercourse with a girl under 13 years old incurs a maximum of two years on solemn
conviction, and three months on summary conviction.
4.2 s. 4(1) Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 'Intercourse with girl between 13 and 16
years'
S.4(l) is similar to s.3(l) in that it provides that it is an offence to have or attempt to have
unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl of or above the age of 13 years and under 16 years.
Again the offence is one of 'unlawful' or extra-marital intercourse.36
The offences in both s.4(l) and s.3(l) are what are known as 'strict liability' offences with
regard to the age of the girl. This means that it is no defence that the accused believed the
girl to be over 16 years, no matter how 'reasonable' his belief. However, in respect of
s.4(l) there is what Gane (1992) calls "a limited defence of error as to age".37 This defence,
commonly known as 'mistaken belief in age', applies if the male perpetrator is under 24
years of age and he "reasonablybelieved" that the girl was of, or above, 16 years. This defence
is only available if the accused has not been charged with a like offence ('charged' does not
mean 'convicted'). This defence does not apply to s.3(l).
4.3 s.5 Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 'Indecent behaviour towards a girl between
12 years and 16 years'
This statutory provision provides that it is an offence if any person uses lewd, indecent or
libidinous practices or behaviour towards a girl over 12 years, which if used towards a girl
under 12 years would constitute an offence at common law. This provision effectively
extends the common law prohibition on indecent behaviour towards girls under 12 years.
Unlike s.3(l) and s.4(l), this offence can be committed by a female as well as by a male.38
36 It would be a defence to either s.3(l) or s.4(l) if the parties were married. Although under s.l of the
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 amarriage which has taken place in Scodand between persons either of whom
is under 16 years old is considered void.
37 Gane, op. cit. p 72
38 HMA v Walker & Another Dundee High Court March 1976, unreported
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Incest and Incest-Related Offences
The Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986 introduced a number of reforms into the
area of criminal law that deals with sexual relations between members of the same family or
the same household. The statutory offences are designed to prohibit sexual intercourse
between those whose relationship is such that it ought not be permitted, that is, within
degrees of incest specified by the criminal law.
Prior to the introduction of the 1986 Act, the crime of incest was dealt with under the 1567
Incest Act, which incorporated the prohibitions on incest contained in the biblical chapter
Leviticus. Before the passing of the 1567 Act, incest was an ecclesiastical offence. The 1567
Act, up until the time of its' reform in 1986, was still in the old Scots language, and
criminalised the "abhominabill, vyle and filthy lust of incest". This ancient Act, which covered full
and half-blood relationships to the degree of great-grandparents and great-grandchildren, and
also a wide range of affine relationships, resulted in a range of prohibited relationships.
There were a number of calls for reform to this area of law, and in 1981 the Scottish Law
Commission reported on the law of incest39 and made a number of recommendations. These
recommendations included that incest should be restricted to sexual intercourse between
persons related by consanguinity or adoption; that intercourse between step-children and
step-parents should be a criminal offence; and that it should be an offence for anyone over the
age of 16 years to have intercourse with a child under the age of 16 years if he or she is a
member of the same household as the child and stands in a position of trust or authority in
relation to the child.
The recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission on incest were accepted by
Parliament, and formulated into the 1986 Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act. The
current provisions relate specifically to sexual intercourse, so it follows that the offences are
exclusively heterosexual. Sexual intercourse has the same meaning as in rape in that incest is
constituted solely by the act of penetration of the vagina by the penis. Consent is no defence
to incest. In that the provisions relate to sexual intercourse, they are somewhat narrower than
similar provisions in other jurisdictions, which extend to other forms of sexual behaviour.
s.2A Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986
s.2A contains the revised offence of incest. It is similar to the 1567 ruling in that with regard
to consanguinity, sexual intercourse is prohibited in the line of ascent and descent to great-
grandparents and great-grandchildren. The prohibitions extend to full and half-blood
39 The Law of Incest in Scotland 1981 Cmnd 84222B
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relationships, and include consanguine relationships through illegitimacy, where the
relationship is traced through any person whose parents are not married to one another.
s.2B Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986
This section, like s.2C of the Act, is primarily concerned with the protection of children and
young persons from sexual abuse by adult members of the family or the same household. It
provides that it is an offence if any step-parent (or former step-parent) has sexual intercourse
with his or her step-child (or former step-child) if the step-child is either under 21 years, or,
before reaching 18 years of age, has lived in the same household as the step-parent and has
been treated as a child of his or her family. This is so even if the sexual intercourse takes
place after the step-child has left the household, and irrespective of the age of the step-child at
the time of the intercourse.
s.2C Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986
s.2C is also concerned primarily with the protection of children, and provides that it is an
offence if any person over the age of 16 years has sexual intercourse with any young person
under the age of 16 years who is a member of the same household as the child, and is in a
position of trust or authority. This offence is aimed at protecting those children who are not
protected by the offence of incest (s2A) or are step-children (s2B).
There are four categories of statutory defence provided which relate to these offences. These
are:
a) Lack of knowledge by accused of degree of relationship. This applies to s2A
and 2B.
b) Reasonable belief by accused that other person was above the relevant age.
This section applies to 2B and 2C
c) Absence of consent by accused. This section applies to s2A, 2B and 2C.
d) Proof that accused was married to other person by a marriage recognised as
valid by Scots law. This defence applies to s2A, s2B and s2C.
s.80( 7) Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980
This offence, whilst it does not apply in the case of female victims, is covered by the
legislation, and included here for completeness. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980
formally decriminalised certain homosexual acts, although for some time before the
introduction of the Act, it was policy in Scotland not to prosecute homosexual acts which
took place in private between fully consenting males over the age of 21 years. The Act did
not fully consolidate existing common and statutory law in the area, although it repealed the
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statutory provisions regarding 'gross indecency'40 between males and introduced new
statutory provisions to deal with certain acts. It did not, however, affect the common law
regarding exclusively homosexual acts, such as sodomy and those offences that constitute
lewd and libidinous practices and shameless indecency.
s.80(7) of the Act provides that it is an offence to commit or procure a homosexual act
otherwise than in private; without the consent of both parties; with a person under 21 years;
and between merchant seamen on board ship.
Where s.80(7) is used in a charge of committing a homosexual act with a male under the age
of 21 years, then there is a defence available to the accused if he had reasonable cause to
believe that the young man had reached the age of 21 years. This is available if the accused is
under 24 years and has not previously been charged with a like offence. This statutory
defence is similar to that of a charge of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl between 13
years and 16 years. The maximum penalty under s80(7) is two years imprisonment on
solemn conviction and three months on summary conviction.
40 Introduced by the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act
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CHAPTER THREE
EVIDENCE, COURT PROCEDURE, AND THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
This chapter outlines some important general legal and procedural features of the Scottish
criminal trial system in order to provide a context for the more detailed description and
analysis of the research data which will form the substance of later chapters. The aim here
is first, to situate the criminal trial within the particular framework of the adversarial system
and, second, to indicate the fundamental interconnectedness between the exercise of due
process in the criminal court room and the use and function of evidence in criminal trials.
Some general rules of evidence will be discussed, and certain features of evidence which
are particularly characteristic of sexual offence trials will be introduced here, and
elaborated upon in subsequent chapters.
The Adversarial System and Principles of Advocacy
In Scotland, like England and Wales, an adversarial system of criminal justice prevails.
This system incorporates formal procedural rules which in turn structure the trial process.
Procedure dictates that a trial should take place in open court, that is, in the presence of the
accused and members of the public and, in the case of solemn proceedings, before a jury of
15 persons. It also dictates that the prosecution carries the burden of proof, and
consequently has to produce sufficient evidence to justify the accusation(s) against the
accused contained in the criminal charges. Failing that minimum there is no case to
answer. Further, the core concept of criminal justice is that an accused person is innocent
until proven guilty, and the public trial is an open demonstration of the process by which
the guilt of the accused is proven. The fundamental purpose of the criminal trial, then, is
to decide whether or not the criminal charges put forward by the prosecution can be
substantiated by the evidence provided.
The main means of evidence in a criminal trial is likely to be the testimony of witnesses,
who relay to the court their perceptions of things or events in reply to direct questioning by
the prosecution and defence. Other important means of evidence are the presentation of
various relevant documents and physical objects, and - particularly in cases involving
sexual offences - the results of forensic analysis and the contents of medical reports.
Evidence for legal purposes has been defined as
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"information which tends to prove or disprove any matter of fact the truth of
which is submitted to judicial investigation."1
The adversarial criminal justice system is characterised by a particular method of proof,
which in turn involves a distinctive style of advocacy in which the prosecution and defence
engage in what is often referred to as a 'contest' to decide a case.
In simple terms, during the course of a criminal trial evidence is elicited by the prosecution
through the examination of each prosecution witness and presented to the judge/sheriff and
jury.2 This is known as the prosecution examination-in-chief, the ideal form of which has
been described as a "spontaneous conversation"3 between the prosecution and witness. Here,
evidence is not presented directly by each witness, but in response to prosecution
questioning. It is said that such questions should be short, clear, and unambiguous, yet at
the same time the skilful advocate will try to control the witness' testimony to ensure that
the court hears a factual and logical account.4 The defence, in turn, will then attempt to
dispute or challenge the prosecution evidence through the cross-examination of each
prosecution witness. Again, this is done by means of interrogatory questioning of
witnesses. Following cross-examination, the prosecution may then re-examine the witness
to clarify or to re-iterate parts of their testimony, perhaps to clear up any confusion arising
from cross-examination, or counter any alternative explanation put forward by the defence
during cross-examination. As one writer describing the art of the advocate put it,
"if the witness has been badly mauled by the cross-examination, then the re¬
examination can attempt to put Humpty Dumpty back together again" 3
After all prosecution witnesses have given their evidence, and the facts of the prosecution
case have been stated, the entire procedure is reversed with the defence leading with the
examination of defence witnesses and the prosecution following with the cross-examination
of those witnesses. Re-examination of witnesses is this time done by the defence. When
all witnesses, those for the prosecution and those for the defence, have given evidence both
sides 'sum up' their case. Summing-up entails a drawing together of each witnesses'
evidence and a pulling together of all of the evidential strands to produce 'the facts of the
case', and it is here that the 'contest' reaches it apex. This is the stage at which the evidence
is assembled and presented in a summative form. Here - as long as the recounting of it is
1 Wilkinson, A.B. (1988) The Scottish Law ofEvidence p.l
2 The evidence will be presented to a sheriff sitting alone if it is a trial under summary procedure, and to a
judge or sheriff sitting with a jury if it is a trial heard under solemn procedure.
3 DuCann, R. (1980) The Art of the Advocate p. 87
4 Walker, A.G. & Walker, N. M. (1964) The Law ofEvidence in Scotland
5 DuCann, (1980) pl44
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accurate, the evidence may be re-organised, and edited in parts to form a logical total of all
that has gone before in the trial. Summing up is done first by the prosecution, and then by
the defence and the judge and jury are therefore presented with two (or more) conflicting
versions of 'the case' on which to reach a verdict.
When describing the operation of the adversarial system, an analogy is often drawn in
gladiatorial terms, likening prosecution and defence to adversaries or combatants engaged
in a 'battle' over the evidence - putting forward opposing versions and parrying each others'
claims before an audience of judge and jury.6 Eventually a victor will emerge from this
fight over the truth and meaning of evidence, and the case will be won or lost. As several
critical writers have pointed out, the 'contest' between the prosecution and the defence is
not necessarily one over the 'truth' or the 'probity' of, for example, what actually
occurred in a particular incident. Rather it is more accurately a 'contest' concerning
accounts of the incident. McBarnet (1981), writing on the difference between an incident
and a case maintains that,
"Far from being 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth' a case is a
biased construct .... not so much an exhaustively accurate version of what
happened as one which is advantageous to one side The good advocate is not
concerned with reproducing incidents but producing cases ..." 7
The depiction of the trial as 'contest' between advocates concerned with 'the production of a
case' has led several writers, such as Carlen (1976) and Chambers and Millar (1986) to
comment on the inherent theatricality of the adversarial court room 8 - wherein not only the
opposing advocates, but other witnesses engage - albeit sometimes unwittingly - in high
drama (set, of course, within an appropriate legal context) which is presented before an
audience of judge and jury. Accounts of the incident are presented to the court primarily
via the verbal evidence of witnesses, but also from other evidential sources such as physical
Crown productions, and consequently much of the adversarial 'contest' is over the
authenticity and meaning of this available evidence.
But however colourful and compelling this image of the criminal trial as a tournament of
truth-finding, it is a somewhat inaccurate portrayal. The two opponents, although in one
sense representing opposing interests, are not on an equitable or balanced footing. To
6 See, for example, Frank, J. (1949) Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice
7 McBamet, D. (1981) Conviction
8 Carlen, P. (1976) Magistrates Justice for example used the theatrical metaphor to describe magistrates
courts in England. Similarly, Chambers, G. & Millar, A. (1986) Prosecuting Sexual Assault adopted the
metaphor of 'the stage setting' when describing women's experience in the witness box giving evidence in
rape trials in Scotland.
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continue with the gladiatorial analogy - it could be said that they wear different armour and
carry different arms to the battle. Their fundamental purposes in the fight also differ. These
differences are so much a fundamental part of the formal adversarial system - indeed they
are at the very root of the system - that it led Brown et al (1993) to maintain that it is more
accurately termed an asymmetrical adversarial system.9 There are several reasons for this
perceived asymmetry - the roots of which lie in the respective roles and duties of the
defence and, in particular, the prosecution.
The Role of Prosecution and Defence
Duty to the Court
In Scotland, as in England and Wales, there is a system of public prosecution in place. The
prosecution represents the interests of the Crown (which is in turn seen as the interests of
the public at large) in a criminal trial, whilst the defence represents the interests of the
accused. So far as matters of law are concerned, the duty of the prosecution is to the court,
and he or she has a duty to bring to the attention of the court any and every relevant statute
or decided case of which he or she has knowledge. As regards matters of fact, the
prosecution must present all of the facts of the case to the court whether or not they are
favourable or unfavourable to the prosecution case. It does not matter whether or not it is
in the favour of the prosecution case to do so. He or she is obliged to disclose all of the
evidence available, even if it is damaging to the prosecution case, or indeed, even if it is
detrimental to the interests of the complainer. According to one criminal law commentator,
the role of the prosecution is,
"to assist the jury in arriving at the truth. He must not urge any argument that
does not carry any weight in his own mind, or try to shut out any legal evidence
that would be important to the interests of the person accused. It is not his duty
to obtain a conviction by all means; but simply to lay before the jury the whole
facts which compose his case, and to make these perfectly intelligible and to
see that the jury are instructed with regard to the law and are able to apply the
law to the facts .... the Crown has no interest in procuring a conviction. Its only
interest is that the right person should be convicted, that the truth be known, and
that justice should be done."19
Unlike the prosecution, the defence does not have a duty to lay out all of the relevant facts
in a case and therefore can be seen to have much more scope for creativity during the
course of a trial. He or she is able to introduce a version of events which may be designed
to confuse or contradict the prosecution case, and which could not be said to meet the same
criteria as that demanded of the prosecution. However, the defence will be instructed by
9 Brown, B. et al (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial p.22
10 Kenny, C.S. (1966) Outlines ofCriminal Law p.612
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his or her client (the accused), and the defence argument is based on the accused's version
of events.
Burden ofProof
The burden of proof in a trial lies solely with the prosecution; and the standard of proof
required is that the prosecutor must prove the charges against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The defence is not constrained in the same way. Whilst it is the
prosecutor's job to prove the case, that is, prove the defendant's guilt - the defence need do
no more than pick holes in the prosecution case, or point to inconsistencies in an attempt to
raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. The defence is not required to prove that
which he or she puts forward in the trial in the same way as the prosecution is required to
do so. In fact, the defence need not present any positive alternative to that put forward by
the prosecution, merely raising reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury is enough to
disprove the prosecution case. Often this raising of doubt can be done quite simply by
introducing some ambiguity back into the case after the presentation of the 'logical or
'factual' prosecution account.
What The Prosecution Has To Prove
In a criminal trial, two things have to be proved by the prosecution. First, that the crime or
offence outlined in the criminal charges took place; second, that it was the accused who
committed it. Thus, evidence is used to address both the individual elements of the crime,
and to determine whether the accused committed the crime. To take each of these in turn,
first, each offence has its own specific definition which requires to be addressed by
evidence. The legal definitions of sexual offences have already been discussed in some
detail in Chapter Two, but it is nevertheless useful to draw on that information again here
to illustrate some of the most significant criteria involved in the proving of sexual offences.
For example, in the cases of rape and 'unlawful sexual intercourse' (i.e. ss 3 and 4 of the
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976) it has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt that actual heterosexual intercourse took place; that is, that penetration,
no matter how slight, of the vagina by the penis occurred. There does not necessarily have
to be any emission of semen. If penetration did not occur, then it could not be said that
rape or 'unlawful sexual intercourse' took place, however there may be evidence that what
took place was actually attempted rape or 'unlawful sexual behaviour' (i.e. s 5. of the Sexual
Offences (Scotland) Act 1976). Therefore, there has to be detailed questioning, usually of
the complainer, about the degree of sexual penetration. Similarly, in the case of attempted
rape and assault with intent to ravish, it has to be proved that the accused intended to
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achieve sexual intercourse. Again, the precise stage which the assault had reached has to
be established, primarily through the evidence of the complainer.
A second significant legal element of crimes such as rape, attempted rape, and assault with
intent to ravish which requires to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt is
that the complainer was an unwilling partner throughout, that is, that she did not consent.
Under current Scots law, rape is defined as sexual intercourse with a woman 'forcibly and
against her will'.11 It is thus necessary to prove that the complainer's will was overcome,
and she is therefore questioned closely about her non-consent to sex. Evidence of lack of
consent will not however necessarily lead to a conviction for rape. Since the case of Meek
and Others v HMA it has been held that an honest and genuine belief in consent, even if
unreasonable, can be a defence to a charge of rape.12
The prosecution also has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was indeed the accused
who was the perpetrator of the crime. The complainer may have already identified the
accused as the perpetrator in an identification parade held at a police station. Nevertheless,
she will still be required to identify him in the trial. The accused may also be identified as
having had sex with the complainer through forensic evidence, and fairly frequently in
sexual offence trials, the accused will admit to having had sexual intercourse with the
complainer. However, in such cases, the accused will often maintain that the intercourse
took place consensually. Because the issue of consent is of such central importance in
sexual offence trials, the complainer will often be closely questioned about such details .
The Accused, the Complainer and the Witness Box
Because the onus of proof lies with the prosecution, the accused does not have to answer
the charges against him and can decide not to give evidence in the trial, should he not wish
to do so (or should he be advised against giving evidence by his defence counsel). Thus,
many accused neatly avoid the ordeal of giving evidence in a trial. By not speaking in
court, the defendant is exercising his right to silence,13 which is a not uncommon
occurrence in criminal trials. The research documented here confirms this general tendency,
and in the observed contested trials, only a very small number (approx. 10 %) of defendants
entered the dock to give evidence. The accused is not compellable and he need not
incriminate himself; in other words, the prosecution has to be able to prove the case
without the co-operation of the accused. To reiterate, neither the accused, nor his defence
11 Stallard v HMA 1989 SCCR 248
12 Meek and Others v HMA [1982 SCCR 613]
13 Since modified in England and Wales
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counsel, need prove anything. Other defence witnesses, although cited as witnesses, may
or may not be called to give evidence in the trial, depending on the judgement of the
defence. Often defence counsel will wait 'to see how the wind blows' before deciding to
bring on a particular witness, and will often play a canny game of withholding some
witnesses altogether, or fielding a particular witness at an appropriate time in the trial,
playing all of the time for maximum disruption to the prosecution case.
The prosecution witnesses, on the other hand, are of crucial importance to the prosecution,
for it is their testimony, spoken in court, which forms the backbone of the prosecution
case. The main witness for the prosecution in a sexual offence trial is, of course, the
complainer although, in practice, she is treated in the same way as any prosecution
witness at a trial. The relationship between the complainer and the prosecution is very
different from that which exists between the defence and the accused. The prosecution is
not representing the interests of the complainer in the same way as the defence represents
those of the accused, but rather the prosecution represents the Crown and has to take
account of the 'public interest' in presenting the case at trial. In their research into the
Scottish prosecution service, Moody and Tombs (1982) found that prosecutors are very
mindful of their role to take account of the 'public interest' both at the stage of deciding
whether to prosecute and also during the trial.14 Because of this, as Chambers and Millar
(1986) assert, the complainer may often feel that:
"she is peripheral to the key relationship at a trial, that between the State as
representing the 'public interest' and the accused."1-'
The complainer's testimony is of the utmost importance for the prosecution case, and she
has no alternative but to appear in the witness box, simply because if she did not there
would be no case. Her evidence is usually the focus of the trial, the main event as it were.
As indicated earlier, her evidence is crucial in relation to what the prosecution has to prove
in sexual offence trials. Like other witnesses, she is required to give her account of events
in response to questions put first by the prosecution. This will often entail not only an
extremely detailed 'blow-by-blow' account of what happened in the hours (or sometimes
days) leading up to the alleged incident, such as how she came to be with the accused in
the first place, and the conversations that took place between them, but also what actually
occurred during the alleged incident, and what she did immediately afterwards. The focus
here is on recounting the detailed minutiae of what occurred - what parts of her body were
touched, and how were they touched ? What did she do in response, how did she show her
14 Moody, S. & Tombs, J. (1982) Prosecution in the Public Interest
15 Chambers & Millar (1986) p.94
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refusal to consent ? What did she say at the time of the assault ? What did she do
immediately after the assault ? Who did she see and what did she say ? The complainer is
almost always required to reiterate certain aspects of her account over and over again in
reply to continual questioning by the prosecution. But giving an initial account (or more
usually, a series of accounts) to the prosecution is not the end of the ordeal. Because the
complainer is the chief prosecution witness, it follows that her testimony will receive the
strongest attack from the defence. During cross-examination, the defence may seek to
challenge the reliability and/or truthfulness of her account, usually in an attempt to
undermine her credibility as a witness. Here, she may be subjected to further interrogation
as to what happened before, during, and after the alleged incident, but she may also be
cross-examined as to her lifestyle, her appearance, her demeanour, her relationships with
others, her past sexual experience, and often her medico-gynaecological history16 - often in
a very hostile and intimidating way. There is much to support the view of writers such as
Lees (1989) and Chambers and Millar (1986) that the complainer is as much 'on trial' in the
court room as is the accused.17
General Issues in Evidence
It is often argued that the giving of evidence is a 'necessary ordeal' for the complainer,
particularly in sexual offence trials which are perceived as serious crimes and thus carry the
potential for severe sentencing. Evidence is, after all, of fundamental importance in relation
to proof in criminal trials. There are some integral features of evidence which in turn
dictate certain evidential requirements, the satisfaction of which, taken together with the
rigorous style of many defence cross-examinations and the public nature of the court room,
can further contribute to the ordeal of the complainer in sexual offence trials. In
illustration of this, I turn first to a major evidential requirement, that of corroboration.
The Corroboration Rule
It is a general requirement of Scots criminal law that every material fact which has to be
proved in order to secure a conviction in a criminal trial must be established by
corroborated evidence.18 'Corroborated' evidence is evidence which emanates from more
than one single independent source, and, as such, corroboration acts as an objective
criterion for sufficiency of evidence. Hence, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish
both the commission of the crime, and the accused's involvement in it, by evidence from
more than one source. This rule applies in respect of all evidence and is imposed in
16 See, for example, Brown et al (1993); Adler, Z. (1987) Rape on Trial .
17 Lees, S. (1989) Trial by Rape' New Statesman and Society 24 November : Chambers & Millar, (1986)
18 Walker & Walker, (1964)
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relation to all crimes and offences. The corroboration requirement has a long history in
Scots law.19 The 18th century institutional writer Baron Hume wrote:
"No one shall in any case be convicted on the testimony of a single witness. No
matter how trivial the offence, or how high so ever the credit and character of
the witness, still our law is averse to rely on his single word, in any inquiry
which may affect the person liberty or fame of his neighbour ,.."20
This is unlike the situation in England and Wales where the evidence of a single witness, if
believed, is sufficient to prove the case against the accused; that is, however, with the
exception of certain sexual offences in England and Wales , such as procuration, where the
woman's evidence alone is not sufficient to secure a conviction. In other sexual offence
cases in England and Wales, corroboration is not actually required, but the judge is obliged
to warn the jury of convicting solely on the basis of the evidence of the complainant.21
This is so in all sexual offence cases, involving both female and male complainants,
although the need for corroboration tends to be seen mostly in terms of female
complainants. Until relatively recently, the corroboration warning was also administered in
cases involving the sworn evidence of children in England and Wales. In Scotland,
however, the corroboration requirement affects all witnesses, and confirmatory evidence is
required in all trials, not only those concerned with sexual assault. It also applies equally to
evidence elicited from children and young persons, as it does to that elicited from adult
witnesses. Indeed following the removal, in England and Wales, of the corroboration
warning in cases involving children, the Scottish view was that to remove the requirement
only in relation to children would be "unprincipled and anomalous" in Scots law22 (see
Chapter One).
The cautionary instruction in sexual offence cases heard in England and Wales has,
unsurprisingly, been much criticised by feminist authors, as insulting, anachronistic, and
indicative of a gender bias in the law.23 Temkin (1987) for example, argues that the
justification for the English corroboration warning is "to protect men from the alleged fabrication
of women." The underlying rationale on which the cautionary instruction rests is that women
are less able to tell the truth in sexual matters, and are more prone to tell lies and make
19 Until relatively recently, the corroboration rule applied to essential matters in both criminal and civil law
in Scotland. In 1986 this requirement was removed in relation to personal injuries cases (Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968 s9), and with effect from 1989 the Civil Evidence
(Scotland) Act 1988 removed this requirement from other civil cases.
20 Baron Hume Commentaries on the Law ofScotland respecting Crimes (published 1797 - 1800)
Vol. II p383
21 Temkin, J. (1987) Rape and the Legal Process p.133
22 Dent &Flin (1992) p. 132
23 See, for example, Temkin, (1987) Edwards, S. (1981) Female Sexuality and the Lew ;
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false allegations of sexual assault due to their inherent capacity for fantasy, jealousy, spite,
revenge, lying and general mischief-making. Women lie about sex because women lie
about sex - so goes the tautology - hence women alleging sexual assault are not to be
trusted. Edwards (1981) locates both the concern with the importance of corroborative
evidence in sexual offence trials and the idea of women as hysterics and sexual fantasisers
as stemming from medical and psychoanalytic discourses of knowledge that since the
1800's have been assimilated into law and legal procedure. She asserts that it is specifically
from within the writings of medical jurisprudence, which reflect medical and psychological
theory (and the assumptions and fundamental misconceptions about female sexuality
contained within these theories), that
"police, police surgeons, counsel, judges, and 'significant others' are most likely
to derive and assimilate ideas on the nature of femininity and female sexuality in
the context of formulating impressions of rape allegations and of the
predilections of sexual assault complainers."24
Certainly allegations of sexual assault by female complainers is treated with a great deal
of suspicion, not only within the court, but elsewhere within the criminal justice system.
For confirmation of this, one need only consider, for example, judicial pronouncements to
juries on the veracity of female rape complainants such as
'The experience of these courts is that sometimes women make up such charges
- I ask you to accept that. It is dangerous to convict in a sexual case on the word
of a woman." 25
Similarly the infamous statement by a judge that:
"It is well known that women in particular and small boys are liable to be
untruthful and invent stories." (Judge Sutcliffe, 1976)
I would tend to agree with Smart (1989) who contends that, although the judge refers only
to small boys, "one should not assume that girls escape the sweep of his judgement."26 Other
examples of such conceptions of women as liars and prone to making false allegations can
be found in instructions to police officers investigating rape and to police surgeons. Up
until very recently, when most police forces changed their procedures for the investigation
24 Edwards (1981) p..120
25 Temkin (1987) p. 136. See also Adler (1987) for further examples of cases where judges pronounced on
the likelihood of false allegations by rape complainants
26 Smart, C. (1989) Feminism and the Power ofLaw p.53
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of sexual assault, such documents highlighted the possibility of false allegation on the part
of those alleging sexual assault. 27
Because the corroboration rule applies universally does not mean to say that proving sexual
assault cases in Scotland is any less difficult than it is in England and Wales.
Corroboration can take a variety of forms, for example, it can take the form of direct
testimony of two or more witnesses to the facts; the evidence of a single witness may be
corroborated by evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances; evidence can be derived
from two or more sources of facts and circumstances alone; or a series of similar acts may
afford mutual corroboration of each other.28
In general, independent corroboration of a complainer's account of an event can potentially
come from such sources as other witnesses, who saw or overheard something which would
confirm what the complainer alleged; it could also come from physical evidence which
shows what the complainer alleged; it may also emanate from medical or forensic sources.
But cases of sexual assault, by their very nature, are often very difficult to corroborate.
Incidents of sexual assault generally take place in relative privacy, often inside a home or
enclosed space. There are rarely witnesses. Physical evidence, such as torn or muddied
clothing, medical evidence such as cuts or bruising or swollen genitals, and forensic
evidence, such as traces of semen and saliva, are so open to multiple interpretation that they
rarely provide conclusive corroboration. So, although the prosecution may introduce
evidence such as torn clothing to substantiate an assault, the defence will often rebut it by,
for example, suggesting the clothing was torn for some other reason even, perhaps,
deliberately torn by the complainer out of malice. Similarly, the prosecution may bring
evidence of swollen genitals to corroborate a sexual assault, but the defence will offer an
alternative interpretation suggesting that the swelling was either self-inflicted or due to
'normal' sex play. Chambers and Millar (1986) and Brown et al (1993) writing about
Scottish sexual offence trials documented both of these tendencies on the part of the
defence. Chambers and Millar, (1986) for example, describe a case where it was suggested
by the defence that a woman had thrown herself against furniture in order to scar her back,
and another where clear signs of physical injury on the complainer were referred to by the
defence as "part of the lovemaking process." (1986, p.97). Similarly, Brown etal (1993) describe
a case where bruises and abrasions on the body of the complainer were turned around by
27 Burman, M. & Lloyd, S. Police Specialist Units for the Investigation ofCrimes ofViolence Against
Women and Children In Scotland. (1992)
28 This is known as the Moorov Doctrine. The leading case is Moorov v HMA which concerned a number
of charges of indecent assault. The only direct evidence in each case was that of the woman assaulted.
However it was held that there was sufficient interrelation in time, place and circumstances between each of
the indecent assaults to afford their mutual corroboration.
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the defence into the results of nothing more than "the rough and tumble of normal sex." Clearly,
the same assumptions concerning female sexuality that underpin the rationale of the
corroboration warning in England and Wales undoubtedly inform defence rhetoric and
reasoning in Scotland.
Signs of injury presented by the prosecution as evidence of, for example, violence
perpetrated by the accused, or indication of the complainer's lack of consent to sex, are
therefore open to interpretation in a number of ways, and the defence are often both quick
and inventive in their presentation of alternative interpretations. Forensic evidence presents
similar problems for corroboration. For example, the presence of the accused's semen may
be construed as evidence of consensual sex just as much as nonconsensual sex.
Furthermore, forensic scientists and medical witnesses are notoriously difficult to pin down
to a definite statement concerning the precise evidential meaning of their findings. In cases
observed in this study, the majority of forensic and medical witnesses would go no further
than state that their findings were no more than "consistent with" the prosecution account.
But equally, under cross-examination, they invariably stated that their findings were also
"consistent with" the defence alternative. In only a small handful of cases were such
witnesses prepared to categorically state that their findings were totally consistent with the
prosecution account and no other. This hesitancy on the part of such witnesses to commit
themselves one way or another in such circumstances is precisely because of the possibility
of ambiguity of aspects of medical and forensic evidence and, as such, is a further
indication of the corroboration difficulties inherent in sexual offence trials.
Credibility and Reliability
All witnesses, as primary sources of evidence, may be tested for credibility and reliability.
Credibility usually refers to the witnesses' sincerity or desire to tell the truth, that is, does
she or he wish to tell the truth ? Is the evidence given by the witness to be trusted ? Is it
tenable ? Credibility relates to notions of witness interest or motive for lying. For
example, cross-examination as to the credibility of a witness may include questions on his
or her relationship to the accused, the witness's motive for giving evidence, and any
interest (financial or vested) that he or she may have in the case.29 As stated earlier,
cross-examination is not limited to matters on which the witness has given evidence in the
prosecution examination; it may also range beyond those matters so as to elicit facts not
already brought out which may be in favour of the defence, or with a view to destroying
the credibility of the witness. However, evidence cannot be led if its only purpose is to
reflect on the witness's credibility, although evidence which is otherwise relevant may also
29 Wilkinson (1988) pl60-161
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be used to test (or discredit) credibility. One general exception to this exclusion of
evidence bearing solely on credibility is where there is a question of inconsistency in the
witness's statements, where, for example, the witness has given different accounts of the
matter in issue. Consistent statements are, as one may expect, a key test of a witness's
credibility, measuring whether the witness is uniform in the telling and repeating of his or
her version of events.
In sexual offence trials, largely, it is said, because of the particular difficulties which are
presented by the need for corroboration (see above) both the substance of the testimony of
the complainer, and her honesty and truthfulness are focused on very strongly.
Consequently, the credibility of the complainer often comes under close scrutiny,
particularly in cross-examination by the defence. Does she have a motive for not telling the
truth ? Is she bent on revenge against the accused ? Is she trying to hide an illicit love
affair ?
The requirement of reliability is like credibility, in it refers to the dependability of the
witness's account. But reliability concerns the witness's capacity to tell the truth, rather
than the witness's desire to tell the truth. For example, sometimes a witness may try to tell
what they believe to be the truth, but they may be mistaken, either because they misheard,
or did not see what was happening, or because their memory has since faded. Mental and
physical competence is obviously important here. Similarly, evidence of drinking or drug-
taking prior to the witnessed event is often introduced to dispute the reliability of witness
testimony. As is the case with the question of credibility, and again, it is said, due to
corroboration requirements, the reliability of a complainer in a sexual offence trial is
strongly focused upon. Can she really remember the events ? Is her recollection clouded in
any way ?
The issue of reliability takes on another dimension when children and young people are
concerned. Children and young people, primarily due to their age, are often considered to
be unreliable witnesses - they may misinterpret events, they may not fully understand
situations, and this is reflected in their unreliable testimony. It has been said that the view
of young people as unreliable witnesses tends to be more associated with judicial
pronouncements made in the English courts than the Scottish courts,30 however the
research documented here found that, in sexual offence trials, presumptions concerning the
unreliability of children and young people are not uncommon, and this is evident in the
focus on questioning which appears designed to test reliability. As well as questioning to
30 Dent, & Flin (1992)
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test recollection, there is considerable use of questioning by the defence which raises the
possibility that evidence given by the young complainer is the result of fantasy and
imagination. Again, it should be reiterated that there is no need for the defence to do more
than 'put' such suggestions, in order to raise doubt as to reliability. Indeed, the adversarial
system allows the defence much scope, in the trial situation, to utilise a wide and creative
range of questioning and suggestive techniques to discredit complainers and undermine
both their credibility and reliability as witnesses.
Several studies31 have shown that such views on the reliability of women and children
witnesses are prevalent in court room attitudes and in court room practice, even though
there is no research evidence to suggest that victims of sexual assault are more likely than
victims of other crimes and offences to make false allegations and lie about events.
To turn now to another primary rule of evidence, that is, the requirement that evidence be
relevant and admissible.
The Relevance and Admissibility ofEvidence
In order to be led in a trial, evidence has to be deemed to be admissible. The criterion of
admissibility is the relevance of the evidence. Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant
to the facts on which the judge or the jury have to decide. To be relevant, evidence must
relate directly to the facts at issue in the case, or facts bearing on the credibility of
witnesses. In a criminal trial, the judge has the right to exclude evidence which is
considered to be irrelevant, and to impose restrictions on the questioning of witnesses if
such questioning is considered to be irrelevant.
The common law in Scotland used to be that, in cases of rape and other sexual offences, the
sexual character of the complainer might be the subject of evidence as relevant to the issue
of consent. However, since the introduction of the 'shield' legislation, this position has
changed somewhat and this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
Suffice it to say at this stage that the old common law rules regulating the use of sexual
character evidence were superseded by the 'shield' legislation, so that, presently,
questioning designed to elicit evidence which shows or tends to show that the complainer,
is not of good character in relation to sexual matters; is a prostitute or associate of
prostitutes or; has at any time engaged with any person in sexual behaviour not forming
31 Chambers & Millar (1986) ; Adler, Z. (1987) ; Brown et al (1993)
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part of the charge, is excluded. However, there are exceptions to this general exclusion,
wherein such evidence may be introduced if it is considered relevant to issues in the trial.
To sum up, this chapter has tried to lay bare the trial process using the 'logic' of the
adversarial system and the rules of evidence as a means of elucidating the legal-evidential
procedures that occur in criminal trials. The aim has been to situate the criminal trial
within the context of the constraints and determinants of the institutional structure that
comprises our public prosecution system. What one observes in a criminal trial then is the
result of a complex interaction between the general principles of the law (such as the
requirement to prove the case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the right of
the accused to a fair trial, the burden of proof - that is, what McBarnet has called "the rhetoric
of justice"32) and the operation of formal rules of law and legal procedures (that is, the
operationalising of the law, such as what is permitted by statute, the use of case law, and
what is deemed acceptable evidence). In the trial, the original event is reconstructed
within this mesh of rules and principles that constitute the adversarial system.
Obviously, this interplay of legal and procedural conventions has a strong bearing on the
complainer's experience at court, regardless of the type of crime or offence. Whilst
defenders of the present system view the process of giving evidence followed by cross-
examination as part of the routine workings of the system, the victim of a crime as a
witness (and also as an observer of the process) experiences the trial situation in a very
different way. McBarnet (1983) has argued that feelings of degradation and humiliation
may be experienced by all victims in the court room and that this feeling is not incidental,
but rather structural to the court proceedings.33 In the court room, because the victim is no
more and no less than any other prosecution witness, he or she is placed in a position of
vulnerability and is at the mercy of questioning by both prosecution and defence. The
adversarial nature of advocacy and the legal rules that define the construction of 'truth'
mean that victims are liable to be treated harshly by both sides.
The ordeal of giving evidence then, for all victims, can be severely testing. However, some
writers argue that it is particularly so for victims of sexual assault, given the nature of the
offence and the corroboration difficulties outlined earlier in this chapter.34 It is argued
that as a result of the protocol of having to give evidence in court, and by so doing, having
to re-live and recount the original ordeal, as well as having to be cross-examined on that
32 McBarnet (1983) p.6
33 McBarnet (1983) 'Victim In The Witness Box : Confronting Victimology's Stereotype' Contemporary
Crises 7: pp293 - 303
34 See for example, Temkin (1987); Adler (1987); Brown et al (1993)
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evidence, the testing process of the trial can often constitute a form of secondary
victimisation for the victim of sexual assault. In addition, in sexual offence trials, very
often the extraction of relevant evidence can be a painful, humiliating and tortuous ordeal
for the complainer. The trial process is, nonetheless, an inevitable ordeal given the
structures of the present system with its processes of examination and cross-examination as
a means of ascertaining the 'truth' (although this is not to deny that much of the ordeal
experienced by complainers is unnecessary, particularly that which involves a focus on
sexual evidence of dubious relevance). The point of this chapter has been to try to show
some of the reasons why this should be the case.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SCOTTISH SHIELD* LEGISLATION
Following on from the more general features of evidence outlined in the previous chapter,
this chapter looks at sexual evidence in more detail. The first part of the chapter concerns
the Scottish reformer's conceptions of the problematic nature of sexual evidence - why and
how it was conceived as a problem to be curbed by the 'shield' legislation - and then
outlines the 'solutions' put forward by the legislative reformers. It thus provides the
background context necessary for assessing whether sexual evidence is present in sexual
offence cases involving young female complainers and, if so, whether its' use has the same
problematic consequences as in trials involving adult female complainers.
However, the process of the Scottish law reform also requires to be put into context. The
following section briefly sets out the immediate precursors to the Scottish reform of sexual
evidence which preceded the passing of the 'shield' legislation.
The Impetus Behind the 'Shield' Legislation
In Scotland, the sexual evidence reform did not stem directly from a concern with the law
on rape, as it did in England and Wales. Rather sexual evidence came under scrutiny within
the wider context of a general programme of revision of the whole of the law of evidence
which was being undertaken by the Scottish Law Commission.1 The reform process is
documented in detail by Brown et al (1993)2 and only a brief outline of the process will be
given here. In the late 1970's a practising sheriff, Ian MacPhail, was commissioned to
review the law of evidence in both criminal and civil matters, and to pinpoint those areas in
need of reform. In the subsequent MacPhail Report (1979) which put forward several
proposals for change, sexual evidence was discussed in the context of general issues of
character evidence.3 The circulation of this report in the form of a consultation document
heralded the beginning of the reform process. It is interesting to note however, that it was
initially envisaged by the Scottish Law Commission that the reform process would
1 The Scottish Law Commission is an independent body set up by Parliament in 1965 for the purpose of
planning and conducting law reform. Some of their work originates in suggestions from the public; they
consult widely and receive responses to papers The SLC prepares reports proposing draft statutes which are
laid before Parliament.
2 Brown, B., Burman, M. & Jamieson, L. (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial: The Use ofSexual Evidence in the
Scottish Courts
3 This report was subsequently published as MacPhail, I. (1987) Evidence: A Revised Version ofa Research
Paper on the Law ofEvidence Edinburgh, Law Society of Scotland
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commence with the law of evidence in civil, rather than criminal, law. However, a number
of events took place which conspired to alter the order of reform, and which together
placed the reform of sexual evidence higher on the Scottish law reform agenda.
As documented by Shapland et al (1985) and Maguire and Pointing (1988), the early 1980's
were a time of fast growing academic, policy and public interest in the needs and rights of
victims of crime, and in particular, their treatment within the criminal justice system.4 The
general concern about, amongst other things, the lack of provision of information to
victims about the legal process and the ordeal of giving evidence, dovetailed with the
concerns that feminist and victim support groups had been expressing about the experience
of rape victims. Against this background, the early 1980's also saw increasing concern
about the investigation of sexual assault and the conduct of rape trials, although
interestingly, this concern was not directly about sexual evidence but more about methods
of investigation and decision-making in rape cases. Partly triggered by a television 'fly on
the wall' documentary which showed officers from Thames Valley Police investigating an
allegation of rape, public concern swelled following some notable resolutions of rape cases
heard in the courts during 1982. The first of these concerned a Scottish appeal case, Meek
and Others v HMA, in which the defendants had been convicted of raping a young woman
in a country field.5 On appeal, they claimed that they had come across her having sex with
a group of young men and so they thought she was willing to have sex with them. This
appeal, in effect, raised the defence of 'honest belief'. The 'honest belief defence' had been
established somewhat controversially in an earlier English case Morgan, in which it was
validated that a man had not committed rape if he genuinely believed that the woman was
consenting at the time. (The Morgan ruling was in fact one of the precipitating factors of
the reform of rape law in England and Wales.) In the Meek case though, the appeal failed
on facts, although the pnnciple of 'honest belief' was established.
A second controversial case of the same year, known as the Glasgow Rape Case also
played a part in the prioritisation of sexual evidence in the Scottish reform process. Public
opinion was outraged in this case, which involved the gang rape of a young woman in
which she suffered horrendous stabbing injuries. The Crown dropped proceedings against
the three youths involved before it went to court without notifying the victim. The reason
for this was that she was deemed by the Crown to be unfit to give evidence in court. The
4 Shapland, J. , Willmore, J. & Duff, P. (1985) Victims in the Criminal Justice System; Maguire, M. &
Pointing, J. (eds.) (1988) Victims ofCrime : A New Deal ?
5 Meek and Others v HMA 1982 SCCR 6143 and 1983 SLT 280 (Notes)
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crux was that the trial was abandoned because of the woman's mental condition as a result
of the trauma.6 In this decision, the Crown took into account the contents of a psychiatric
report which stated it would be dangerous for the woman's mental health for her to have to
endure the trial process. In prosecutorial terms then, the victim's interest and welfare was
taken into account in making the decision. This in fact was the real reason behind the
decision, although matters were considerably clouded at the time that the decision was
announced by a seemingly uninformed statement made to a journalist by the then Solicitor
General for Scotland, Sir Nicholas Fairbairn. He confused an already complex situation by
stating that the case had been dropped because
"the prosecution did not have sufficient, competent or available evidence to
stand any chance of gaining a conviction."7
He also claimed that the mental condition of the woman was "irrelevant". The case attracted
vast amounts of publicity. The case was soon taken up by a Glasgow lawyer and a
journalist and a private prosecution eventually took place, capturing much media and
public attention in the process. 1982 also saw a third controversial rape ruling, this time an
English case. This case involved the rape of a young hitchhiker by a lorry driver. In passing
sentence, the judge found that the victim's "contributory negligence" had precipitated the rape
and so fined the accused £2,000. In making such a statement, the judge effectively put
some blame for the rape onto the victim. The light sentence and the suggestion that
negligence was a relevant factor in rape caused outrage amongst academics, women's
groups and journalists.
There were however other events of the early 1980's that facilitated the Scottish reform of
sexual evidence, in addition to those three controversial rape cases of 1982 (which all
involved adult women). Feminist groups in Scotland (as in England and Wales) at this
time were campaigning against the treatment of rape victims in the criminal justice system,
and there were calls in the early 1980's by Scottish Rape Crisis Centres pressing for
changes in the law for victims of rape who could not face the ordeal of the witness box to
be allowed to give written evidence.8 As previously stated, there had been reforms of rape
law in several other jurisdictions around the world, including England and Wales.9 The
6 Harper, R. and McWhinnie, A. (1983) The Glasgow Rape Case
7 Harper, R. & McWhinnie, A (1983) p.95
8 s.32 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 gave the power to the Crown in a criminal trial to apply to
the court to take evidence 'in commission' from witnesses who were either too infirm to attend or were
abroad. Rape Crisis Centres in Scotland were pressing for this to be extended to rape victims
9 ss. 2 and 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976
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workings of the English 'shield' legislation had been the subject of a study of rape trials
conducted at the Old Bailey by Zsuszanna Adler and she began to make the results of this
study public in 1982.10 As Brown et al (1993) point out, not only did the publication of
Adler's work express feminist concerns about the use of sexual history and sexual character
evidence and the way it feeds into and reflects the stereotyping of women, but her work
also pointed to the wide divide between the spirit of the policy aims behind the
English/Welsh 'shield' legislation and the practice in the courts. It thus focused attention on
the design of effective and workable legislation in the area of rape law reform, in particular,
on sexual evidence
Towards the end of 1982, the Scottish Law Commission announced its revised intention to
prioritise the reform of sexual evidence over that of evidence in civil procedure. The
Commission's Report (1983) states that
"
many reforms on these aspects of the law of evidence have in recent years been
taking place both in England and elsewhere in the world and that, particularly in
the last year or two, there has been some demand for reform in Scotland coupled
with considerable media interest in the subject of trials for rape" 11
There had been demands for reform emanating from various quarters and, as the above
quote suggests, the Scottish Law Commission clearly acknowledged these demands. The
reform process proceeded by means of debates and the circulation of discussion and
consultation documents in which the Scottish Law Commission variously set out their
commitment to reform, their perceptions of the problems of sexual evidence and
subsequent legislative proposals. It is clear from these debates and discussion that the
reformers were guided throughout the reform process primarily by a concern with issues of
principle in relation to the law of evidence.
The Problems of Sexual Evidence
The central aim of the reformers was
"to see the law of evidence changed so as to provide that, while the court would
continue to admit all the evidence necessary to ensure that justice is done to the
accused , the exposure of the complainer to intimate, and possibly embarrassing,
questioning is reduced to the minimum possible."12
10 Adler, Z. (1982) 'Rape : The Intention of Parliament and the Practice of the Courts' 45 Modern Law
Review; Adler, Z. (1982) The Reality of Rape Trials' New Society 4th February; Adler, Z. (1982) 'Rape Law
: The Latest Ruling' New Law Journal 5th August
11 Scottish Law Commission (1983) Evidence : Report on Evidence in Cases ofRape and Other Sexual
Offences para. 12, p. 1 also cited in Brown, B. et al (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial
12 Scottish Courts Administration Consultation Paper, para. 1.3
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As Brown et al (1993) indicate, the aim of the reformers in framing the legislation was to
achieve, overall, a balance. 13 On one side of the scales they wished to minimise the use
of sexual evidence (in order to minimise the ordeal for the complainer), whilst on the other
side of the scales they wished to continue to admit all relevant evidence in order for justice
to be done to the accused. Sexual evidence incorporates both sexual history and sexual
character evidence. Both can refer to many things, for example, sexual experience, past
sexual relations and sexual reputation. Brown et al (1993) distinguish between sexual
history and sexual character and it is their broad categorisations that I adopt here. They
refer to sexual history evidence as specific information about particular facts, individuals
and events. These may be occurrences prior to the alleged sexual offence, but equally, may
occur after it.14 Sexual character, on the other hand, refers to the 'typing' of a person,
usually in moral terms of 'good' and 'bad' on the basis of generalised propensities.15 Whilst
law reform in several jurisdictions has conceded that sexual history evidence may be of
some relevance in sexual offence trials, it is the use of sexual character evidence which has
proved most problematic. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it was also the case
that sexual character proved a thorny issue for the Scottish reformer.
As briefly stated in the Introduction, there were several different reasons given by the
reformers for restricting sexual evidence. In the main these concern the problematic
consequences brought about by the use of sexual evidence. Brown et al (1993) suggest
that the reasons for restricting evidence (and thus averting the potential for problematic
consequences) can be categorised in terms of whether they relate to certain policy goals, or
whether they concern issues of principle relating to the law of evidence.
First, it was recognised by the reformers that the "trauma and distress" caused to the
complainer by "intimate, or possibly embarrassing questioning" was a significant problem which
required to be addressed.16 It was also recognised that fear of the court room ordeal (as
well as that of the police investigation) and a lack of belief in the capacity of the criminal
justice system to achieve justice might be contributing to the unwillingness of victims to
come forward to report sexual assault. Of course, this problem of under-reporting gave rise
to the possibility that offenders were evading justice. Brown et al (1993) term the aim of
13 Brown, B. et at (1993) chapter 1
14 ibid, p.l
15 ibid. p.2
lf> ibid. p. 10
77
minimising distress to the complainer (and thus indirectly addressing the problem of under¬
reporting) as a primarily policy-related goal of the reformers.
This concern with the trauma that dealing with intrusive and embarrassing questioning may
constitute for the complainer echoed in many ways feminist concerns about the subjective
experience of the complainer in the witness box. Giving evidence in a sexual offence trial
has been described by many feminist authors as almost a repetition of the rape itself, a
form of secondary victimisation, a re-living of the original ordeal. Lees (1989), for
example, described the giving of evidence in a rape trial as a "life-threatening experience" for
the complainer; similarly, the depiction of the trial as a grossly intimidating, humiliating
and horrendous experience was reported by the majority of women interviewed by
Chambers and Millar (1986) in their study of the prosecution of rape and rape-related
offences.17 Of course, and as detailed in the previous chapter, it is not surprising to learn
that having to answer questions on personal sexual matters in the public arena of the court
room can be a particularly painful and abhorrent experience. The process of the trial with
its focus on establishing evidence and cross-examination to ascertain the smallest details of
the alleged incident can and does touch upon what many people would consider their most
private concerns, and understandably gives rise to the tensions and fear associated with
giving evidence in criminal trials. The public scrutiny of sexual experiences, sexual
preferences and predilections, together with the production of, for example, photographs of
her body parts, and the presentation of her underwear, can of course produce emotional
reactions of embarrassment and humiliation on the part of the complainer.
In addition to voicing a concern about the complainer's ordeal caused by embarrassing and
intrusive questioning, the reformers were also particularly concerned with what Brown et
al (1993) identify as issues of principle in relation to the law of evidence itself. In Scots
law, at the time of the reform, sexual character evidence whilst admissible (in principle, at
least ) in sexual crimes, was excluded in relation to other crimes. It thus held a rather
anomalous position within the law of evidence. The reformers were concerned with this
anomalous use of sexual character evidence in sexual offence trials and with the
consequences of its' use, particularly with the potential that such evidence had for
prejudicing a jury. In addressing the problems of sexual character evidence, the reformers
had three main aims.
17 Chambers, G. & Millar, A. (1986) Prosecuting Sexual Assault
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As briefly stated in the Introduction, the reformers specifically repudiated the validity of
any sexual character construction of consent. Thus one of the main aims of the Scottish
Law Commission was to outlaw any suggestion that because the complainer had sex with A
or B then she would consent to sex with C.18 In other words, they wished to prohibit a
presumption of 'automatic' or indiscriminate consent by the complainer on the basis of her
sexual history or sexual character. Although this sort of inference had been explicitly
denounced in Scots law, there was a concern (voiced by some) that the practice of inferring
consent on the basis of sexual character was creeping into the court room.
Second, the reformers were concerned with outlawing inferences made in the court room
about the complainer's credibility on the basis of sexual evidence.19 Although there was a
precedent for this sort of inference in Scots law, the reformers repudiated such inference
on the basis that it was archaic and out of touch with contemporary sexual behaviour
patterns.
Third, the reformers were concerned with the possibility that sexual character evidence,
even when not introduced as having a bearing on the issue of consent, may be taken that
way by juries.20
Character Evidence
Many of the concerns of the law reformers centred on the problematic potential of sexual
character evidence. As stated in the Introduction, the notion of 'character' is important in
legal terms. It is usually defined in general moral terms and underpinned by the
polarisations of 'good' and 'bad'. Embodied within the concept of 'character' is the notion of
propensities or disposition towards certain forms of behaviour.21 For example, to be of
'good' or 'bad' character may denote general propensities towards particular forms of
acceptable or unacceptable conduct, such as honesty or dishonesty, although it may also
be used in relation to reputation ('good' = respectable; 'bad' = disreputable or of 'ill repute').
It may also be used to attribute certain other characteristics, such as a disposition or habits
towards certain sorts of conduct. 'Character' evidence is difficult to define precisely
because it takes many forms and could potentially be drawn from any sort of evidence.
Although the specificity of 'sexual' character makes this particular type of evidence
18 Scottish Law Commission (1983) Evidence: Report on Evidence in Cases ofRape and Other Sexual
Offences (Scottish Law Commission No 78) para 5.1
19 ibid. para. 5.3
20 ibid. para. 5.3
21 Wilkinson, A. B. (1986) The Scottish Law ofEvidence p30
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somewhat easier to identify, it too suffers from problems that not only make it difficult to
define precisely, but also render it very difficult to control in the trial setting. In general,
'sexual' character centres on allegations of (or allusions towards) particular forms of sexual
conduct engaged in by the complainer (is she chaste ? lascivious ? promiscuous ? does she
indulge in unusual sexual practices ?); her sexual reputation (is she of impeccable sexual
character or of sexual ill repute? ); and her sexual past (is she virginal or has she had
any/many previous relationships ? ) Obviously, 'bad' sexual character is constructed by
evidence suggesting she is sexually immoral, promiscuous, unchaste, loose,
indiscriminate. The exoneration of being of 'good' sexual character, in contrast, is reliant
on evidence suggesting chastity, probity and sexual propriety.
Whilst 'character' is an accepted legal concept, it is recognised in Scots law that the use of
'character' evidence tends to distort legal judgement and is apt to lead to misrepresentation.
As such, there are a number of protective conditions attached to the use of general
'character' evidence which preclude its use in certain circumstances and which serve to
diminish the tendency towards misrepresentation and distortion. These legal protections
are for witnesses, and particularly for the accused in a case. The conditions dictate the
circumstances in which 'character' evidence can be used in a trial situation. For example,
if a witness makes a claim to possessing a 'good' character, then they lay themselves open
for cross-examination on their character which aims to show 'bad' character. Similarly, the
prosecution may only lead evidence of the accused's character, whether by leading
evidence or by cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, if the accused has set up the
issue of his own character. If an accused were to cast imputations on the character of a
prosecution witness, it would then expose him to cross-examination of his own character.
Sexual Character, Credibility and Consent
The Scottish law reformers were concerned with the concept of sexual character and the
problems associated with sexual character, specifically 'bad' sexual character. Indeed
throughout the process of reform, the thorny question of character evidence was a cause of
much deliberation and a continuing source of anxiety to the reformers. As a result, the
issue of sexual character underwent several reformulations in the process of reform. A
main reason for the reformulation and reification and indeed, for the tentative air in which
the legislators approached the question of sexual character, lay primarily in the state of the
law of evidence in this area, and in particular the way that the question of sexual character
was posed in relation to the issues of consent and credibility.
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Prior to the reform the common law was that in cases of rape the character of the victim in
relation to sexual matters might be the subject of evidence as relevant to the question of the
complainer's consent and to her credibility.22 However, this was subject to fairly stringent
restrictions, in that specific acts of (prior) sexual intercourse with the accused could not be
the subject of such evidence unless proximate in time with the alleged rape (time-
restricted). Neither could acts of intercourse with other men, unless they were part of the
res gestae of the case, that is, part of a set of incidents linked in time and place so as to be
part of the same inter-connected event.23 The authoritative source for this was the 19th
century case of Dickie v HMA.
"... [Concerning] individual acts of unchastity with other men at an interval of
time. I am not aware that such evidence has ever been allowed, and indeed it
could only be allowed upon the footing that a female who yields her person to
one man will presumably do so to any man - a proposition which is quite
untenable." 24
Whilst the position then was to firmly reject as untenable the proposition that a woman who
consents to sex with one person may consent to sex with others on the basis of some
disposition towards general or indiscriminate consent, it was however seen as legitimate to
admit 'bad' sexual character evidence as relevant to the complainer's credibility. There are
two main points of interest here. The first point of interest is that the admission of sexual
character evidence in relation to credibility is an exception to the general rules of evidence
which offer protections with regard to character evidence. But this exception has long been
justified in Scots law in relation to trials for rape and assault with intent to rape on the
basis that:
"... proof of unchastity is circumstantial evidence to rebut the charge: while so
much depends on the truth of her statements, and there is so great a risk of her
story having been concocted in a fit of jealousy or with the view to extorting
money or covering her shame when discovered in a voluntary connection that a
full enquiry into her character is requisite to the jury to estimate her
credibility." 23
22 Dickie v HMA (1897) 24R (J) 82
23 This is in some contrast to the English position where it was accepted that evidence of 'bad' sexual
character was relevant as indicating consent with the accused and that such character could be shown through
evidence of the complainer's sexual history with specific individuals
24 Lord Justice Clerk MacDonald in Dickie v HMA 1897) 2 Adam 331 at p.337 cited in the Scottish Law
Commission Report (1983) para.3.5 p.7
23 Dickson, W.D. Treatise on the Law ofEvidence in Scotland (as updated by SJ Hamilton Grierson) (T &T
Clark, Edinburgh 1887) p.890
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Clearly, this was a situation in which it was envisaged that a woman may lie (or more
accurately, may consent to sex and then lie). This situation - or issue - specific approach is
somewhat characteristic of the Scottish law of evidence in relation to character, in that
certain stipulated situations and/or issues are considered to be relevant to character
evidence and others are not. But this quote also raises other important issues, not least the
inherent difficulties of corroboration in sexual offence trials and the consequent reliance on
the complainer's version of events. The quote also raises the issues of acting out of interest
or motive for lying, which are established aspects of credibility evidence used to test
general credibility in that cross-examination as to credibility may include questions on any
interest that a witness may have in the case, or any motive he or she may have for giving
evidence in the case;26 yet these are put forward by Dickson in the above quote as possible
reasons why sexual character evidence should be allowed to assess specific credibility
issues.
The second point of interest is the implied link between a woman's 'bad sexual character
and repute' and her general credibility, which in a sense forms the background to the
exception cited above. This biased link between sexual character and credibility is not
specific to sexual offence trials. It has a long history in both criminal and civil evidence in
Scotland, most notably in relation to prostitutes, and applies whether a woman was a
victim or simply a witness in a trial. In general, the word of a woman of 'bad' sexual repute
was held to be untrustworthy. In the 19th century case of Dickie v HMA it was stated that
"it seems a relevant subject of enquiry whether the woman was at the time a
person of reputed bad moral character, as bearing on her credibility when
alleging that she has been subjected to criminal violence by one desiring to have
intercourse with her. Such evidence may seriously affect the inferences to be
drawn from her conduct at the time." 27
Thus the view was expressed that if there was evidence that a women was of loose and
immoral character than this evidence could be of importance in relation to her credibility
as to the issue of consent - and also with regard to the veracity of her evidence in general.
Some years before the Scottish Law Commission turned its attention to the reform of
evidence in sexual offence trials, a report by Sheriff MacPhail which focused on sexual
character and credibility, highlighted the problematic link between sexual immorality and
26Wilkinson, A.B. (1986) The Scottish Law ofEvidence p. 160
27 Dickie v HMA (1897) 24R (J) 82
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untruthfulness. The MacPhail Report argued against the acceptability of this link on four
grounds:
1. It is wrong to assume that a witness is likely to tell the truth because he or she
is sexually immoral
2. Evidence of sexual immorality is rightly not generally admitted on the
grounds of its relevance to credibility in any other class of crime
3. Although the evidence is admitted because of its assumed relevance to
credibility, there is a danger that the jury will regard it as having a bearing on
the issue of consent
4. It may be that the present admissibility of evidence of bad reputation has the
result that victims of sexual offences who are of bad character are reluctant to
report the offence to the police. 28
Here, MacPhail is commenting on the broad equation between immorality and
untruthfulness (unchaste women are liars) and the anomalous exception of sexual character
evidence in the class of sexual crimes, but also on the potential deleterious effects of sexual
character evidence in terms of its potential for conflating credibility and consent, and for
contributing to the under reporting of sexual crimes.
The relationship of sexual character to the issue of consent has, at its root, the distinction
between those who are 'chaste' and those who are 'unchaste' - the two opposing images of
'good' and 'bad' women and girls. The stereotypes of 'good' and 'bad' encompass particular
notions of female sexuality - as those 'who do' and those 'who don't'. The implication is
that those who are sexually experienced, who have consented to sex in the past, who have
a sexual character, are more likely to consent to sex again. The articulation of a 'bad'
sexual character sets up the general presumption or propensity towards consent on the part
of the complainer, and as such has met with much censure from feminist critics, who argue
against this notion of generalised consent as erroneous, outdated, and irrelevant. 29
The pernicious use of sexual evidence as an index of the complainer's credibility has also
been the subject of much criticism from feminist writers. Edwards (1981) attributes the
use of sexual evidence to long-held assumptions about the nature of female sexuality
which, over time, have become embodied in statutory law and legal procedure, and which
are reproduced in legal practices within the court room. Specifically, she refers to the
inferred relationship between the sexual character of the complainer and her credibility as a
witness, wherein not only is an 'unchaste' woman, one who possesses a sexual history,
presumed less likely to tell the truth than a 'chaste' woman, but also she is presumed to be
28 MacPhail Report para 16.09
29 See, for example, Adler, A. (1987); Edwards, S. (1981)
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more likely to make false allegations of sexual assault. The informing premise is that
women with sexual histories lie, particularly about sex. It is this particular formulation
which has given rise to the equation of sexual immorality with untruthfulness on the one
hand, and the equation of chaste sexual innocence with truthfulness on the other. These
presumptions linking sexual immorality with truthfulness carry a significant resonance for
the complainer's perceived credibility in the court room. As such, the use of sexual
evidence to undermine a complainer's credibility was one of the key instances of the use of
sexual evidence which the reformers intended to address.
The legal reformers drew specific attention to the unacceptability of the implied link
between immorality (or 'unchasteness') and truthfulness during the discussions and debates
that preceded the passing of the 'shield' legislation. Moreover, they were particularly
concerned with the position regarding the relevance of sexual character evidence. Whilst
they endorsed the principle that lack of chastity or 'bad' sexual character should not be used
to convey a general propensity to indiscriminate consent, they rejected the view that
evidence of sexual character should not be allowed under a blanket exclusion.
Sexual Character and Relevance
The Scottish Law Commission, in their articulation of the problems of sexual character,
were specifically concerned that character evidence was being routinely allowed in sexual
offence trials simply as relevant to the complainer's general credibility. They therefore
proposed a general prohibition on 'bad' sexual character evidence on the grounds that such
evidence is uncertain and unspecifying and
"opens the door to much that is irrelevant .... To admit such evidence is ...
inconsistent with contemporary sexual attitudes; it may cause unnecessary
distress to a complainer, and it may divert a jury from the proper issues in the
case ... [it is] unlikely to be relevant to credibility or to a proper determination of
the issues in a case."
This mirrors to some extent the problems pinpointed by MacPhail. However, it also
highlights one of the main concerns voiced by the reformers and reiterated throughout the
reform process, and that was the concern that the complainer be protected from undue and
unnecessary, and possibly embarrassing, questioning about her sexual life. Clearly, it was
thought that sexual character evidence had the potential for causing distress to the
complainer. In a similar vein, MacPhail referred to the potential that such evidence had for
contributing to a reluctance to report by victims of sexual offences.
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There was also another important point of convergence between MacPhail and the Scottish
Law Commission, and that was on the point of the relevance of evidence. The legal
concept of relevance is a double-edged sword, as it were. On the one hand, relevance is a
legal principle for excluding evidence, and the Scottish Law Commission strongly endorsed
as irrelevant the exclusion of evidence introduced on the basis that because a woman has
had consensual sex with A and B in the past, she can therefore be presumed to have
consented with C - that is, a predisposition to consent constructed and introduced on the
basis of sexual character. But unlike the old common law formulation, they saw no reason
to restrict this to trials for rape and assault with intent to rape, but envisaged that it should
apply to all crimes of a sexual nature.30 Whilst there was no specific mention of, for
example, the age-related offences and other sexual offences involving young complainers,
nonetheless they were included in this wide inclusionary sweep. By so doing, the problems
of sexual character evidence were also seen (albeit implicitly) to apply equally in sexual
offences involving young complainers. Additionally, the Scottish Law Commission also
endorsed the old common law principle that evidence of unchastity cannot be used as
evidence of a general propensity to consent and thus, theoretically at least, severed the
implied link between unchastity and 'automatic' consent.
On the other hand, relevance is also used as a principle for including evidence. It must be
borne in mind that the reformers were also concerned with striking a balance between
minimising undue questioning of the complainer and allowing all relevant evidence in
order for justice to be done to the accused. It is clear from their deliberations that, with
regard to the issue of justice being done to the accused, the criterion for admissibility of
sexual evidence was to be its relevance to issues in the trial. It is also clear that the
reformers envisaged that there would be some situations and circumstances in which sexual
evidence would be relevant. The Scottish Law Commission followed the format of
specifying certain situations wherein sexual evidence would be relevant. These included
the situation where the defence was one of 'mistaken belief in consent'. In such a case, if
the complainer had a 'bad' sexual reputation and the accused knew of it, then such evidence
would be admitted. Also included was the situation where the complainer was a prostitute,
evidence of which was seen as relevant and should be admitted in the trial.
They also envisaged that past sexual behaviour between the complainer and the accused
would "normally be relevant" evidence unless the past sexual behaviour was a "chance encounter"
which took place in the distant past. Although not explicitly articulated, they seemed to
30 Although, in the end, the legislation did not apply to clandestine injury nor to incest offences
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regard recent sexual relations between the complainer and the accused as relevant to the
issue of consent.
A further important consideration about the concept of relevance is raised by MacPhail's
third ground for prohibiting sexual character evidence, that of the possible danger of
conflation. This raised the point that evidence admitted as relevant to credibility, might
mistakenly be applied to the issue of consent by the jury. In other words, that evidence of
promiscuity may be seen to have more bearing on consent rather than truthfulness. The
Scottish Law Commission, whilst at first not explicit about the possibilities of conflation in
the same way as MacPhail, referring as they did to the tendency of sexual character
evidence to deflect the attention of the jury from the 'proper' issues in the case, later on in
the reform process stated that
"In cases of rape or similar assaults evidence that the complainer was of bad
moral character or that she associated with prostitutes should no longer be
admitted as being relevant to credibility." 31
There were other related considerations concerning sexual character evidence that occupied
the Scottish Law Commission in relation to sexual character. In the main, these were
concerns about the possibility of distinction between sexual character and general 'bad'
character in the context of sexual offence trials; discussions concerning the precise wording
of the statutory clause to be employed to exclude sexual character evidence, and
particularly whether there was to be a general or a specific exclusionary clause.
The Scottish "Shield" Legislation
The balancing aims of the reformers are distinctly visible in the formulation of the
legislation. The Scottish legislation takes the form of broad exclusions followed by a series
of exceptions (see Appendix II). The exclusionary section bars any evidence that shows or
tends to show :
• the complainer is not of good character in relation to sexual matters;
• the complainer is a prostitute or an associate of prostitutes, and;
• any discussion of sexual behaviour not forming part of the subject matter of the charge
It excludes sexual evidence and questioning concerning the complainer and persons other
than the accused, and also - and this is something that is not found in other jurisdictions - it
31 Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum No.46
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excludes in the first instance any evidence of the complainer's past sexual behaviour with
the accused.32 The exclusion is mandatory and is thus in force unless a formal application
is made by the defence to the court to introduce the prohibited evidence under one (or
more) of the exceptions. So although the 'shield' legislation specifically excludes certain
evidence or questioning nevertheless such evidence is allowed back in under certain
exceptions to the general exclusion. The exceptions relate to evidence which :
• explains or rebuts evidence adduced by the Crown
• concerns behaviour taking place on the same occasion as the behaviour in the charge
• is relevant to a defence of incrimination
• is contrary to the interests of justice
The court has the power to limit any questioning by the defence made on application. As
Brown et al (1993) point out, this is primarily to control the potential open-endedness of the
'interests of justice' exception.33
The Crown is exempt from the prohibitions. The Scottish Law Commission envisaged that
the restrictions would not apply to the sorts of evidence that the Crown would introduce in
laying out the prosecution case. They did not see that this would conflict with the intention
of protecting complainers from unnecessary questioning, since they were of the view that
the problems associated with (defence) questioning of past sexual behaviour did not arise in
prosecution questioning. There was some opposition to this view, notably from Rape
Crisis Centres who felt not only that this would leave the Crown free from control by the
Court, but also that the Crown, in practice, did in fact ask distressing questions which
caused unnecessary embarrassment. This was backed up by the research findings of
Chambers and Millar (1986) who found that prosecution questioning of a complainer
occurred quite frequently 34 They found that the prosecution often focused on the
complainer's 'good' sexual character, especially lack of sexual experience. Not only did this
set up an equation of lack of sexual experience with 'virtue' which, as a form of
stereotyping, was almost as invidious as equating sexual experience with being 'sexually
'loose', but it also set up a situation whereby the prosecution, by introducing 'good'
character evidence laid open the complainer to counter attack by the defence.
32 The English/Welsh legislation, ss. 2 and 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 excludes only
the complainer's sexual behaviour with others
33 Brown et al (1993) p.45
34 Chambers, G. & Millar, A (1986) p. 137-141, cited in Brown, B. et al (1993) p.45
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To sum up, the 'problems' of sexual character evidence then lie primarily in the perceived
harmful effects of such evidence in terms of its potential for misrepresentation and
distortion, but also, specifically, in its anomalous position in sexual offence trials and in its
implications for the questions of credibility and of consent. These were the prejudicial
effects that the legislators aimed to curb. Sexual character evidence, then, was to be
excluded unless it had genuine relevance to issues in the trial. Even more specifically the
legislators aimed to exclude two types of evidential constructions stemming from the use of
sexual character evidence. These were a) that the complainer is promiscuous and therefore
a liar, and: b) that the complainer consented to sex with A and B and therefore consented
to sex with C.
As a result of the reform deliberations, the old common law rules regulating the use of
sexual bad character were superseded by the 'shield' legislation, so that, presently,
questioning designed to elicit evidence which shows or tends to show that the complainer,
is not of good character in relation to sexual matters is specifically excluded (see Appendix
I for precise details of the 'shield' legislation). The resultant prohibition on sexual character
evidence is a very important prohibition. Not only is it an extremely wide-ranging
prohibitionary clause that could potentially cover any sort of evidence which, directly or
indirectly, ascribes a dubious sexual character to the complainer but it also, on the face of
it, relates quite closely to feminist criticisms of the use of stereotyping in the courtroom. It
is not only the ascription of stereotypical characterisations, but the subsequent assassination
on the basis of the stereotype that feminist writers have found so objectionable. As will be
shown in the following chapters, stereotyping can be done through innuendo and
implication just as much as direct statements, and one of the recurring themes under
discussion by the legislators concerned the use of sexual character innuendo and inference
and, relatedly, the potential for the blurring of non-sexual and sexual character innuendo in
sexual offence trials. This aspect of sexual character construction is of some significance
and, obviously, very difficult to control within the trial setting. It will be described in more
detail later in the thesis (see Chapter Six).
As previously stated, during the reform process, the crime of rape was referred to as
throughout as the paradigm instance. There was very little discussion of other types of
sexual offences, still less on offences which specifically relate to young victims.
Nonetheless the legislation, in its final formulation specifically covered virtually all of the
sexual offences (see Appendix II). Whether trials for sexual offences involving young
complainers demonstrate the problems that the reformers attributed to rape trials involving
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adult complainers and, relatedly, whether the rape paradigm can be extended to those




This chapter details the numerical findings generated by the main means of data collection,
that of court observation. Information about the observed cases - the crimes and offences,
verdicts and sentences - is recorded in this chapter, as is some information about the
complainer, such as her age and her relationship to the accused.
The Cases
Over a period of three years, 94 sexual offence cases with female complainers aged under
17 years were observed in the Sheriff and High Courts in the central belt of Scotland -
specifically in courts in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Stirling, Dundee, and Jedburgh. In the
Sheriff Courts, cases were observed which were heard under summary procedure (sheriffs
sitting alone) and under solemn procedure (sheriffs sitting with a 15 person jury). In the
High Courts, trials were heard by a judge and 15 person jury. The cases are referred to by
an identification number (1 to 94) throughout the thesis. Details of each case, giving
information on type of court, charge(s), age of complainer, plea, verdict, and sentence,
are given in Appendix I.
Contested Trials
Fifty three of the 94 observed cases culminated in a full contested trial where all of the
evidence was led and a verdict reached. Thirty trials were heard in the High Court, five
were heard in the Sheriff Court under solemn procedure, and 18 were heard in the Sheriff
Court under summary procedure. Trials varied substantially in length. Some were heard in
one day, others took up to seven days, although the majority were completed within three
days.
Twenty three (43%) of the 53 contested trials resulted in the full acquittal of the accused,
that is, the accused was acquitted on all of the charges which formed the case. The
breakdown of acquittals was as follows:
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(i.e. case withdrawn, deserted pro loco,
no case to answer, acquitted by judge)
6
Total 23
Thirty (57%) trials involved a guilty verdict. This does not mean however that the accused
was found guilty on all of the charges which formed the case. Seven of those 30 trials
involved multiple charges, and the accused was found guilty on one or more charge, but
acquitted on other (often more serious) charges. In ten of the 30 trials where guilty
verdicts were returned, it was for reduced, or less serious, charges than the original
charges. In two of these trials, the original charges remained, but were subject to deletions
in the detail of the offences. In the other eight trials, the original charges were reduced or
dropped altogether. For example, in case 1 the original charge was assault with intent to
rape, the final charge was indecent assault. In case 37 the original charges were rape and
indecent assault. The charge of rape was reduced to one of 'unlawful sex with a girl under
16 years' (s.4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976) and a guilty verdict returned,
and the second charge of indecent assault was dropped. Thus of the 30 trials which
involved a guilty verdict, in only 12 instances was there a guilty verdict returned against
all of the charges in the case. Guilty verdicts in contested trials are thus not as
straightforward as they may at first appear.
In the vast majority of contested trials where a guilty verdict was returned, a plea in
mitigation was given and a sentencing decision was made there and then. However, there
were 4 cases where sentencing was deferred pending further reports (all of these were heard
in the Sheriff court).
A custodial sentence was the most common disposal, given in 16 cases, and sentence
length ranged from three months to life imprisonment. Monetary penalties were imposed
in six cases, (ranging from £50 to £300); one year deferred sentences were given in two
cases; and a community service order of 100 hours was imposed in one case. In one case
involving three accuseds, two were given a year's probation and the third 50 hours of




In 41 of the observed cases, the accused(s) pled guilty. For the purposes of this analysis, the
term 'guilty plea' is used in a general sense to cover all the various manners in, and stages
at, which a plea of guilty was given by the accused. Within this general categorisation
there are, however, different types of guilty plea. For example, in two observed cases, the
accused pled guilty during the trial after a substantial amount of prosecution evidence had
been led ("late guilty pleas"). In 30 observed cases the accused pled guilty on the day set
for the trial in advance of any evidence being led ("trial day pleas"). Here, the accuseds had
initially pled not guilty at the preliminary pleading diet, and hence a date for the trial was
set, subsequently there was a change of plea from not guilty to guilty, and the guilty plea
was tendered on the day of the trial in advance of it going ahead. Therefore, no evidence
was led. It should be noted that, in the vast majority of these guilty plea cases, the
accused did one of three things, either
a) where there were multiple charges involved, the accused tendered a 'mixed plea' that is,
pled guilty to some of the charges and not guilty to other charges contained in the
indictment,
b) where there was a single charge, the accused pled guilty to a lesser charge, or
c) the accused pled guilty to the charge as broadly outlined in the indictment but with
(often several and substantial) deletions or alterations to the substance of the charge.
It was very rare for the accused to plead guilty as charged to all charges. Moreover, in all
observed guilty plea cases, 'mixed' pleas, and charges with alterations and/or deletions
were accepted by the prosecution.
The remaining nine guilty plea cases were those where the accused pled guilty at the
preliminary pleading diet, and consequently an 'accelerated' hearing date was set on which
to decide sentence. These cases are heard under s.102 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act (called here's 102' cases). Where s. 102 cases are heard, the prosecution gives a brief
account of the facts of the case, the defence offers a plea in mitigation, and a sentence is
given. No evidence is led.
Of the 32 trial day and late guilty plea cases, 29 were heard in the High Court, and six in
the Sheriff Court (three under solemn and three under summary procedure). All nine s.102
cases were heard in the High Court.
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Table 2 shows the breakdown of type of guilty plea.








In all types of guilty plea cases, the prosecution gave a summary of the facts of the case,
including some details concerning the defendant, and a plea in mitigation was given by the
defence. All defendants were legally represented. Sentence was passed in 36 cases, with
five sentences deferred pending the receipt of reports. Custodial sentences were given in
the vast majority of cases (29). Of those remaining, a fine was given in two cases (£150 and
£225); probation orders were given in two cases; a one year deferred sentence in one case
and a hospital order in one case.
The Charges
Appendix I sets out exact details of both the initial and final charges involved in each case.
It is worth noting here, however, that the charges covered the full range of sexual offences
under common law and statutory law. In several cases, there were alternative charges
offered in the indictment, see for example, cases 26, 30 and 59 in Appendix I.
Many of the cases involved different types of sexual offences and different numbers of
charges. Some cases involve a single sexual charge (or a single sexual charge with a bail
contravention charge); others involved seven or eight charges of a sexual nature; still more
involved a mixture of sexual and non-sexual charges. It is difficult to represent this amount
of diversity and complexity in one table, so this information is broken down into those
cases which involve a single sexual offence and those which involve more than one sexual
offence and so is contained in two tables. Thirty of the contested trials involved a single
sexual charge, and 13 of the guilty plea cases involved a single sexual charge.
Table 3 shows the offences in single sexual charge cases (included in this table are those
cases where there was also a charge of contravention of bail in addition to the single sexual
offence). Where alternative charges are given, type of offence refers to the first, rather than
the alternative charge.
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Table 3. Charges in Single Sexual Offence Cases
Offences Trials Guiltu Pleas Total
n. n. n.
Rape 10 10
Attempted Rape 3 3 6
Indecent Assault 1 1 2
Leiud and Libidinous Practices 7 4 11
Assault LUith Intent to Rape 2 — 2
s.4 Sexual Offences (S) Act 1976 4 — 4
s.3 Sexual Offences (S) Act 1976 — 1 1
Incest — 1 1
s.2A Incest & Related Offences Act — 2 2
s.2C Incest & Related Offences Act — 1 1
Indecent Behauiour 1 — 1
Indecent Exposure 1 — 1
Breach of Peace (with indecency) 1 — 1
Total 30 13 43
This table shows that the cases demonstrate a wide range of sexual offences, although the
majority of single sexual charge cases were rape and lewd and libidinous practices. All
single charge rape cases were contested and resulted in a full trial. All accuseds in the
single charge incest and incest-related cases pled guilty, and hence no trial took place.
Considerably more contested trials than guilty plea cases involved a single sexual charge,
and this will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter under the section Single and
Multiple Charges.
In 23 of the 53 contested trial cases there was more than one sexual offence charged.
Similarly, twenty eight of the guilty plea cases involved more than one sexual charge. The
figures in Table 4 relate to numbers of cases. There were a wide spread of different types
of sexual offences. Table 4 sets out the numbers of cases which involved one or more of the
sexual charges listed under offences For example, 13 contested trial cases involved at
least one charge of rape, as did nine guilty plea cases; 10 contested trial cases involved a
charge of lewd and libidinous practices and behaviour, as did 18 guilty plea cases. As in the
single charge cases, rape and lewd and libidinous practices were the most common charges,
occurring, respectively in a total of 22 and 28 multiple charge cases. As in the single
charge cases, cases involving incest and incest related offences tended to end up as guilty
pleas rather than contested trials.
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Single and Multiple Charges
The vast majority of contested trials (45 of the 53, or 85%) involved a single complainer.
Of these, 29 involved a single sexual charge and a single accused ( called here 'single
complainer, single charge' cases). One other trial involved a single complainer, a single
charge, but two accuseds.
In 13 trials involving one single complainer and a single accused, multiple charges of a
sexual nature were involved (called here 'single complainer, multiple charge' cases). There
were another two cases involving single complainers and multiple charges (cases 35 and
52) where there was more than one accused involved, respectively three accuseds and four
accuseds.
There were only 8 contested trials involving more than one complainer and multiple
charges (called here 'multiple complainer, multiple charge' cases), that is, 15% of contested
trials. Of these, five involved two complainers, two involved two complainers, and one
case involved four complainers. All involved a single accused.
1 This refers to the total number ofmultiple charge cases involving one or more sexual offences of the
type hsted in the left hand side of the table.
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In the guilty pleas cases, the picture was somewhat different. Twenty seven of the 41 guilty
plea cases involved a single complainer. Thirteen of these involved a single complainer
and a single charge, and fourteen involved a single complainer and multiple charges. There
were however 14 guilty plea cases which involved more than one complainer. These
differences between contested trials and guilty plea cases are best displayed in tabulated
form.
Table 5 Charges and Complainers in Contested Trials and Guilty Pleas
Trials Guiltu pleas
Single complainer, single charge 30 (57%) 13(32%)
Single complainer, multiple charge 15 (28%) 14(34%)
Multiple complainer, multiple charge 8(15%) 14 (347>)
Total 53 (100%) 41 (100%)
From these figures, it appears that the guilty pleas cases that were observed in this study
were characterised by multiple charges, that is 68% of guilty plea cases involved multiple
charges. Contested trials, on the other hand, appear to be characterised less by multiple
charges (43%) and more by single complainers.
Multiple charges, obviously, offer more leeway for pleading guilty to a reduced number of
charges. When the actual numbers of multiple complainers and multiple charges are
considered, differences between contested trials and guilty plea cases in this regard become
more evident. Multiple complainer, multiple charge guilty plea cases involve higher
numbers of complainer and more charges than in contested trials, see for example case 54
which involved seven complainers and ten charges; case 71 which involved 13 complainers
and 13 charges; and case 78 which involved six complainers and seven charges.
The Complainers
Age
The 94 observed cases involved a total of 133 young female complainers, all under the age
of 17 at the time that the case came to court. The issue of the time distance between the
alleged sexual incident(s) and when cases actually came to court is fairly complex. In the
majority of cases - 51 of the 53 contested trials and 36 of the 41 guilty plea cases - less
than a year had elapsed between the alleged sexual incident(s) and the case reaching court.
However, in a substantial number of these cases (22) all of which involved multiple sexual
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charges, sexual relations between the complainer and accused had taken place over a
period of several years. In these cases, sexual relations between the accused and the
complainer had commenced three, five, even eight years before coming to light. However
the time-lapse between the last sexual incident and the time that the case came to court was
approximately one year. The complainer was therefore not much older than she was at the
time of the last incident(s). In a smaller number of cases (6) much longer periods (of
between two to five years) had elapsed between the last sexual incident and the case
coming to court. In such cases, therefore the complainer was considerably older at the time
of the trial than she had been at the time of the last incident(s).
The 53 contested trials involved a total of 65 complainers. The age-breakdown of those
complainers when the case came to trial was as follows:
Table 6 Rges of complainers at time of contested trial
Years no (%1
4-6 yrs 3 (4)
7 - 9 yrs 2 (3)
10-12 yrs 14 (22)
13-15 yrs 26 (40)
16 - 17 yrs 20 (31)
Total 65 (100%)
Nearly three-quarters (71%) were teenagers aged between 13 and 17 years when they gave
evidence in court. 22% were aged between 10 years and 13 years. A small percentage (7%)
were aged under 9 years old.
In guilty plea cases, complainers are not required to give evidence, although in most cases
where a trial-day plea was given, the complainers were present at court awaiting the trial to
commence. No complainers were present at the s.102 hearings.
After a plea of guilty from the accused, the prosecution summarises the case, and gives the
name, age and address (usually c/o a Police Office) of the complainer(s). This information
is also recorded on the indictment. In the 41 guilty plea cases, the ages of the 68
complainers at the time that the case was heard in court were as follows:
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In the guilty pleas cases, just over half (53%) were teenagers aged between 13 years and 17
years. 27% were aged between 10 years and 12 years, and 13% were aged between 7 years
and 9 years.
Relationship to Accused
One of the most striking characteristics of cases involving young female complainers is the
degree of prior relationship that exists between the complainer and the accused. Indeed,
many of the charges involved in such cases point specifically to the degree of relationship.
Offences under the Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986, for example,
presuppose a particular relationship. Specifically, ss 2A, 2B and 2C of the Act refer to
relationships of consanguinity and adoption, step-relationships and breaches of authority
and trust, respectively.
In an overwhelming majority of cases, the accused was already known to the complainer -
and in most cases the accused had been known to the complainer for a long period of time.
There were also some cases where the accused could be described as a casual or short-term
acquaintance, having been known to the complainer for a short time prior to the incident.
A small number of cases involved total strangers - where they did, this was most often in
cases of indecent exposure, or breaches of the peace which involved some form of
indecency, although some involved charges of rape or attempted rape.
In most cases the relationship between the complainer and the accused was one of blood or
affinity, but there were several cases - where the accuseds were neighbours, mother's co¬
habitees, and friends of the family - which involved relationships of trust and/or authority.
The following table shows the relationship between complainers and accuseds in contested
trials.
98
Table 8 Relationship Between Complainer and Recused in Contested Trials
Tupe of Relationship No. of Complainers %_
Consanguine 10 15%
(e.g. daughter, grand-daughter, niece, sister)
Step Relation 4 6%
(e.g. step-daughter, step-granddaughter)
Liuing in same household 6 9%
(e.g. mother's cohabitee, lodger)
Family friend 8 13%
(e.g. baby-sitter, father's Luorkmate)
Neighbour 4 6%
Long-term Rcquaintance 19 29%
(e.g. friend's uncle, father's employer)
Short -term Rcquaintance 5 8%
(e.g. met in Lueek preceding incident)
Stranger 9 14%
Total 65 100%
Ten (15%) of contested tnal cases involved a blood relationship, ten (15%) involved a non-
blood relationship, but the complainer and accused were living in the same household (four
of these involved step-relations). Taken together, the categories of neighbour and family
friend and long-term acquaintance constitute 48% of cases.
As Table 9 shows, (over page) the guilty plea cases were very striking in terms of the
closeness of the relationship between the complainer and the accused. There were close
blood relationships in 31% of the guilty plea cases, and in an additional 26% of cases, the
complainer and accused shared the same household, either as step or foster relations, or
where the accused was a lodger or the child's mothers' cohabitee). In 26% of cases the
accused was some form of long-term acquaintance of the complainer or the complainer's
family. As in the contested trial cases, the accused was a stranger in 8% of cases.
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Table 9 Relationship Between Compiainer and Recused in Guilty Plea cases
Tupe of Relationship No. of Complainers %
Consanguine 21 31%
(e.g. daughter, grand-daughter, niece, sister)
Step Relation 9 9%
(e.g. step-daughter, step-granddaughter)
Foster Relation 2 3%
(e.g. foster daughter)
Liuing in same household 9 13%
(e.g. child of cohabitee, lodger)
Family friend 7 10%
(e.g. baby-sitter, old friend)
Neighbour 4 6%
Long-term Rcquaintance 7 10%
(e.g. local bus driuer, friend's uncle,
community worker, )
Short -term Rcquaintance 4 6%
(e.g. met in week preceding incident)
Stranger 5 8%
Total 68 100%
Analysis of the empirical observation data tentatively suggests certain differences between
contested trials and guilty plea cases. The research documents a fairly high rate of guilty
pleas made in advance of a trial. One may speculate on the basis of the data assembled here
that, by and large, 'guilty plea' cases share some common characteristics. In general, whilst
contested trials appear to be characterised by single, mainly teenage, complainers, guilty
plea cases appear to be characterised by multiple charges which often involve multiple
complainers who tend to be younger in age than those in the contested trials. This tends to
suggest that cases involving several complainers are more likely to involve a guilty plea.
There may be a number of reasons for this, other than the most obvious that the accused
decides to admit his guilt. The scope for a mixed plea (guilty to some charges, not guilty to
others) is obviously far greater in these cases than in those involving a single compiainer,
single charge. Hence the accused may plead guilty to some and not to others in the hope of
a lesser sentence overall. It may be that the potential for corroboration is enhanced in cases
involving several complainers, given that Scotland adheres to the Moorov doctrine whereby
evidence of similar fact can provide corroboration. It may be that, faced with the prospect
of evidence emanating from several sources, the accused decides to plead guilty. There are
other, social (and family) pressures on those accused of sexual offences with children
(particularly if there is a blood relationship) to plead guilty, and thus 'spare the child' the
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ordeal of giving evidence in court. It may be that these pressures prevail (if one recalls also
that many of these cases involved fairly young children), and the accused pleads guilty.
One may also speculate about the reasons for the finding that contested trials tend to
involve single complainers, again apart from the obvious one that the accused is innocent
and wishes to prove a false allegation. Obviously, the potential for corroborating evidence
is diminished where there is only one complainer. These cases also tend to involve older
teenage complainers. It may be that the accused decides (or is advised ) to take his chance
in court in the hope that the complainer will crumble in the witness box or be vulnerable
to attacks as to her credibility.
Both contested and guilty plea cases are characterised by close and long-term prior
relationships between the complainer and the accused. That the majority of sexual offenecs
take place between those who are known to each other rather than between strangers has
been repeatedly documented by other research. However, it was also the case in this
particular research that there are a higher percentage of consanguine relationships in the
guilty plea cases. Similarly, a much higher percentage of guilty plea cases contained incest
and incest-related offences than contested trials. Again, one may speculate that family
pressures and dynamics may mean that the accused is more likely to plead guilty where
there is a very close relationship, than in those cases where there is not. Of course, the
sample is relatively small and accused's were not interviewed as to their motivation for
pleading guilty or not guilty. As such all of this is tentative speculation, and further
research is needed in this area.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL CHARACTER
As outlined in the Introduction, a main concern of this thesis is with the ways in which
evidence about the young complainer - in particular information about her sexuality - is
elicited and deployed in the court room, and the way that it is used in the construction of
sexual character. This is the focus of this chapter. Using data from the observation of
trials, it will be argued that in most sexual offence trials, a number of active and quite
specific processes take place throughout the trial which, cumulatively, feed into and inform
the construction of a 'sexual character' which can be attributed to the young female
complainer. It was also stated in the Introduction that sexual character is the conduit
through which stereotypical images of young female sexuality are channelled and applied
in the court room. The process by which this takes place will be described here. By
examining the process of character construction, what goes on in the trial can be explicated,
however it is important to state that this should not be construed as giving a justification for
the application of stereotypical images of female sexuality in the court room. Rather, what
is interesting is the process by which such stereotypical images become installed and
embedded in court room practice.
Ascribing a sexual character to the complainer seems to be a crucial component of the
defence argument, in a sense regardless of the form(s) that the defence argument might take
during the trial. Whether the defence aim appears to be merely to undermine or cast doubt
on the prosecution case or, more actively, to try to show that the complainer fabricated,
imagined or consented to the sex, this is commonly accompanied by attempts by the
defence to show sexual character. Additionally, and of central relevance to this discussion,
the first of the general exclusions put into place by the Scottish 'shield' legislation states
that the court is not to admit or allow questioning designed to elicit evidence which shows
or tends to show that the complainer "is not of good character in relation to sexual
matters."1 Yet despite the restrictions set up by the legislation on the use of such evidence,
sexual character construction does continue to go on in Scottish sexual offence trials,
largely with the effects that the legislation aimed to prevent.2 Whilst blatant character
attacks are relatively rare,3 court room observation indicates that sexual character evidence
1 s 141A (1) (a). Unless there is an application to introduce such evidence on the grounds that a) it is
designed to explain or rebut evidence adduced or to be adduced otherwise by or on behalf of the accused; or
b) it relates to sexual behaviour which took place on the same occasion as the alleged offence, or is relevant
to incrimination, or c) its exclusion would be contrary to the interests of justice
2 see Brown, B. et al (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial especially chapter 12 for an analysis of the effectiveness of
the 'shield' legislation
3 see Brown et al (1993) chapters six and seven for a breakdown of the use of applications under the
exception clauses of the legislation to introduce sexual character evidence
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does in fact persist across all types of sexual offence trials under both solemn and
summary jurisdiction and is not restricted to trials for rape or rape-related offences. It is
also, and this is the main concern of this chapter, a strong feature of sexual offence trials
involving young complainers. Here again it is not restricted to rape trials, but is also found
in trials for statutory sexual offences.
Before embarking on a fuller discussion of the research findings, it is important to
emphasise the multifunctionality of evidence, that is, that evidence in a trial can be applied
to more than one issue. This is particularly pertinent here because, whilst the aim of the rest
of this chapter is to try to show how sexual character is constructed, I will be drawing on
evidence that, in addition to suggesting or conveying sexual character, may also have been
introduced in the trial situation by the defence for another specific purpose, for example, in
relation to a particular issue such as consent, or to test credibility or reliability. Evidence is
used in a number of ways throughout the trial, so whilst a particular piece of evidence may
be specifically and explicitly used to address an issue such as the complainer's sexual
behaviour with someone other than the accused, it also has implicit connotations and
resonances for the construction of her sexual character.
Ascribing Character
This chapter describes in some detail the main processes which contribute to the
construction of 'sexual character' in trials involving young female complainers. In so
doing, it traces the ways in which character is built up and is developed during the trial
by, amongst other things, the eliciting of evidence, the interpretation of that evidence
and, crucially, the deployment of forceful and evocative images of the young female
complainer which are used to suggest and convey sexual character. It also describes the
relationship between the imputation of sexual character and credibility and, to a lesser
extent, its relationship to consent. Predisposition towards consent is implied by the defence
in a number of ways throughout the trial, and the dynamics involved in the specific
construction of the consenting complainer are dealt with in fuller detail in the following
chapter.
An important preliminary point to be made in advance of this discussion, and one which
will be returned to periodically throughout the subsequent sections, is that the construction
of a sexual character for a girl or young women does proceed very much along the same
lines as does the construction of sexual character for adult women, and the basic polarities
of 'good' and 'bad' which underpin the depiction of adult women as someone who is
promiscuous, indiscriminate and likely to consent are also present. However, there are
some important variations in that what is played up by the defence in such constructions is
not so much 'bad' sexual character, but sexual character in itself. It appears that any
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evidence of a sexual character, in a sense irrespective of whether it is "bad' sexual
character is sought by the defence. For young women and girls, to have a sexual
character at all, to be shown to be a 'sexual being' is the potentially damning equivalent -
in defence terms at least - of 'bad' sexual character for an adult women. The aim of sexual
character formulation - with it's 'bad' girl moral undertones, appears to be the presentation
of the complainer as someone who is likely to consent, the juvenile corollary of the
consenting adult complainer.
Connotation and Inference
As well as being specifically addressed through the use of evidence which is directly sexual
in nature, such as evidence of promiscuity, or loose morals, sexual character can also be
connoted through evidence that, in itself, is not overtly sexual. For example, sexual
character can be conjured through references to the complainer's general lifestyle, her
choice of friends, or her preferred leisure activities. Whilst not directly sexual in
themselves - indeed at first seemingly innocuous - such topics are given sexual
connotations in the context of the trial. Repeated reference to such information throughout
the trial and in conjunction with more explicitly sexual evidence can effectively result in
the building up a picture of the complainer's sexual character. Indeed, this particular
problem of non-sexual evidence being used to connote sexual character was cited explicitly
in the Parliamentary Committee debates which preceded the formulation of the 'shield'
legislation, as the following quotation demonstrates:
"In cities such as Glasgow, Dundee or Edinburgh, it is not difficult to envisage
situations where the line of evidence may be, 'Were you at such-and-such pubhc
house ? Were you there on your own ? Were you there at 11.30 at night? " My
hon. and learned friend could doubtless continue a skilful line of
questioning without mentioning the word 'sex' for a considerable time, but his
questions would clearly hint that the girl had loose morals and went out late at
night into dives of low character. The implication to the jury might be that if
someone carried on in such a way she might be prepared to engage in sexual
intercourse. The chain of questioning might establish that there had been consent
on her part. "4
Connoting character may involve asking questions which carry certain character
implications, e.g. questions about lifestyle as in the above quote, but also through the
inferences that can be drawn from such information. As Brown et al (1993) found in the
case of adult complainers, quite specific inferences can be drawn from questions
concerning marital status, particularly if juxtaposed with questions concerning numbers of
children. The current research found that, in the case of younger complainers, information
concerning contraception and of course, virginity, can have a similar effect. Similarly,
questions concerning dates of past pregnancy and/or abortions which may not be directly
4 Parliamentary Committee debate quoted in Hansard, Col 878,26 March 1985. Statement made by Peter
Fraser, then Solicitor-General for Scotland
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sexual in themselves, but the inferences that can be drawn - particularly if the complainer is
young - can be potentially damaging in terms of her character. During the court
observation of trials, involving young complainers, it appeared as if the defence was
eliciting lifestyle information solely in order to get at the latent meaning implicit within
such evidence and so draw out it's character implications. Very often there is no evidential
justification by the defence for this sort of line of questioning. It is the connotation of
sexual character through implication, inference, innuendo and subtle suggestion that is so
very difficult to control. In addition to this sort of connotation, there are the allusions and
innuendoes drawn by the defence (and also by other witnesses called to give evidence).
These are quite difficult to represent in a written form as often, whilst the question itself
may appear innocuous, the suggestion or implication is made by gesture or tone of voice.
At times, 'character-loaded' questions may be put rhetorically by the defence, yet at others
a question may not be put to a witness at all, but the suggestion or implication is made by
the defence in the form of an aside to the jury, or stated during the defence summing up.
At the level of due process, the use of suggestion and innuendo by the defence to denote
character is one way of avoiding gross character attacks which would probably rebound
back on the defence, because under the rules of evidence, if an accused (via the defence)
were to cast aspersions on the character of a prosecution witness, it would then expose him
to cross-examination of his own character by the prosecution.
The Use OfSexual Stereotypes
The most pervasive - and seemingly effective - way of developing and then ascribing
character in sexual offence trials is through the accumulation of evidence drawn from a
number of different sources. Such evidence can be elicited, not only from the complainer
herself, but from a range of other sources that can be drawn on in the trial. For example,
evidence that, directly or indirectly, has implications for sexual character can be elicited
from other witnesses in the trial; it can also be drawn from a wide range of physical
evidence, such as forensic evidence which suggests sexual activity with someone other than
the accused or, equally, from the production of the clothing worn by the complainer, and;
as clearly documented by Brown et al (1993), from information concerning gynaecological
and medical history - such as past pregnancies and/or abortions or contraceptive practices -
all of which may be gleaned from the medical report submitted routinely as part of the
Crown productions.5
Taken together, verbal testimony from different witnesses, physical and/or forensic
evidence, and the inferences that can be drawn from such evidence have a cumulative
effect, so that constantly throughout the trial a picture is being built up of the complainer,
5 Brown, B. et al (1993) p.77
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a picture which shows the type of girl she is; the type of background she hails from; the
types of friends she associates with; the type of lifestyle she leads. Evidence from a variety
of sources is woven by the defence into a picture of a particular type of girl - who can be
summed up as 'that kind of a girl' - which denotes someone who is the type of girl who
demonstrates some interest in sex, the type of girl who is likely to experiment with sex,
and who is the type of girl who is also likely to lie about such matters. This last typification
occurs due to the seeming ease with which sexual character can be linked with the qualities
of untrustworthiness, untruthfulness and unreliability (a variation of the 'unchaste = liar'
equation despite the preventive efforts of the legislation). Once it is suggested that the
complainer possesses a sexual character, it seems to follow that she is intrinsically of
dubious character in the more general sense.
But these typifications are not always the end of the story. Character construction is more
complex than merely suggesting to the judge and jury that the complainer is a certain type
of girl. The construction of sexual character is invidious in that it also draws heavily on
certain stereotypical notions of female sexuality, and in particular those stereotypes which
depict young women and girls as sexually immoral, seductive, promiscuous,
untrustworthy, provocative, and thus somehow sexually dangerous. Clearly, such
stereotypes are largely synonymous with dubious (if not at times outright 'bad' sexual
character) and therein lies their prime significance. As will be shown in this chapter,
such stereotypes are introduced into the court room through the use of innuendo,
suggestion, implication and inference as well as through the use of direct statements from
particular witnesses. Stereotypes of young female sexuality are drawn upon and
simultaneously strengthened through the accumulation of both sexual and non-sexual
evidence.
However, what adds to the complexity of this schema of the stereotype is that,
counterposed with the image of the sexual being is the opposing image of the asexual
being - the posited 'ideal' image of young femaleness which denotes sexual innocence and
purity - which is not only equally stereotypical and equally invidious, but which also sets
up a standard against which the sexual complainer can be measured - and always found
wanting. This stereotype of the 'ideal' young female sexuality denotes someone who is
sexually inexperienced, innocent, untarnished, respectable. It is this quality of innocence
which requires to be protected, this sexual inexperience which is the grave object of
concern, this vulnerability to seduction which formed the rationale upon which the state
controls on sex were formulated. Sometimes the stereotypical 'ideal' is referred to
explicitly in the trial; it is also sometimes evoked through the (often misguided) use of
'good' character evidence by the prosecution - but more frequently it is implicitly present in
the allegories of the ('bad') sexual stereotype. Resonating through these stereotypes are the
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twin discourses of threat and innocence. The threads of sexual character are thus woven,
with reference to these two opposing stereotypes and conveyed through the use of images,
throughout the trial. Each evidential theme that emerges is subsequently tied in to a
stereotypical image (sometimes several images) of young female sexuality, and thus the
layers of sexual character are built up.
Of course, the 'ideal' image of female sexuality also constitutes the 'ideal' victim in
criminal trials, yet another problem that feminists have pointed to in relation to the use of
stereotypes. The use of such 'ideal' stereotypes as the standard against which all are
measured is dangerous precisely because it can be used to construct a hierarchy or 'real' and
'not real' rape6 whereby only those complainers which 'fit' the schema of the ideal rape
typology are taken seriously and treated as having suffered harm.
Images and Their Deployment
What is so striking about the stereotypical images of young complainers which are used so
distinctively in the courtroom is that they appear to be underpinned by particular
conceptions of young female sexuality, which seem to have remained largely unchanged
since the end of the 19th century. The twin discourses of vulnerability and danger which
informed conceptions of young female sexuality in the 19th century, and which so
characterised the debates and discussions preceding the passage of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act in 1885,7 are frequently present in the images of young female
complainers evoked in the contemporary court room.
The images of young complainers, whilst providing a foundation upon which the
construction of sexual character can take place, also bear a complex relationship to the
rationales of protection and competence which underlie notions of non-consent. The
vocabulary used to describe the complainers in sexual offence trials, and the language
which is used to invoke the stereotypical images essentially divides girls and young women
into the 'good' and the 'bad' - the promiscuous and the pure, the sexually dangerous and the
sexually innocent. They are described and discussed in terms of their sexual knowledge,
their sexual reputation, their sexual experience - or lack of it. The sexually aware girl or
young women is depicted as dangerous, sexually potent, whilst the accused may often be
depicted as suffering the consequences of these uncontainable female passions. Present
also are tensions and contradictions which relate to the notions of the 'passivity' and
activity' of girls and young women, particularly in relation to their role in initiating and
6 see Estrich, S. Real Rape (1987)
7 The 1885 Act created a series of age-related sexual offences where the complainer was under a certain age,
and ultimately led to the raising of the female age of consent to 16 years (see chapters one and two of this
thesis)
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sustaining sexual relations. The ideal of innate asexuality and the need for enhanced
protection is at odds with the images of sexually active and provocative young girls who
have moved beyond the protective folds. Young girls are subject to fairly similar
stereotypical sexual myths as are adult women, in that within the context of the sexual
offence trial, they are invariably portrayed as seductive temptresses, as loose and sexually
indiscriminate, but at the same time young girls are seen as 'easy to get and sexual prey1.
It is important to note that the images that are conjured up and deployed by the defence in
the construction of sexual character are not wholly exclusive of each other, and several
images can often be identified in the same trial context. This is partially due to the
multiplicity of uses that evidence can be put to by the defence, but also due to the degree of
overlap between these stereotypical images. Very often they feed off and inform each other.
The links between the images are many and varied. For example, where the image conjured
is one of a sexually active, experienced, provocative and precocious complainer, the
spring board is set up to allow an almost effortless jump to the image (or secondary
characterisation) of the untrustworthy, deceptive or vindictive complainer.
The following sections describe, by means of examples drawn from the observed trials, the
main ways in which sexual character is built up and the images that are evoked thorough
direct questioning, suggestion and inference.
The Complainer as Sexually Knowledgeable
The most important (and direct) source of character evidence is the complainer herself.
Evidence will be drawn from her directly through questioning on her lifestyle, sexual
knowledge and sexual experience, but also additionally through connotation and
implication. Sexual offence trials by their very nature offer a good deal of leeway for the
construction of sexual character, as much of the material discussed is overtly and explicitly
sexual. This is particularly the case during the complainer's testimony, where she will be
required to describe in great detail the sexual minutiae of what took place. This in itself
offers all sorts of scope for the pursuit of character evidence. However, even when
evidence is not explicitly sexual in itself, it becomes so in the process of telling the story of
the sexual assault. Smart (1989; 1995) describes the rape trial as
"a specific mode of sexualisation of a woman's body ... Her body becomes
literally saturated with sex. She is required to speak sex, and figuratively to re-
enact sex; her body and its responses become the stuff of evidence."®
8 Smart, C. (1995) Law, Crime and Sexuality : Essays in Feminism p.83-84
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Evidence becomes 'sexualised' in the context of the court proceedings. This appears to be
no different when young complainers are involved, although the focus of evidence and the
ways in which it is sexually imbued may be different. For example, in the case of younger
complainers, there is much more emphasis placed on establishing sexual awareness, than
there is in cases involving older women. Establishing the extent of the young complainer's
sexual knowledge, usually done in terms of her understanding of biology and/or physiology
and sexual terminology is almost routine. The prosecution, particularly in the case of a
very young complainer, will frequently try to establish whether she uses any particular
words to describe parts of the body or particular aspects of sexual behaviour. This is done,
presumably, as a means to try to ensure the clarity of her account and to circumvent
possible ambiguity in the minds of those present. In the case of older girls, the prosecution
questions are more specific, and preface particular discussions, for example, "Do you know
what masturbation is ?" (case 25); "Do you know what a condom is ?" (case 15). In cross-
examination, this is often taken further by the defence, and her knowledge of sexual terms
and practices is used to suggest sexual character.
Several cases demonstrated attempts by the defence to ascertain the extent of the
complainer's understanding of sexual terminology, in particular what one defence referred
to as "playground sexual slang".9 Where a young complainer demonstrates an understanding of
specific sexual terms or has a knowledge of sex, then this is used to substantiate the defence
construction of her sexual character in particular ways. This sort of extrapolation is fairly
common, particularly in cases involving adolescent girls. For example, in one case
involving several charges of lewd and libidinous practices, the defence was concerned to
show that the complainer was, amongst other things, sexually aware and this was evidenced
by her full understanding of, and interest in, sexual talk. Much of his cross-examination
focused on "the school playground talk of sex" and he suggested repeatedly that because she
had "spoken with friends in school" then, by extension, she "must be interested in sex" (case 2). In
a similar vein in case 8 which involved a 5 year old and an 11 year old complainer, these
questions were asked of the 11 year old
Defence: Do you know the facts of life ?
Complainer: Pardon
Defence: Do you know how babies are made ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: You knew this before [accused] came to stay ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: Who told you ?
Complainer: My friends at school
Defence: Do you talk about sex a lot at school ?
Complainer: Not really
Defence: Do you talk about boyfriends ?
9 This is glaringly at odds with feminist notions of 'empowering' young girls through teaching them about sex
and sexual terms and thus raising their awareness of sex and their own sexuality
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Complainer: Sometimes
Defence: Has anything like this happened to any of your friends ?
Complainer: No




The defence then went on to ask the complainer what sort of television programmes she
liked, and specifically focused on programmes and films about young love affairs. He also
asked whether she had seen a rape scene in a soap opera that had recently been shown. The
questions were quite detailed, focusing on how much time the complainers' spent talking
about sex with their friends and what exactly they spoke about and whether they ever
"shared confidences". This kind of equation between talking about sex and being interested in
sex was fairly common, and sometimes the link between being interested and actually
having sex is made quite explicitly by the defence.
The complainer's description of the sexual event(s) that allegedly took place will frequently
prompt questions by the defence designed to test the extent of her knowledge of sexual
terms. This overt preoccupation with the complainer's sexual knowledge is quite curious -
in many ways the information that a young girl is sexually aware is presented by the
defence in a way that suggests she has somehow acquired illegitimate knowledge, that she
has gained insight into something which is forbidden to her, that in some way she has
broken the rules. Her broaching of the subject which is forbidden thus reveals something
essential about her character, her social identity. Moreover, in some cases, evidence that
the complainer possessed some sexual knowledge was used to suggest that she was making
it all up. In these cases, the suggestion was that she used her sexual knowledge to construct
the allegation. Whatever the defence version, it is clear that the complainer's sexual
knowledge is used to cast her in a dubious light, and this image of the sexually aware
complainer is often a first significant step in the construction of sexual character.
But implanting the image of the sexually aware child does not always work. In the
following case involving a 9 year old girl and a charge of assault with intent to ravish, the
defence attempt to show that the complainer had some sexual knowledge seemed to
backfire somewhat when she insisted she did not understand. His switch to questions
implying dubious general character was remarkably swift.
Defence: Do you know how babies are made ?
Complainer: No
Defence: Did you tell [Doctor and WPC] you knew how babies are made ?
Complainer: No
Defence: Do you know what having periods means ?
Complainer: No





Young female complainers - especially adolescent teenagers - are typically presented in a
rather curious way by the defence, a way that is informed by a particular ideology of female
sexuality. Complainers are commonly described as "sexually provocative" , "precocious",
"flirtatious" and, in one particularly memorable case involving a very young girl of 5 years
old as "seductive." Obviously, such typifications carry with them fairly explicit sexual
character connotations. In most of the observed cases, these typifications were brought to
life in the trial through the deployment of certain images of young women and girls that
correspond to a rather spurious, yet curiously unimaginative set of ideas that seem
intimately intertwined with conceptions of female sexuality.
Underpinning and strengthening such characterisations seems to be the implicit idea that
adolescence is a time of awakening or emergent sexuality which manifests itself in "sexual
curiosity" . The image of the sexual adventurer can be summed up fairly succinctly in
statements made by the defence to the jury in two separate cases. In the first, the
complainer is depicted as initiating the sexual activity because her "burgeoning sexuality drives
her to experiment in sex" (case 22); in the second case the sexual activity is explained as "the
result of sexual exploration initiated by the complainer in order to satisfy her sexual curiosities" (case 27).
In both of these cases, the complainers have not only been attributed with initiating the
sexual activity, but their uncontrollably blossoming sexuality has propelled them into it.
These examples are not unusual. The Lolita-like image of awakening sexuality was
frequently drawn upon, not only in the contested trial cases, but also as part of the pleas in
mitigation in those cases where a guilty plea was tendered by the accused (these are
discussed more fully in Chapter Eight).
In cases involving adolescent girls there are often marked attempts to typify the complainer
as provocative or precocious and the sign posts are easy to follow. In case 2 one particular
line of questioning was relentlessly pursued in the cross-examination of the complainer and
other witnesses in the trials. This was to suggest that the 13 year old complainer was
particularly flirtatious and precocious and had a history of being so since her earliest
childhood (the 'lewd and libidinous' incidents which were the subject of the charge
allegedly took place several years previously when the complainer was between 8 and 9
years old). It was alleged by the defence that the sexual activity had been initiated by her in
order to satisfy her "avid sexual curiosity". The accused was a young man of low intelligence
and it was suggested that she had taken advantage of this. Further, it was also suggested
that she had always preferred the company of men to that of women, and that she had
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developed and maintained an overtly sexual pattern of behaviour towards men. This "direct
action" included "going up to men, sitting on their knees, and ruffling their hair". The mother of this
child was questioned about her daughter's hobbies and interests and she replied that they
included pop records and pop bands as well as clothes and makeup and that latterly, she
had shown an interest in boys. This last point was picked up by the defence in his
summing up of the case to the jury as "an unnatural interest in boys for one so young - an obsession
in fact". Her "unnatural curiosity" about sexual matters was, according to the defence, a result
of her overhearing sexual talk in the school playground. The image of the seductive child
was especially strongly conveyed in this particular case. But it is not an uncommon
depiction, neither is it an extreme example. In a further three contested trials (cases 11, 29,
38) the depictions of the complainers were just as explicit. In these cases, the main defence
line was that the complainer's had initiated the sexual activity with unsuspecting accuseds.
Implicit in the image of the seductive child is the idea that the child is somehow to blame
for the sexual behaviour. This is not new. Feminist analyses of incest have traced the
many ways in which the abused child is held responsible for the sexual behaviour.10 One
of the most pervasive of the ways in which responsibility is ascribed is through the
attribution of sexual precocity or forwardness on the part of the girl. Often these views
stem from 'expert' opinion issued on such matters. One of the more authoritative statements
concerning the sexual precocity of young girls in relation to child sexual abuse and which
still seems to hold sway in some court rooms today was made by two American
psychiatrists in the 1930's:
'These children undoubtedly do not deserve completely the cloak of innocence
with which they have been endowed by moralists, social reformers, and
legislators. The history of the relationship in our cases usually suggests at least
some co-operation of the child in the activity, and in some cases the child
assumed an active role in initiating the relationship ... It is true that the child
often rationalised with excuses of fear of physical harm or the enticement of
gifts, but these were obviously secondary reasons. Even in the cases where
physical force may have been applied by the adults, this did not wholly account
for the frequent repetition of the practice. Finally, a most striking feature was
that these children were distinguished as unusually charming and attractive in
their outward personalities. Thus it was not remarkable that frequently we
considered the possibility that the child might have been the actual seducer,
rather than the one innocently seduced." 11
The appeal to an image of the girl as seductive is a common device in the defence
repertoire. It often works. There appears to be widespread belief in the 'Lolita syndrome" as
perhaps evidenced by a recent pronouncement made by Judge Ina Starforth Hill when
10 See for example, Ward, E. (1984) Father -Daughter Rape and Bell, V. (1993) Interrogating Incest
11 Bender, L. and Blau, A. (1937) The Reaction of Children to Sexual Relations with Adults' American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry vol. 7 (quoted in Ward, E. Father-Daughter Rape (1984) pl39)
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awarding a sentence of 2 years probation to a man who pled guilty to attempted intercourse
with an 8 year old:
'The law in this country protects little girls because they do not know right from
wrong and if invited to commit a sexual offence they would go along with it
because they thought it was right. Little girls are not there for you to indulge
your sexual activities. However I have been provided with information that leads
me to think she was not entirely an angel herself. "12
This quote also neatly encapsulates the dualistic notion of young female sexuality referred
to in Chapter One. In the first two sentences, the Judge is articulating the protectionist
argument, and in the third sentence, refers to the girls' past sexual behaviour which,
presumably is the justification for the light sentence.
The notion of young girls' awakening sexuality is also strongly associated with young girls'
sexual fantasising. The sexual fantasiser is a not uncommon image put forward by the
defence. In defence rhetoric, newly awakened sexuality not only manifests itself in 'sexual
curiosity' but also gives rise to 'adolescent fantasy' which is usually romantic or erotic in
nature. There are a number of variations on this theme, but basically they all seem to follow
a similar format. That is, that the sex was a culmination of fantasy, or the sex with the
accused was a substitute for fantasy sex with a pop star or actor. Four cases actually
involved this type of suggestion, frequently pursued through questioning the complainer
(and other witnesses) about her predilections for reading teenage magazines, or romantic
literature, or supposed infatuations with actors or pop stars. Consider the spuriousness of
the following example drawn from one of these cases:
Defence: Is it not the case that you have posters of [popstars] up in your bedroom ?
Defence: Did you not say that you fancied [a pop star] and would love to winch [kiss] him '?
Defence: Did you not say that [the accused] looked like [the popstar] and that you fancied him rotten ?
Defence: I want to put it to you that you played out these fantasies with [the accused].
Another common theme put forward by the defence is that the sex did not take place at all,
but was fantasised or imagined. In this type of case, in addition to suggesting that the
sexual activity took place as a result of sexual curiosity it is also suggested that the sexual
activity did not take place, but rather the accusation was a result of sexual fantasising on
the part of the complainer. The fielding of several different lines of defence is common
(even if they are inherently contradictory) as, after all, the defence has to do no more than
'put' alternative suggestions/interpretations to the complainer. Of course, the image of the
sexual fantasiser, especially the version which suggests that the sexual activity was
entirely fictitious, is often used in conjunction with the image of the lying young
complainer. Here what is being evoked is a stereotypical image of the girl or young
12 The Times 9.6.1993
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women as being inherently untrustworthy when it comes to sexual matters. It comes closest
to the phenomenon of the complainer as 'unchaste liar' which is so condemned under the
legislation and invokes the equation lack of virtue = lack of veracity. Of all the images it
is perhaps the most pernicious in that it can have severe repercussions on the complainer's
credibility in the trial. It was also something which the Scottish legislators wanted to
outlaw (see Chapter Four for a discussion of sexual character and its implications for
credibility). The theme of the lying complainer is very common (and is frequently raised in
relation to her reliability) but the lying complainer also has a number of variations, such as
the vindictive liar and the frightened liar. These are also often used to suggest specific
motives for false allegation. The image of the vindictive liar is used to suggest someone
who lies out of pure maliciousness in order to 'get at' the accused in some unspecified way.
This is very like the evocation of the malicious woman who makes a 'revenge' allegation in
rape trials. In one case (of rape involving a 14 year old girl) the defence presented the
complainer as someone who made the allegation against the accused some time after the
incident took place because she was angry and upset with him because he had not contacted
her following their "sexual romp" (case 36 ).
The depiction of the complainer as frightened liar was produced by the defence in a small
number of cases. In this type of construction, the defence line is usually that the
complainer consented to the sexual activity with the accused, but then panicked afterwards,
either because she thought she would get into trouble with her parents for being late home;
or she would not be able to explain her muddy and torn clothes; or she thought she might
be pregnant. Both images, of the vindictive liar and the frightened liar, draw on the
stereotype of young girls as deceptive and secretive, and prone to making up stories. But in
defence rhetoric the girls and young women in these cases step beyond the stereotypical
depiction of girlish untruthfulness - they are also dangerously untruthful in that their lying
causes harm and suffering to others.
Appearance and Demeanour
Sexual character is not only invoked through direct questioning of the complainer's sexual
knowledge and the imputation of sexual awakening. In the trial, the defence will
commonly try to use the appearance or demeanour of a young girl as an opportunity or
means to demonstrate her sexuality - or indeed her potential sexuality - typically building
towards the ascription of sexual character. Interestingly, it is not only the complainer's
appearance, dress and demeanour at the time of the offence that is used by the defence to
suggest sexual character, but also her appearance and manner in the witness box.
The construction of the provocative, sexual, and likely-to-be-consenting young complainer
is often begun by reference to her outward appearance - the extent of her physical
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development, the way she was dressed at the time of the offence, her use of make-up, her
type of hairstyle and any personal habits such as smoking or, even, gum-chewing.
The extent of her physical development - whether she is tall or small, has begun to take on
a 'womanly' shape, even whether she wears a bra, are often the subject of discussion.
Consider the following examples which illustrate this focus on physical development: "She
has advanced physical development and is sexually mature for her age" (case 3); "She is remarkably fully
developed" (case 42); "She appears much older than her years" (case 52). These examples also
offers clues as to the use which the defence hopes this sort of evidence will be put in the
minds of the jury. Physical development is equated with sexual maturity; someone who
looks older will be likely to act older. It is easier to attribute a sexual character to someone
who looks old enough to have one. It is however important to note again that evidence can
be put to a number of different uses by the defence during the course of the trial, and that it
is common for the defence to deploy more than one argument to combat the prosecution
case. The emphasis on physical development may be used as a step in the construction of
sexual character, but it may also, for example, be an attempt to substantiate the accused's
belief in the age of the complainer (the issue of 'mistaken belief in age' will be discussed in
more detail later in this chapter).
Defence allegations that the complainer made deliberate attempts to make herself appear
older than she really is (either on the occasion of the alleged assault or just in general) are
also fairly common, for example, "Were you not wearing make-up, lipstick and eyes, and wearing
high-heeled shoes ?" "You put on high-heels to go to the pictures ?" and "You were dressed up to look much
older than 15 years" (case 52). Similarly a 14 year old complainer was cross-examined in
some detail on her "modern dress" and her "use of make-up" which, the defence alleged, she
used to "create the impression of being older" (case 3). There was no issue raised of mistaken
belief in age in either of these cases.
The complainer's clothing, particularly if it could be described as provocative (and
sometimes when it could not even by any stretch of the imagination) is used as a building
block in the construction of sexual character. Repeated reference to clothing, both
underwear and outerwear, and to shoes and makeup, in some cases was made at every
opportunity throughout the trial. It is as if the defence, by repeatedly referring to the
complainer's "lacy panties" or her "skimpy top" or her "low backed dress" or her "high-heeled shoes"
is trying to press home a caricatured image of the complainer as a sexual being, and one
who is showing her willingness to consent through her symbolic appearance. Again, this
focus on dress, which takes on sexual character connotations throughout the trial, is a
common defence tactic in rape cases involving adult women.
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As well as referring to her appearance on the occasion of the offence, defence may often
allude to the way that the complainer acts in the witness box and how she addresses herself
to questions - has she a confident manner ? what is her attitude to the courtroom situation ?
is she crying ? does she appear upset ? how does she deliver her answers ? In case 19 for
example, the 16 year old complainer's demeanour in court was construed as evidence of
her character, when the defence remarked to the jury that she had a "brazen attitude". Her
demeanour was also used to suggest that she had not in fact been raped, as she was "too
cool". In other words, she did not display the 'correct' symptoms of someone alleging rape.
Lifestyle
The use of non-sexual signifiers conveying sexual character was typically most prolific
when referring to the complainer's general lifestyle. Lifestyle evidence can be wide-
ranging, although in cases involving young complainers, the most commonly observed
were general references to lifestyle and personal habits, such as whether she drinks or
smokes, whether she swears, what sort of friends she associates with, what sort of leisure
interests she has, and often, crucially, whether she has or has had a boyfriend. This sort of
lifestyle information is used to augment the building of quite personal biographies of the
complainers, developing her character, revealing aspects of her personality and making her
somehow more 'real' to the jury. For example, if the young complainer does drink, smoke
or swear, this has obvious character connotations and is played up by the defence not only
to show that she indulges in 'bad' or questionable habits, but also to emphasise that she has
adopted 'adult" habits. Evidence concerning drinking habits are especially important as this
is often used to suggest her evidence may be unreliable due to drink. Such lifestyle
evidence is referred to at different junctures throughout the trial, sometimes with great
effect. In case 5, which involved a charge of rape of a 17 year old young woman, the
defence repeatedly referred to the amount of drink that she had allegedly consumed prior to
the assault. Whilst on the one hand this had implications for the reliability of her recall of
events (and this use of evidence will be picked up again in the following chapter), the
drink issue was also important in terms of the construction of sexual character. The defence
was concerned to show that she frequently drank a lot of alcohol and that whenever she did
this led to her acting in a sexually suggestive way.
Several cases - and not only those where the defence of "mistaken belief in age" was used -
were observed which contained questions like "Is it not the case that you socialise with friends much
older than yourself ?" and "Is it not the case that you hang around with a group of girls who date older boys ?'
(case 3). Again this is to suggest that the complainer deliberately tries to appear older, but
also the implication is that she probably has more sexual knowledge and awareness as a
result of this association with older friends.
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As well as testifying about particular events that they observed or were part of and which
occurred in close proximity in time to the alleged assault, other witnesses (apart from the
complainer) may also be asked to give evidence concerning the lifestyle or the habits of the
complainer. Sometimes this may not be evidence that has already been raised during the
witness's evidence-in-chief. To reiterate, cross-examination is not limited to matters on
which the witness has given evidence in examination in chief, but may range beyond those
matters so as to elicit information not already brought out which may be in favour of the
case of the defence.13 Several cases were observed where witnesses were questioned
directly about certain aspects of the complainer's character or lifestyle. The following
example of questioning which seemed designed specifically to show sexual character
involved several charges of lewd and libidinous behaviour and 'indecent behaviour' (s5
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976) by a father towards his daughter over a period of 9
years. She was 17 at the time of the trial. The purpose of this questioning of a defence
witness who had no current contact whatsoever with the complainer appeared to be solely
to introduce information about a previous suspected pregnancy two years earlier when the
complainer would have been 15 years old. This was the first and only time that the
suspected pregnancy was mentioned during the trial. What follows is the entire defence
examination:
Defence: Do you know [complainer] ?
Witness: Yes, a while ago I did
Defence: When ?
Witness: About two years ago ?
Defence: Was she a friend of your family ?
Witness: No, she was a friend of my friend's daughter
Defence: What sort of girl was she ?
Witness: Pleasant girl
Defence: Did you ever see her distressed ?
Witness: Once. She thought she was pregnant and didn't want to tell her father or mother.
(Case 49)
Somewhat similarly, in two separate cases involving fairly young teenage girls, the mothers
of both girls were asked by the defence about their daughter's lifestyle, and in particular
whether they had boyfriends. In case 3 the mother of the 13 year old complainer was asked
if her daughter "was in the habit of dating older boys" and specifically about whether she had ever
gone out with a 19 year old boy, and if she had given her permission to do so. In case 15
the mother was asked about her daughter's boyfriends, but was also subjected to detailed
questioning about her daughter's clothes and make-up and group of friends. In a third case,
involving lewd and libidinous behaviour towards a 7 year old, the complainer's aunt was
asked by the defence "In a sexual context, would you describe [complainer] as precocious ?" (case 4).
13 Witnesses may also be cross-examined with a view to destroying their credibility
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The following series of questions were asked of the stepfather of the 13 year old
complainer in case 2:
Defence: Was [complainer] friendly with older boys ?
Defence: Did you observe her sitting on men's knees ?
Defence: Was she prone to going willingly with men ?
Defence: Do you think she is 'overly friendly' with men ?
Sometimes evidence which has character connotations can be elicited from other witnesses
as evidence that is relevant to specific issues in the case. For example, case 27 concerned
charges of 'unlawful sexual intercourse' with a girl under 16 years (s4 Sexual Offence
(Scotland) Act 1976) by two young men in their late teens/early twenties. The complainer
was a 14 year old girl who had met the two men whilst on her own in a city centre one day.
She was 15 at the time of the trial. At the outset of the trial it was stated that the statutory
defence of 'belief in age' would be used, and this was the only case where this defence was
specifically invoked.14 The defence case was that the two accuseds had reasonably
believed that the girl was at least 16 years old. Friends and acquaintances of the complainer
were called as witnesses by the defence and questioned about their relationship with her,
and how they spent their leisure time together. These witnesses were questioned by the
defence in an attempt to verify that they were generally several years older than the
complainer; that she deliberately "sought out" older friends in preference to younger ones;
that she tried to "appear older" than she was by a deliberate choice of clothes, hairstyle and
make-up; that she frequently lied about her age; that she was always "dressed up to appear
older"; and that she was "not shy". Here, evidence specifically about 'belief in age' also takes
on character connotations.
One other defence tactic that is particularly noticeable in relation to young complainers is
to introduce evidence concerning the lifestyle of other witnesses, usually relatives or
friends of the complainer. This type of evidence is used to 'set the scene' as it were, placing
the complainer in various stereotypical contexts, by association with other witnesses whose
own sexual or general character and/or lifestyle is brought into question. The first questions
asked of the mother of the complainer in case 43 illustrate this:
Defence: I understand that you were married at 16 and that you were carrying [the complainer] at
that time ?
Witness: Yes
Defence: Shortly afterwards you left your husband and started living with Mr ?
Witness: Yes
Defence: Your marriage and relationships have all been quite problematic ?
14 This defence applies if the male perpetrator is under 24 years of age and he reasonably believed that the
girl was of or above 16 years old. This defence only applies if he has not before been involved in a trial of a
similar nature
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It was noticeable that, wherever the opportunity arose, the defence would place great stress
on any suggestion of unconventional or wayward behaviour by the complainer (and, as
evidenced by the above quote, on the behaviour of her family or associates as well). This
was particularly vivid in case 25 where the image of the complainer which was being
evoked throughout the entire trial was that of a wild child. In this case the 15 year old
complainer was portrayed as someone who was continually getting into trouble at school,
who was irreverent, cheeky to teachers and neighbours, who played truant, who was
beyond the control of her parents. The wild child portrayal continued by reference to her
smoking, drinking and gum-chewing habits and her "hanging around with an older crowd".
Questions were asked of her and other witnesses in the case concerning whether she
sniffed glue or took drugs. Much was made by the defence out of the fact that she had a
small tattoo on her arm. The following series of questions were asked of her in cross-
examination:
Defence: Have you ever tried to run away from home ?
Defence: Did you not climb out of the window of your Gran's house at night and run around
the streets ?
Defence: Have you been glue-sniffing ?
Defence: Were you ever injecting drugs ?
Defence: Do you have a tattoo ?
Defence: Did you r mother know you had a tattoo ?
Defence: Was your mother happy for you to have a tattoo ?
This line of questioning, designed to discredit the complainer through the use of character
evidence, was continued in the cross-examination of other witnesses in the case. The
questioning also took on specifically sexual character connotations when the defence
moved on to suggest that the complainer was in the habit of running away from home
(unsubstantiated) and engaged in indiscriminate sex whilst "on the run". It was also alleged
that she had climbed out of the window of her Gran's house in order to make a pre-arranged
assignation with a boy in a park at midnight. There was also much discussion in the trial
concerning her sexual history despite medical evidence of virginity and this is described in
the following section. In a second case involving the wild child typification, the questions
put to the complainer were not so explicit, although during the defence summing up to the
jury, the complainer was described as "a troublesome child, with a history of running away from
home."
Case 1 was the case mentioned earlier (in The Complainer as Sexually Knowledgeable)
which involved a somewhat bungled attempt by the defence to show that the 9 year old
complainer had sexual knowledge. When this backfired he went swiftly (and seamlessly)
on to suggest she was of dubious character. He began by asking whether she played truant
from school. Thereafter followed a series of questions to suggest that the girl was in some
sense untrustworthy and out of control. 'Bad' character can be remarkably easy to convey.
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The defence later cross-examined the child's remedial teacher to whom she had complained
about her sore genital area, and as the following extract shows again attempted to cast her
in a particular light:
Defence: [The complainer] is below average intelligence ?
Teacher: Slightly
Defence: And in July last year she emitted an offensive odour ?
Teacher: It was that which alerted me to the possibility that all was not right [the girl had contracted
a vaginal infection as a result of the sexual contact]
Defence: Did she have any particular difficulties at school ?
Teacher: Not really
Defence: Any unusual behaviour ?
Teacher: Sometimes
Defence: Did she play with rubbish ?
Teacher: Yes
Defence: Did she pick it up and eat it ?
Teacher: Yes
Defence: Did she know any of the technicalities involved in sexual intercourse ?
Teacher: I don't know
Defence: Did she know the words ?
Teacher: She had her own words
(case 1)
Whilst not exactly invoking the wild child image, the defence intention appears to be to
convey an image of a child with strange, distasteful, and dirty habits. Whether the defence
was intending to display the child as mentally disturbed, one cannot be sure, but certainly
the suggestion of below average intelligence has implications for her reliability as a
witness. The overall effect was to cast her as somehow alien, not normal.
The Complainer as Sexually Experienced
The sexually experienced complainer is, in many ways, a gift to the defence case, not
only with regard to the construction of sexual character but also, strongly, in relation to the
issue of consent. Not only is her previous sexual experience concrete 'evidence' that she
has 'consented' with someone else in the past, it is also a sure sign (an indisputable sign
for the defence) that she possesses a sexual character. In those cases where the complainer
had in fact had sex with someone else before the alleged assault, the defence made much
mileage out of this information. For example, in case 43 which involved the age-defined
statutory offence of 'indecent behaviour towards a girl of between 12 and 16 years' (s.5
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976) by an uncle, it was alleged that the 14 year old
complainer had previously had sexual relations with her stepfather, and that this was the
subject of a future criminal trial. This case also involved a special defence of incrimination
concerning the stepfather, that is, to suggest that he, rather than the accused, was
responsible for the assault.15 The alleged past sexual behaviour with the stepfather was
15 Although the legislation allows for an application to be made under subsection 141B (1) (b) (ii) on the
grounds that evidence would be relevant to incrimination, the legislation was not utilised in this particular
case.
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therefore repeatedly returned to by the defence in cross-examination in a variety of ways,
for example:
Defence: You've had some problems at home with your mum and stepdad. Your mother has been
involved in this, and has in fact assisted your stepdad ?"
Defence: You know that you are going to another court on [date] regarding the things that your
stepdad did to you , and since this started there has been nothing but talk about these
sexual things. "
Defence: And the truth is that this case started when your stepfather tried to get [the accused]
involved as well because he knew [the accused] was giving you money."
Not only does this raise the issue of incrimination, but is also raises the question of the
complainer's credibility and also a motive for false allegation.
Two cases in particular (cases 40 and 50 ) involved the use of specific information which
was contained in the medical report and which was used as evidence concerning the
complainers' previous sexual experience. In both these cases, this evidence had very strong,
and very obvious, implications for sexual character. The latter, which involved a 17 year
old, involved evidence concerning a previous full-term pregnancy. In the former, the 17
year old complainer had had an abortion.
But even in cases where there is no clear evidence of past sexual behaviour and nothing to
suggest that the complainer is sexually experienced the defence may still attempt to
question the complainer on such matters. For example, in one case involving a charge of
rape, the prosecution asked this series of questions of the 13 year old complainer "Do you
understand the meaning of menstruation ?" "Have you commenced menstruating yet ?" "What form of
sanitary protection do you use ?" "Do you use tampons ?" (case 51). The complainer replied that she
did not use tampons. (At the time, this struck me as a rather odd line of questioning.) All
was made clear during the defence cross-examination however, when an application under
the legislation was made to question the complainer "about her knowledge of sexual matters" on
the basis that "her hymen is not intact and could only hold one finger. She does not use tampons. [Lack of
hymen] could be consistent with prior sexual intercourse. The defence Stated that he wished to
question her on her sexual knowledge and experience because her answers may have a
bearing on her credibility. He went on to say that the medical report had stated that her
hymen would admit one finger, the complainer had stated that she did not use tampons and
had also said that she had never had sex before. The application was allowed, and the
subsequent questioning focused on the complainer's sexual experience. As it turned out
there was nothing to suggest that she was sexually experienced before the alleged rape.
Nevertheless the somewhat speculative discussion about her damaged hymen had strong
implications for her sexual character.
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In another case, the defence made a (partially) successful application to introduce "evidence
of the complainer's repeated casual sexual intercourse with a large number of youths in the [local] area over
the period of the past three years, and the fact that she boasted of sexual conquests" on the grounds that
it was in the 'interests of justice' to do so. Again, this was not substantiated, but the depth
and range of the subsequent questioning had implications for her sexual character.
Inevitably, virginity is a big issue in cases involving young complainers. The presence - or
recent or long-term absence - of a hymen is something that is routinely stated in the
medical report. Evidence of a long-term absence of hymen is taken by the defence to be
indicative of past sexual activity, thus substantiating the picture of the complainer as a
sexual being. As may be expected - and as demonstrated in case 22 cited above - a long-
term lack of hymen was always equated with sexual experience by the defence and, even
when evidence from an 'expert' forensic or medical witness offered an alternative
explanation for the lack of hymen than sexual intercourse, the defence still adhered to the
explanation of sexual non-virginity.
In some cases involving young complainers, good character was made an issue (sometimes
inadvertently) by the prosecution - particularly in those cases where the complainer was ,
or had been, a virgin. Most commonly, evidence of virginity was introduced by the
prosecution, either verbally, but often through reference to the medical report. In fact the
prosecution evidence was most frequently and directly challenged by the defence in
relation to the question of the complainer's sexual experience, and specifically the presence
or absence of hymen. Once such evidence has been introduced by the prosecution, it is
picked up by the defence and explored in cross-examination. This was what happened in
case 22 where, in addition to trying to suggest sexual character through sexual
knowledge, the defence was also pursuing the issue of credibility by testing the
complainer's consistency with regard to what she had said earlier to the prosecution in her
examination-in-chief about "nothing like this" ever happening to her before. Whilst somewhat
ambiguous, the defence construed her statement as evidence of her setting herself up as
having a 'good' sexual character. In this case, the defence made a successful application to
question the complainer on her virginity, on the grounds that the medical report showed a
lack of hymen.
Of course, where the complainer has had previous sexual experience this information is
seized upon as it adds considerable weight to the construction of sexual character. But
even where there is evidence of a recent lack of hymen, which the prosecution may present
as a positive signifier that the alleged sexual assault took place is addressed by the defence
as simply that - circumstantial evidence of consensual sex.
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The issue of masturbation was brought up in about a fifth of contested trials, and appears to
be used, amongst other things, as evidence of sexual experience which has significance for
the construction of sexual character. Masturbation is a sexually significant signifier, used
explicitly to suggest that the complainer is sexually 'functioning'. For example, in case 25
which involved the blatant wild child typification referred to above, the issue of
masturbation was picked up in cross-examination and was the subject of prolonged and
detailed questioning. An application was made by the defence who wished to seek an
alternative source to the medical finding of vaginal swelling. The medical evidence
showed an intact hymen and the defence had no other alternative source to point to, but
nonetheless he wished to question the complainer about other forms of activity which
might have led to the genital swelling. The following questions were asked of her:
Defence: Were you involved with any boy apart from [accused] ?
Complainer: No
Defence: Did you insert anything into your private parts ?
Complainer: No
Defence: Do you know what masturbation is ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: Were you in the habit ofmasturbating last year in July ? [the time of the assault]
Complainer: No
These questions were juxtaposed with questions pointing to her wild child lifestyle and,
cumulatively they enhanced the image of the semi-delinquent bad girl. Here the defence, in
addition to trying to suggest that the complainer was a sexual being who had experienced
self-induced sexual arousal, was also looking for an alternative source for the vaginal
swelling suffered by the complainer and noted in the medical report.
The Effects ofSexual Character Evidence
The construction and ascription of sexual character is very prevalent in trials involving
young complainers. Indeed, the defence quest to ascribe sexual character is so common as
to be almost a routine part of the trial. The defence commonly engage in an inventive
process of 'sexualising' evidence in such a way that the construction of sexual character is
virtually inevitable.
The focus on sexual character through the mechanism of stereotypical images of female
sexuality signifies the dominance of specific notions of female sexuality in the court room.
This is something with which feminist commentators have long been familiar in relation to
rape trials. Smart (1989) for example has argued that the legal treatment of (adult) rape
victims reaffirms a particular form of heterosexuality and disempowers women.16
However, on the evidence presented here this appears also to be the case for younger
women and girls.
16 Smart, C. (1989) Feminism and the Power ofLaw chapter two
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The routine construction of sexual character is also a matter for concern because young
complainers are thus exposed to the same repertoire of arduous questioning that occurs in
sexual offence trials involving adult women. But the construction of sexual character,
although sometimes a means in itself, is very often not the end of the story. Sexual
character, once ascribed, has important implications and is applied in the trial in a number
of ways. These are described more fully in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONSENT AND THE "RAPE MODEL"
Stereotypes and Stories
The last chapter focused primarily on the construction of sexual character through the
evocation of stereotypes of female sexuality. But, as noted in that chapter, the construction
of sexual character is not the end of the story. Sexual character, once ascribed, has
important implications and is 'put to use' in the trial in rather compelling ways. Most
significantly, sexual character construction functions as an important precursor to the
imputation of consent on the part of the complainer. First, the ascription of sexual
character acts as a forerunner to the depiction of the complainer as a sexual being -
someone who is sexually aware and potentially sexually active, someone who possesses a
sexual essence. Second, the depiction of the complainer as a sexual being feeds into the
presentation of the complainer as that type ofgirl - as someone who is likely to consent to
sexual activity. The two are inextricably linked in defence rhetoric, and examples of
conflationary comments confirming this 'interrelationship' were found in approximately
two thirds of the trials. The relationship of sexual character to the issue of consent has, at
its root, the distinction between those who are 'chaste' and those who are 'unchaste' - the
two opposing images of women and girls. The stereotypes of 'good' and 'bad' encompass
particular notions of female sexuality - as those 'who do' and those 'who don't'. The
implication is that those who are sexually experienced, who have consented to sex in the
past, who have a sexual character, are more likely to consent to sex again. The articulation
of a 'bad' sexual character which sets up the general presumption or propensity towards
consent was specifically outlawed by the Scottish legislators (see Chapter Four for a
discussion of the legislation). Yet observation of trials involving young complainers
suggested that the potential for suggesting consent is considerably heightened where the
foundations of sexual character have already been laid. In such trials, defence rhetoric
appears to be underpinned by the implicit presumption that there is a direct relationship
between sexual character and propensity to consent.
The next two chapters will examine this focus on consent, in particular what appears to be
the paradox of the consenting young complainer. This chapter is primarily concerned with
the puzzling image of the consenting young complainer, and specifically with the way in
which consent is used in relation to key evidential issues in the trial. In this chapter, close
attention is paid to how images of the consenting complainer (underpinned and conveyed
by evidence of sexual character) are fed into 'stories' about the sexual activity that is the
subject of the charge. The emphasis here is on the way(s) in which stereotypical images of
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young female sexuality become integral components of an ongoing narrative in the trial
about the complainer and her involvement in the sexual activity, the events that led up to it
and the events that followed it. The following chapter offers an explanation for the
predominance of consent-based arguments in such trials.
The Paradox Of The Consenting Young Complainer
But before embarking on a fuller analysis of the consenting young complainer using
information drawn from observation of trials, I wish to draw attention to the fundamental
paradox which, at first sight, seems inherent in the particular construction of the
consenting young complainer. Court observation revealed that constructions of the
consenting young female complainer, and the use of evidence to show consent play an
integral part of the legal-evidential routine in sexual offence trials. This is something of a
paradoxical finding because, as it will be recalled from Chapter One, consent to sexual
relations by a female under 16 years is considered invalid in Scots law.1 Essentially, the
process of interaction between the complainer who is not yet 16 years old and the accused
concerning consent to the sexual act is not pertinent to the fact of the crime. It will also be
recalled from Chapter One that consent with a girl under the age of 12 years is impossible
because her young age precludes her from having the capacity for real consent in the
matter. For girls over 12 years and under 16 years, although the law recognise that they
have the capacity to consent, their consent is rendered irrelevant . Thus the issue of
consent, one would think, would have no real intrinsic bearing on the nature of the sexual
offence at issue, nor on the question of the guilt of the accused. So why is the question of
consent so consistently focused upon during such trials ? Why are young female
complainers routinely characterised as consenting to the sexual activity when their consent
is technically rendered impossible or irrelevant ? For example, in offences defined by the
age of the complainer, such as the statutory offences where the consent of the complainer is
irrelevant, then age has to be proved. These are strict liability offences defined solely in
terms of the age of the complainer, and one may therefore expect the evidential crux to be a
straightforward matter of proving first that the offence took place, and then proving age in
relation to the accused's belief in the age of the complainer. Mistaken-belief-in-age is a
recognised defence in relation to such offences,2 although court observation revealed that
it was very rarely used.3 Similarly in incest offences one might reasonably expect evidence
proving first that the offence took place and then proving the relationship between the
1 Gane, C. (1992) Sexual Offences ; Gordon, G.H. (1978) The Criminal Law ofScotland
2 It will be recalled from Chapter Two that there is a statutory defence available to a charge of s 4.(1) Sexual
Offences (Scotland) Act 1976, 'unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl between 13 and 16 years' providing
that the accused is under 24 years and has not been charged with a like offence.
3 Informal conversation with court officials indicated that they believed that cases involving young men
under 24 and young girls under 16 years rarely made it to court in the first place. This is because such cases
are often, as one official put it 'young love' cases where the procurator fiscal decides not to prosecute
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complainer and the accused to be vital. One would not think that consent would be an
important issue, far less the most deliberated question in such trials.
'Rape Model' Arguments and the Battle Over Consent
As stated earlier in the thesis, the issue of consent is inextricably bound up with the
definition of the crime of rape and thus the woman's lack of consent is a crucial element of
the crime of rape. However, Brown et al (1993) found the most common defence to rape
in trials involving adult women is that sexual intercourse took place with the consent of the
woman.4 That the complainer consented is a particularly problematic assertion to
counteract - and often - primarily because of corroborative difficulties - this really does
frequently turn into a question of the complainer's word against that of the accused.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary at this point to briefly recall the evidential
requirement of corroboration discussed in Chapter Three. To reiterate, every material fact
has to be corroborated by two independent sources. Because sexual assaults tend to take
place in the absence of any eye or ear witnesses to the event, corroborating evidence that
the sex took place in the absence of consent can often be very hard to find. Corroboration
is therefore sought from elsewhere. In sexual offence trials, possible sources of
corroboration that the offence took place and that it took place in the absence of consent
are, for example, dirty or damaged clothing, bodily injury to the complainer (and also
sometimes to the accused), signs of resistance by the complainer, and 'first report' evidence
which is evidence from the first person whom the complainer told about the assault and
who can attest to her demeanour at the time - was she in an upset state? calm ? distressed ?
nonchalant ? hysterical ? ambivalent ? Corroborating features are sought from a variety of
sources. In addition to witness testimony, these standard corroborating signs may also be
obtained from information contained in the medical report (evidence of bruising, swelling,
abrasions, injury etc. ) and also from the forensic reports (evidence of torn clothing, the
presence of semen, etc.). Often the trial turns into a 'battle' over the interpretation of these
evidential signs . These signs often constitute the main evidential issues in the trial and
much of the 'battle' wages over attempts by the defence to establish consent and attempts by
the prosecution to prove the absence of consent.
The widespread preoccupation with consent and, in particular, the predominance of
consent-based arguments in rape trials has been well-documented (Chambers & Millar,
1983; Adler, 1987; Smart, 1989; Brown et al, 1993). This type of argument with its
emphasis on, and ways of defining and proving consent on the part of the complainer, is
usually associated with rape trials involving adult women. In such trials attention focuses
4 Brown, B. et al (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial
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on questions such as did the complainer consent to sexual intercourse ? did the accused
reasonably or honestly believe that the sexual intercourse was consensual ? did sexual
intercourse take place at all ? These questions explicitly raise the issue of consent and are
most commonly deployed in relation to the key evidential signs, such as the presence or
absence of injuries, damaged clothing, and signs of resistance by the complainer.
The Infiltration of the 'Rape Model'
Brown et al (1993) found that consent-based arguments - which they term 'rape-model'
arguments - were a characteristic of both rape trials and trials for other sorts of sexual
offences involving adult women where consent was not a specific element in the definition
of the crime. Somewhat similarly, in the research discussed here 'rape model' arguments
were a dominant feature of trials involving girls and young women. Moreover, 'rape-
model' arguments were not restricted to rape trials involving young complainers, but were
freely used in relation to other sorts of sexual offences, including the statutory age-related
offences.
Discovering the prevalence of overtly consent-based arguments in trials involving young
complainers was a very puzzling finding. It was also a fairly disconcerting finding,
considering that a focus on evidence of consent by the defence has long been the subject of
criticism where it arises in sexual offence trials involving adult women.5 Clearly a focus
on consent with its emphasis on whether or not she displayed her lack of consent to the
accused can constitute an extremely testing experience for the complainer in the trial. The
use of such arguments in trials involving young women is a matter of some concern
because it means that young complainers are thus exposed to the same repertoire of testing
questions that occur in rape trials, with even less justification. There is yet another reason
why the emphasis on consent in such trials can be considered surprising. This is in the light
of the 'shield' legislation restricting the admissibility of sexual evidence - yet it is precisely
this sort of restricted evidence which is commonly drawn upon in defence attempts to
establish consent on the part of the complainer.
The dominance of consent-based arguments in trials involving young complainers may
well be a paradoxical finding, given that in all sexual offences involving girls and young
women under the age of 16 years is technically irrelevant. But what was also abundantly
clear were the similarities between these trials and rape trials involving adult women.
Strong parallels can be drawn on several levels: those evidential issues which hinge on
consent that routinely appear in rape trials are applied where younger women are involved;
5 See for example Estrich, S. (1987) Real Rape ; Smart, C. (1989) Feminism and The Power ofLaw;
Brown, B. et al (1993)Ser Crimes on Trial, Adler, Z. (1987 ) Rape on Trial; Edinburgh Rape Crisis Centre
response to the Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum no 46
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the same tests of consent and non-consent are used; courtroom practices and defence
rhetoric are markedly similar; stories about the alleged events and the images of
complainers largely converge with those that appear in rape trials. The 'rape model' appears
to have infiltrated an area where, on the legal face of it, it does not technically belong.
Consent and Evidential Issues
As in rape trials involving adult women, the story of the consenting young complainer is
built up through challenging and re-interpreting the signs of the crime and the complainer's
account of what occurred, whilst consistently searching for signifiers of consent. Evidential
issues such as appropriate 'first report' evidence, delay in reporting, the presence or absence
of injuries, and evidence of force and resistance are explored with similar weight as that
given to such evidence in rape trials. It is very rare however, for any sexual offence case to
demonstrate evidence for all of the standard signifiers. Of course, there must be some
corroborating evidence, otherwise the case would not have reached the trial stage, but no
case was observed which contained corroborating evidence from all of the standard
sources.
These main sources of corroboration provide the standard signifiers of sexual assault
despite the large and convincing body of criticisms which maintain that they in fact
represent a rather idealised and inaccurate image of the victim, the sexual assault, and the
victim's experience of the assault. As discussed by Adler (1987), research has shown that
there is really no such thing as a 'normal' reaction to being raped, whilst some victims may
display extreme distress and anxiety, others may appear calm and collected which is often a
sign of shock and trauma.6 A focus on overt physical signs of the sexual assault and/or
evidence that the complainer was extremely distressed following the assault veers
dangerously close to the formation of a standard and prescriptive picture to which 'real'
sexual assaults and 'real' victims should conform. Moreover, an over-reliance on such
signifiers as evidence of force and resistance and injuries largely ignores the possibility,
for example, that coercive sex can be achieved in the absence of physical violence.
Nonetheless these signifiers remain the standard tests of sexual assault.
In the trial, the defence will try to focus on the absence of these standard signifiers in an
attempt to establish that the complainer in fact consented to the sexual activity. So, for
example, if there is no visible sign of injury on the complainer's body, then the defence will
use that evidence of lack of injury to 'show' that the complainer consented. Of course, in
terms of corroboration, if the complainer's account is that she received a severe beating in
the course of the sexual assault, and if there is no sign of any injury, then her account of
6 Adler, Z. (1987) p 12-13
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being violently attacked cannot be corroborated (this may also be relevant for her
credibility). But even in cases where the complainer's account was that she did not receive
any injury, but rather was threatened or coerced by the accused and so evidence of injuries
would not therefore be expected, her lack of injuries will be focused on by the accused as a
positive indicator of consent. By focusing on the issue of consent in such circumstances,
the defence goes beyond the overt evidence, as it were, to insinuate, at every opportunity,
that an absence of one of the standard signifiers equals consent.
But the defence preoccupation with consent in sexual offence trials extends beyond
emphasising lack of signifiers. Because even where corroborating evidence for sexual
assault is present and there is strong corroborative evidence of injury for example, the
defence will then try to turn it around into evidence of consent by negating it as evidence of
non-consent, according it a different meaning, or putting forward an alternative version.
Thus tests of consent and non-consent are consistently applied to what appear as seemingly
straightforward evidential issues in the trial.
The deployment of rape model arguments and forms of questioning contribute immensely
to the ordeal faced by the young complainer in the witness box. These sort of defence lines
can not only prove very confusing for the complainer, but they are also very harassing.
Often such questions focus on the smallest of details and can generate a plethora of
confusing and unnecessary 'possibilities'. By fielding several different interpretations of
evidence (seemingly simultaneously), the defence can effectively create a smoke screen of
dubiety around the complainer and her tale of the events. Some of these alternative
interpretations may ultimately turn out to be nothing more than evidential red herrings
thrown out by the defence in what often seems to be a concerted effort to confuse, harass,
and upset the complainer.
The rest of this chapter draws on the research findings to illustrate the prevalence of
consent-based argument in trials involving young complainers. There are two main aims
here. One is to try to show what a fundamental position the issue of consent holds in such
trials and, crucially, how it gets related to the key evidential issues on the trial. The other
is to try to show how the image of the consenting complainer fits into ongoing narrative(s)
in the trial concerning defence stories about the sexual activity and her involvement in it.
'First Report' Evidence and Delay in Reporting
Hearsay evidence, that is, the reporting by a witness of something that has been told to
them is disallowed under the general rules of evidence. The rule against hearsay is designed
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to prevent witnesses reporting what they or other persons said on other occasions.7
However, the 'first report' made to a witness by a complainer very soon after the event can
be seen as an exception to this. In giving 'first report' evidence, a witness is able to
comment on the complainer's state or demeanour, but also what she said had happened to
her. 'First report' evidence is important in sexual offence trials as it is often admitted in
relation to the complainer's credibility, usually as evidence of the veracity and consistency
of her account of events. Disclosure and distress after the event is also investigated as
evidence of lack of consent and hence the absence of a witness who can testify to the
complainer's distress after the event is presented by the defence as evidence of consent.
However, what began as an exception soon became a presumption. The presumption
regarding 'first report' seems to be that a complainer who had just experienced non¬
consensual sex would make her allegation as soon as possible after the event and also that
she would tell the first person with whom she came into contact about her ordeal, whether
that person is known to her or not. The fact that she did not tell anybody immediately
afterwards is often used by the defence to 'show' that she had sex willingly. Sometimes it is
also used by the defence as evidence that no sex had taken place at all. As has been
emphasised throughout this thesis, not only can evidence play a multiplicity of functions
for the defence, but it is also perfectly common for the defence to run several lines of
defence during the course of the trial which may even contradict one another. In case 22
where the 14 year old complainer was allegedly raped by her uncle in her father's house,
the fact that she did not run out of the house to tell the man in the ice cream van which
passed by the house shortly afterwards was used by the defence both to suggest that the
sexual assault did not occur and also to suggest that she had consented to it. The worth of
'first report' evidence decreases if the complainer did not act on the first chance that she had
to tell someone what happened, but as Brown et al (1993) point out, what constitutes an
opportunity to tell someone is highly contentious.8
A second, but no less important presumption is that someone who has recently been
subjected to a sexual assault would appear distressed and upset and distraught and this
would be reflected in 'first report' accounts. Where a witness attests that the complainer did
not appear unduly emotionally distressed, then this too is used to show that the complainer
had willingly participated in the sexual activity. In several cases involving younger girls
the 'first report' evidence on demeanour was that they did not volubly display extreme
distress in a way that the defence clearly believed that, as victims, they should. In some of
these cases, the 'first report' evidence described complainers as "withdrawn", "very quiet",
7 Wilkinson, A.B. (1986) The Scottish Law ofEvidence p.33 The rule excludes all sorts of assertions other
than those made by the witness of his or her own knowledge
8 Brown, B. et al (1993) p 187 - 187
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"submissive" or in one case, "giggly" when they relayed what had happened to them. One
interpretation of this sort of behaviour is that it is in fact vividly symptomatic of shock and
trauma. But it does not fit the stereotypical picture held by the defence of the crying,
screaming, distressed complainer , and as such is presented as evidence of her willingness
to take part in sex.
There were a number of very memorable cases involving young complainers where the
absence of 'first report' evidence was turned around by the defence into evidence of
consent. This happened most frequently in cases of incest or where there was a close
relationship between the complainer and the accused. For example, in a trial involving a
number of sexual offences which took place over a period of four years from the time that
the girl was 9 years old and where the accused was her mother's cohabitee, the defence
commented twice in asides to the jury that "the girl clearly enjoyed it as she didn't report it." (case 33 )
This kind of interpretation ignores the possibility that the young complainer may have been
threatened or intimidated or coerced into silence by the accused.
In several trials, particularly where the accused is in a position of close relationship, trust or
authority in relation to the complainer, the offences took place over a protracted length of
time. In some incest cases, this was over a period of several years. In such cases there was
a delay in reporting what happened and the 'first report' was made a long time after the
sexual behaviour had commenced, and sometimes after it had ceased to take place.
Sometimes the behaviour came to light because an allegation was made by a second
complainer; or because the first victim believed that her sibling was being targeted for sex
by the accused; or, as in a few cases, following a catalytic event such as when a mother
gave her 10 year old daughter a sex education booklet (case 20), and a nine year old and her
grandmother watched a television programme on a sexual abuse help-line for children (case
23).
Even in cases where, in court, the complainer was able to explain her silence as due to
embarrassment, horror, ignorance, guilt, or, as in several cases, the belief that she would
"get into trouble" with one or both parents, the long delay and absence of an immediate 'first
report' was still presented as evidence that either nothing had happened at all, or most
frequently that she had willingly participated. This was particularly so in those cases where
the complainer had said nothing about the sexual behaviour, but someone else had
inadvertently found out what had happened, for example, where a mother found what she
thought were semen stains in her daughter's underwear; where an older brother accidentally
'discovered' his sister and the accused having sex (unusual in that it involved an eye¬
witness); a 12 year old girl became pregnant; a suspicious neighbour found the accused
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fondling his two young nieces, and; in two untypical cases where it was actually the
accused who confessed to a relative and a friend.
The absence of an immediate complaint and a time lapse between the event and telling
someone about it are taken to imply a compliance on the part of the complainer, and in turn
a lack of trauma. But even where there is prompt reporting and this is made by a (suitably)
distressed and upset complainer, the defence will still offer an alternative interpretation
challenging her account of what occurred. Consider the following example : a series of
(fully corroborated) mishaps led to a teenager who had been out with her friends missing
the last bus home. She telephoned for a taxi and, whilst waiting outside the telephone call
box for it to arrive, a car driven by a complete stranger stopped and asked her if she wanted
a lift. She refused. He drove off. Minutes later, the car returned and stopped, the man got
out of the car, dragged her over a fence and into a nearby field and attempted to rape her.
He then left her lying in the field and drove off. The taxi arrived, to find the girl very
distressed and incoherent, covered in mud, one shoe missing and her clothing torn. She
gave her address to the taxi, but did not tell him what had happened to her, but told her
parents what had happened as soon as she arrived home. In cross-examination, the defence
insisted she had had consensual sex, and explained her distress and allegation of attempted
rape as "a show of pretence" because she would not otherwise be able to explain her lateness
and her torn and muddied clothing and she was afraid that she would get into trouble with
her parents for having sex and for being late home (case 21). Of course, in doing so, the
defence was also introducing a motive for false allegation at the same time as arguing
consent, but as has been emphasised it is quite common for the defence to run several lines
of argument simultaneously.
Resisting the Assault
How the complainer resisted the assault takes on importance not only because it is treated
as an indicator of her general unwillingness to participate, her 'lack of consent' in other
words, but also because resistance can be corroborated. Shouts and screams can be heard -
if there is anyone to hear. Neighbours may verify an account of a struggle if they
overheard screams or bangs or loud noises. Struggle can be corroborated by medical and/or
forensic evidence of torn clothing, or injury to the complainer. It may possibly be
corroborated by signs of disarray in a room or evidence of a struggle in the immediate area
surrounding where the assault took place, and this evidence would be introduced into the
court room through the testimony of a 'scenes-of-crime' police officer and backed up with
photographic and/or forensic evidence. Resistance by the complainer can also -
occasionally - be evidenced by injuries sustained by the accused.
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The prosecution, in taking evidence from the complainer, will often focus on how she made
her non-consent or her unwillingness clear to the accused. This is a routine part of
prosecution questioning in rape trials involving adult women, but court observation
suggests that this practice has also permeated into trials involving younger women and
girls. In cross-examination, the defence will again focus on any lack of signs of resistance
to substantiate the argument that she in fact 'consented'. What happens in this process of
examination and cross-examination is that the absence of any of the standard pieces of
evidence which the prosecution use to support their case that the sex was non-consensual is
turned into positive evidence of consent by the defence. Interrogatory questions such as
"why did no one hear you scream ?" "why did no one hear you struggle ?" "how was it that no one saw this
happen to you ?" "why are there no marks to show you struggled ?" are fired at the complainer, often
in a very hectoring and intimidating manner.
At the same time, the defence will also focus on whether the complainer did in fact actively
resist and, if she did, the manner in which she resisted. Defence lines of questioning
specifically aim at establishing whether the complainer did everything that she possibly
could to vocally and physically state her unwillingness. The following are examples of
typical defence questions fired at complainers "are you sure that you did everything you could to
resist ?" "why did you not fight back ?" "are you sure that you screamed/shouted/cried out ?" "why did you
not kick him between the legs ?" "why did you not poke him in the eyes ?" "why did you not hit him with the
chair ?" This sort of 'rape model' type of questioning - in fact exactly the same sort of
standard questioning is commonly found in rape trials involving adult women. 9 But in
the observed cases involving young complainers not only do such 'rape model' style
questions concerning consent appear misplaced - they also contribute hugely to the ordeal
of giving evidence in sexual offence trials. In the observed trials, evidence of resistance
signified by shouting or screaming or fighting back was rare. In many cases, especially
those involving incest, the absence of the resistance signifier could perhaps be explained
by the fact that the sexual behaviour formed part of a long-established pattern of sexual
abuse, many of the complainers were very young, they were threatened or intimidated into
keeping quiet about events, and the perpetrators were well known to them. In fact in several
cases, the complainer and accused had a very close relationship, and were for example,
relatives, neighbours or family friends.
During the trial, witnesses may be requested to relate what they saw or heard in relation to
the alleged assault or, for example, to describe their involvement in events leading up to or
9 Brown, B. et al (1993) document several such cases. In one case involving an adult complainer the woman
was asked why she did not grab the shot gun which the accused was pointing at her, and in another the 4 foot
10 inch woman was repeatedly asked why she did not fight back against her 6 foot two inch, 12 stone
attacker.
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following the incident. For example, it is common to call witnesses who saw the
complainer and accused together prior to the incident and elicit information concerning the
witness's perception of how they were behaving towards each other. Such evidence is often
the source of dispute over whether the complainer resisted the accused or not. The
questioning often follows a similar format, with the prosecution first trying to establish that
the complainer and accused did not appear as if they were preparing to have sex soon
afterwards, and the defence trying to show that they were, and by so doing implying that
she consented. To illustrate this, what follows are two extracts, the first from the
prosecution examination and the second from the defence cross-examination of a teenage
witness who saw the complainer and accused together about an hour before an alleged
attempted rape of a 14 year old girl by an older boy in a local park:
Prosecution: and when you saw [complainer and accused] in the street, did they appear to be
talking to each other ?
Witness: Aye
Prosecution: Did you hear what they were saying to each other?
Witness: No really
Prosecution: Did they appear to be on friendly terms?
Witness: No really
Prosecution: Did you see [accused] pull [complainer] in the direction of the park ?
Witness: Aye, by the railings he had hold of her arm
Defence: Did [complainer] appear to be distressed at all ?
Witness: No really
Defence: She was not distressed. Did she try and resist being pulled towards the park?
Witness: I dunno
Defence: Did she cry out to you for help?
Witness: No
Defence: So you did not think she was being pulled against her will?
Witness: I dunno, she wasnae crying
Defence: Was she struggling to get away from him?
Witness: No really maybe I dunno
Defence: She could easily have run away from him if she wanted to, couldn't she ?
(Case no. 42)
From this point on in the trial, the defence began to build up a picture- using the evidence
of several witnesses - of the complainer as willingly entering the park with the accused with
the intention of having sex there with him. The defence interpretation of the evidence of
this particular witness was that the complainer and accused were "horsing around" outside the
park and at no time did the complainer display any signs of distress or unwillingness to be
with the accused, rather she appeared to be thoroughly enjoying the "game" as a kind of
sexual foreplay. Subsequent witnesses who were also around the vicinity of the park prior
to the incident and saw the complainer and accused together were similarly cross-
examined. Although all witnesses attested to the accused pulling the complainer's arm, and
none explicitly stated that they thought the complainer entered the park willingly, the
defence interpretation of their evidence was that she displayed no distress, could easily
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have got away from the accused if she had wanted, and was ultimately enjoying "fooling
around" with the accused. Throughout the cross-examination of these witnesses, all of whom
were children or in their very early teens, the defence continually asserted that the
complainer freely and gladly entered the park and, by so doing, demonstrated her readiness
to take part in whatever transpired thereafter.
Underlying the reliance on the signifier of resistance to show non-consent is the implicit
assumption that 'real' victims of sexual assault would resist their attackers to the very last;
that 'real' victims would do everything in their power to resist the assault, and shout,
scream, holler and fight back regardless of the circumstances of the assault. In their study,
Chambers and Millar (1986) also found that the defence frequently emphasised that 'real'
victims would resist to the end.10 The focus on how the complainer struggled and resisted
is a major criticism of court room rhetoric that has been well-documented by several
writers.11 Despite the heavy criticism levelled at such practices - in terms of presenting a
picture of what counts as 'real' rape which distorts the experiences of women, and also in
terms of the ordeal of giving evidence - such practices unfortunately do still persist. There
is, however, a further implication of this sort of defence tactic which focuses on how the
complainer fought back. This is that such questioning makes clear that the burden of
'showing' or 'refusing' consent to sex is seen as the responsibility of the complainer, and is
not something that is the responsibility of the accused.
The focus on how the complainer resisted the assault and showed her non-consent raises
another important point, and this is in some ways indicative of the way that the law
perceives gendered sexual relations. As Jamieson (1994) has pointed out in relation to
trials involving adult rape complainers, the focus on how the complainer resisted fits with
the notion that women usually need to be persuaded to have sex. Some resistance from the
woman is expected by the man and seen as part of the 'normal' sequence of events.12 This
type of construction of the 'coy yet ultimately willing' complainer is also evident in the
defence interpretation of case 42 quoted above. The presumption that a certain amount of
sexually persuasive 'foreplay' is a 'normal' part of any sexual encounter is also apparent in
questioning concerning the amount of force used and related questioning concerning
injuries sustained by the complainer. It is almost as if a woman's "No" is not strong
enough and her unwillingness can only be demonstrated through physical means.
10 Chambers and Millar (1986) Prosecuting Sexual Assault
11 See, for example, Estrich, S. (1987); Adler, Z. (1987); Brown, B. et al (1993)




In Scots law definitions of rape, it is no longer required that force be used. Nevertheless,
the presumption seems to be that signs of force are important in 'overcoming the will' of the
woman. Brown et al (1993) found that juries were often presented with definitions of rape
that privileged force.13 Force thus appears to remain a sign of rape in Scottish court rooms.
This emphasis on force and the physical results of force - most notably injuries - can also
be found in trials involving younger complainers and in crimes and offences other than
rape.
The presence or absence of bodily injuries to the complainer provokes much court room
discussion. 'Significant' injuries may include cuts, swelling, bruising and abrasions to all
parts of the body, but to the genital area in particular. Details about any injuries are
routinely recorded in the medical report which, as has previously been mentioned, is a
Crown production submitted to the court. In all sexual assaults which allegedly involve
some form of physical contact, physical injuries are seen as major evidential determinants,
key signs of the presence or absence of consent. The presence of injuries is presented by
the prosecution as evidence of force and/or resistance which can corroborate the
complainer's own account of what happened. For example, if the complainer stated that she
was pulled or dragged by her limbs or punched anywhere on her body, then the presence of
injuries on those precise parts of her body are presented as corroborating her account of
force used by the accused. Lack of injury is used by the defence to show that the accused
did not force himself on the complainer, she did not resist him and, by logical extension,
she was a willing participant. Again, the emphasis on the presence or absence of injuries
implies that 'real' victims are those that are badly beaten and injured.
This reliance on injury-as-indicator appears to be no different in sexual offences involving
young complainers. When absence of any signs of force or injury is combined with a delay
in reporting the offence, it would be very optimistic to expect to find any evidence of
bruising or other physical marks to corroborate the complainer's account. In the following
case, the complainer's account was that the accused had pulled her denim jeans off in order
to have sex with her. The defence disputed this and was relentless in focusing on the lack of
bruising around her lower abdomen and thighs that he presumed would accompany such a
display of force.
13 Brown, B. et al (1993) quote a number of rape definitions given to juries by both judges and defence
advocates, e.g. "The essence of the crime of rape is force"; "Sexual intercourse must have been forcibly
against will"; "Rape is overcoming the female's resistance by physical violence or by using a lethal weapon",
p 184
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Defence: And you say that [the accused] ripped off your jeans ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: Right off of your body ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: How can that be so ? They were tight blue jeans were they not ?
Complainer: Not all that tight
Defence: But to remove them [the accused] would have had to exert a degree of force, not so ?
Complainer: He did
Defence: Then why are there no marks to show that force ?
Complainer: I don't know
Defence: I suggest there are no marks because you took them off yourself, didn't you '?
The lack of marks and the seeming improbability that the accused could have pulled them
off without marking the complainer in some way was returned to by the defence throughout
the cross-examination of the complainer and other witnesses. All the while the defence was
slowly building up an image of the complainer as consenting to sex with the accused, and
building on the story that she was willing but then changed her mind at a later stage and,
frightened at what her parents may say if they found out, she fabricated an attempted rape.
Yet even where there has been prompt reporting and there has been an ensuing medical
examination which documents strong evidence of injuries and marks that are consistent
with the complainer's account of what occurred, these injuries are still highlighted by the
defence and either turned into nothing more than the marks of 'normal' childhood or
adolescent play activity, or dismissed as nothing more than marks of the 'normal' rough and
tumble of sexual activity. Examples of the former include referring to bruising as due to
"billing off a bicycle" or due to "energetic disco dancing".
Specific genital injury and/or internal damage would perhaps appear to pose more of a
problem, yet this is frequently construed as circumstantial evidence of consensual sex. In
fact, in one case, it was suggested that the soreness and redness around the complainer's
vagina was a result of energetic "sexual exploration" and both the accused's and the
complainer's sexual inexperience. In some cases, and as discussed in the previous chapter,
it was suggested that the genital swelling or injury was due to masturbation by the
complainer, once again picking up on the theme of adolescent sexual exploration.
Stories ofConsent
Defence opportunities to construct an image of the consenting young complainer are not
exhausted by casting alternative versions of evidence. The characterisation of the
consenting young complainer is also conveyed by means of large narrative accounts about
her involvement in the sexual activity that is the subject of the charge, and specifically
about her relationship with the accused. These accounts are in effect much bigger 'stories'
that pull in several elements of the defence argument.
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Defence advocates are opportunistic in their appropriation of evidence which can be re¬
interpreted to fit their story of events. Indeed that is part of the art of the advocate and a
feature of the adversarial system. Typically, an alternative version will be put to the
complainer through a series of questions - some of which are in interrogatory mode and
others more rhetorical in nature. This device seems to work on the premise that questions
that probe the smallest of details are an effective means of unfolding the defence story. Of
course they can also prove very harassing for the complainer. The following example of
defence questioning of a 15 year old complainer regarding the accused's allegation that
they had consensual sex illustrates this:
Defence: Is it not the case when you were upset, you sat down to be consoled ?
Complainer: No. I was pulled on to his knee by him
Defence: Did it not happen, you were upset and put your arms around him and were crying ?
Complainer: I wasn't crying
Defence: You were being comforted sitting on his knee ?
Complainer: He was not comforting me. I did not sit on his knee
Defence: You were washing the dishes. He came up behind ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: You were enjoying his attention?
Complainer: No
Defence: You were leaning against him ?
Complainer: No
Defence: You had on jeans and a T-shirt. Your jeans were too big, quite loose at the waist ?
Complainer: Very
Defence: He put his hands in your jeans
Complainer: No
Defence: Whilst still at the kitchen sink you agreed to him slackening off buttons on your trousers ?
Complainer: What ?
Defence: While still at the kitchen sink you agreed to him slackening off buttons on your
trousers ?
Complainer: No !
Defence: At the same time you tried to take down the zip of his trousers
Complainer: I totally deny that!14
One of the main ways in which such 'narrative accounts' proceed is by suggesting that the
complainer indicated her consent or willingness to have sex at some time prior to the actual
incident. This is most frequently done by recasting the complainer's version of events and
utilising information from other witnesses in the trial. A first step is to impute a friendly -
if not blatantly flirtatious - relationship between the complainer and the accused. For
example, in one case the accused worked in a local shop, and the defence construed the
complainer's regular visits to the shop as evidence that she 'fancied' the accused, although
the complainer denied this (and appeared shocked when this was put to her in the witness
box) (case 6). Similarly, in another case involving two accuseds, the defence story was that
the complainer had told one of them that she 'fancied' the other a few days before the
14 This example is also quoted in full in Brown B. et al (1993) p 189
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activity that was the subject of the charge, and that she asked the first accused to set her up
with a date with the second accused (case 19).
Any previous sexual conduct with the accused is regarded as being strong evidence of
consent. As Brown et al (1993) found in relation to trials involving adult complainers, past
sexual conduct with the accused was usually deemed relevant to consent, and in fact
consent was the crux of the defence case in the majority of the applications under the
legislation which were made to introduce evidence of past sexual relations with the
accused. In this research, in two cases involving young complainers where there was some
evidence of flirtatious behaviour with the accused (case 39 and case 53) it was put to both
complainers that the "kissing and cuddling" was evidence of their willingness to participate in
sex on the occasion of the charge. Although in the former case this "sexual behaviour" was
alleged by the defence to have taken place a few weeks previously (and there was no
objection from the prosecution at the use of this evidence), in the latter case it was alleged
that the kissing and cuddling had taken place just prior to the sexual activity and this was
the subject of an application made by the defence. The application was successful and, in
granting the defence permission to pursue such evidence, and investigate the area, the
judge said 'This goes right to the root of the matter, whether [it is an] act of rape or consensual".
In cross-examination it was put to the 15 year old complainer that she had willingly
engaged in kissing and cuddling and had allowed the accused to give her love bites on her
neck, but then changed her mind:
Defence: Was it not a case that you were kissing and cuddling ?
Complainer: No
Defence: And that he then wanted to go further and you didn't?"
Complainer: No"
Defence: So everything of a sexual nature was against your will ?"
Complainer: Yes
Defence: And hateful to you ?
Complainer: Yes
Defence: Was it not a situation that you were happy to go to a certain point ?
Complainer: I don't understand. I already told you [no]
And then later in her cross-examination, the defence suggested that she and the accused had
had consensual intercourse in the past:
Defence: Has [the accused] ever been to your house ?
Complainer: Before ? No.
Defence: Is it not true that he came to your house and had sexual intercourse with you with
your consent as on the current occasion ?
Past sexual behaviour with someone other than the accused was also used by the defence to
suggest consent with the accused. In some ways, this is closest to the formulation of a
predisposition towards 'automatic' consent that the Scottish Law Commission wished to
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outlaw. Again, the study by Brown et al (1993) throws some light on this continuing trend.
They found that questions focusing specifically on sexual behaviour between the
complainer and someone other than the accused were frequently allowed when the defence
made an application to pursue such evidence. In the majority of the cases that they
observed, the defence argued that this evidence was relevant to the complainer's credibility
and the judge accepted that it was. However, in other cases, the defence wished to pursue
such a line in order to show that the complainer had some predisposition to consent on the
occasion of the offence.
There were no applications made to pursue evidence on sexual behaviour with others in
trials involving young female complainers. However, this sort of evidence was raised by
the defence in an absence of an application, most notably in two cases. In the first, the
defence tried to construct an image of the consenting young complainer by referring to
comments that she had allegedly made concerning her "past boyfriends" and in the second by
referring to the "well-known sexual reputation" of the young complainer. The prosecution did
not object on either occasion.
Some of the most blatant attempts to construct a picture of the consenting complainer are
those 'stories' which depict her as going to (at times, extraordinary) lengths in order to set
up a situation where she could have sex with the accused. This has the effect of casting her
in the role of conniving young temptress and is most frequently used in conjunction with
the typology of sexual adventuress as discussed in the previous chapter. In one example
of this, the sexual activity that constituted the charge was cast as a case of entrapment of
the accused by the young complainer. In a quite remarkable feat of convoluted 'logic' the
defence suggested that the complainer had lured the accused into a situation where he had
simply succumbed to her seduction techniques. This was a situation where the complainer
had gone with her friends to the house of another friend whose parents were out. The
accused was also there with friends of his. The defence alleged that the complainer
displayed sexually provocative behaviour to the accused all evening and then engineered a
situation where the accused was lured to an upstairs bedroom where she lay in wait. This
was particularly notable because there was no other evidence from any of the complainer's
friends nor the accused's friends (who were all witnesses in the trial) to suggest that any
sexually provocative behaviour took place nor that the complainer lured him away to an
upstairs bedroom.
Non-Sexual Indicators ofConsent
Aside from using specifically sexual evidence to construct stories of the consenting
complainer, the defence may also utilise 'indicators' of consent that are not specifically
sexual in themselves. This often involved putting forward what appears at first to be a
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somewhat spurious list of ways in which the complainer allegedly indicated her sexual
interest in the accused. Court observation revealed these non-sexual indicators to be many
and varied, and this is not surprising if one remembers that the defence need only 'put' to
the complainer (and the jury) alternative versions or interpretations of events. For
example, in case 53 cited above, the defence suggested that because the complainer had on
the evening in question asked to borrow the accused's bicycle and his cycling gloves then
this somehow constituted a subtle sexual overture from her towards him whereby she
indicated her consent. In several other cases the defence attempted to put forward other
non-sexual 'indicators' such as going into the accused's home when no one else was at
home; accepting a lift home with him; accepting something from him - a gift, a drink,
chewing gum, a ride in his car or on his motor bike; giving something to him; sending him
notes; and going to watch him play sport. All of these 'indicators' are used to 'show' that
she tacitly consented. Throughout the trial, the deployment of a particular style of defence
rhetoric and one which is resonant with suggestion imbues these non-sexual indicators
with sexual connotations, whilst at the same time building up a particular picture of the
consenting complainer. The prevalence of stories and presuppositions acknowledges the
role that stereotypical perceptions of female sexuality - irrespective of age - play in the
court room. This is of course not dissimilar to the way in which sexual character is
sometimes built up (see previous chapter). It is the same gradual process of accumulation,
using innuendo and suggestion, that is utilised. When stories about the young complainer
are deployed in conjunction with images of her as a sexual being the presentation of her as
someone who is likely to consent is very strongly made. As a result, the experience for a
young complainer is as much of a devastating ordeal as that experienced by an adult
women.
Why Consent ?
So why are questions of consent such an integral part of such trials ? Is this just a question
of the defence mobilising the same forms of questioning and the same well-worn
arguments, of running through tried and tested 'rape model' routines with the aim of
suggesting that the complainer consented in an attempt to undermine her credibility ? Of
course, such lines of questioning and the consequent creation of confusion and/or doubt
in the minds of the jury may potentially lead to favourable trial outcomes for the defence (it
should be remembered that, in Scotland, there is a third verdict open to jurors, that of Not
Proven), and as such may go some way to explain the appearance of consent in these
trials. Certainly, in the research interviews defence counsel were quite clear that, during
the trial, they try to do their best for their client, which usually means aiming for an
acquittal. In this, they are concerned with influencing the jury to reach a favourable
outcome for the accused. Impugning the character of the complainer and attacking her
credibility and suggesting that she consented may influence quite significantly the
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adjudication decision made by the jury in coming to a verdict at the end of the trial. But it
is submitted that this is only a partial reason for the prevalence of consent-based
arguments in trials involving young complainers. A second set of reasons - no less
important in terms of potential effects - concern the relationship between the suggestion of




THE IMPORTANCE OF MITIGATION
This chapter focuses on the issue of mitigation in sexual offence trials, and draws on
mitigation data from the observation of contested trials and also from observed cases where
the accused pled guilty and no trial took place. Thirty of the 53 observed contested trials
involved a guilty verdict (fuller details of the complex nature of guilty verdicts can be
found in Chapter Five) and pleas in mitigation were provided in all of these cases. In
addition, pleas in mitigation were given in the 41 observed cases where the accused pled
guilty in advance of the trial ( called here 'guilty plea' and 's.102' cases1). This chapter is
about these pleas in mitigation. An examination of pleas in mitigation also throws some
light on the paradoxical use of consent-based argument. But before turning to the
specificities of the use of mitigation in sexual offence cases involving young women and
girls, the following section sets out the process of, and some general characteristics about
pleas in mitigation.
The Process and Function of Mitigation
In procedural terms, following the delivery of a guilty verdict in a criminal trial, a plea in
mitigation is given by the defence on the behalf of the accused, before the court proceeds to
decide sentence. Pleas in mitigation are also given in cases where the accused has pled
guilty on the day scheduled for trial. In such cases a conviction is recorded and the plea in
mitigation is given after the prosecution has summarised the facts of the offence and given
some relevant information about the offender, such as his current circumstances and, if
appropriate, any previous convictions and then moved for sentence, and before the court
decides the manner of disposal of the case.
The general aim of a plea in mitigation is to seek a lesser sentence. The role of the defence
in giving a plea in mitigation is to attempt to draw attention to mitigating factors in the case
which lessen the culpability of the offender and/or the seriousness of the offence. These
mitigating factors are put forward by the defence^ in the hope of influencing the
sentencing decision by the presiding judge or sheriff and gaining a more lenient sentence
1 'Guilty plea' cases are those where the accused pled not guilty at the preliminary pleading diet, but on the
day set for trial pled guilty. Cases heard under s. 102 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act are those
where the accused has pled guilty at the preliminary pleading diet, and an 'accelerated' hearing date is set on
which to decide sentence
2 Pleas in mitigation can be made by the defendant where there is no legal representation. In this study,
however, all defendants were legally represented and all pleas in mitigation were made by defence
lawyers/advocates.
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for the defendant. It is essentially a 'plea for clemency' and the judge is urged to take
account of the arguments and explanations given, and to view the offender in a more
compassionate way. As Shapland (1981) points out in the introduction to her very detailed
study of pleas in mitigation the process of mitigation is highly important, both to the
defendant and to the public.3 This process is important to the defendant not only because -
if he pleads guilty - it may represent his only experience of how the court operates, but
also because of its potential effect on the way in which the court disposes with his case. It
is also of importance to the general public because, as Shapland points out, the sentences
handed out will often be the only means by which they are able to see how particular
offences or offenders are viewed by the courts. However, as is the case with most crimes
and offences, sentencers have wide discretion in their choice of sentence for sexual
offences (even those which are defined by statute and where a sentencing maximum is
given). Walker (1985) maintains that it is because of the lack of an inflexible sentencing
tariff that sentencers cannot avoid reasoning in terms of mitigation (or aggravation).4 Be
that as it may, as Ashworth (1992) points out, the judiciary have a discretion to take
account of any mitigating factor which is put forward.5 Of course, that is not to say that
sentencers are formally obliged to be influenced by a mitigating plea, they may decide to
disbelieve it or regard it as irrelevant, or take the view that it is outweighed by aggravating
factors. 6
In Scotland, crimes of rape, incest and other serious sexual offences carry a potentially
substantial custodial penalty. Nicholson (1992) points out that a sentence of three years'
imprisonment for rape has been described as "lenient", while particularly aggravating
circumstances such as the use of violence, or where the victim is young may justify
sentences up to 10 years' imprisonment.7 Sexual offences other than rape can carry many
types of disposal and, although the age-related offences under the Sexual Offences
(Scotland) Act 1976 carry sentencing maximums, there is scope for wide variation in
sentencing. In all of the cases described here the victim was young and many of the
charges were extremely serious, several involving aggravating circumstances such as the
use of weapons, breach of trust and abuse of position, and premeditation. The presence of
aggravating factors considerably raises the potential for high sentences. Conversely,
mitigating factors may diminish the potential for a severe sentence. There are a range of
factors which may be influential in the sentencing decision, such as the character of the
3 Shapland, J. (1981) Between Conviction and Sentence p. 1
4 Walker, N. ( 1985) Sentencing : Theory Law and Practice p.43
5 Ashworth, A. (1992) Sentencing andCriminal Justice
6 Walker, N.( 1985)
7 Nicholson, C.B.G. (1992) Sentencing ; Law and Practice in Scotland (2nd ed.) 11-35 p.246
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crime, the degree of harm done, the level of provocation, the effect of drink or drugs, and
background information about the offender, including past convictions.8 Any of these
factors could influence the sentencing decision as mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
depending on the facts of the case. Pleas in mitigation are therefore important in that they
present an opportunity for raising for consideration those factors which may influence
sentencing in a way that is favourable for the offender.
Pleas in mitigation take the form of what can be seen as an explanatory speech by the
defence which essentially gives an account of the offence, outlining the defendant's point of
view. An explanation, or sometimes what amounts to a justification, of the offence may be
offered. Such speeches also usually include information about what type of person the
defendant is, what his social and familial circumstances are, and also what his intentions
may be concerning his future. This may take the form of a potted life history or may be a
selection of what may be considered significant factors from the defendant's current or past
life. Putting forward this information in mitigation serves several purposes. The
information may serve to fill in any gaps or inadequacies in the information provided by
others, that is, the prosecution in giving the facts of the case in guilty pleas, and others who
have provided information and views about the offender. It provides a means for portraying
the defendant in a more sympathetic light. More specifically, such information is
conveyed as important for the consideration of sentence. As such, some factors highlighted
by the defence in mitigation are designed to 'key in' to certain elements in sentencing. To
provide, for example, a means by which the sentencer can assess the relative
appropriateness of different types of disposal. Certain factors can fulfil many functions.
For example, information concerning the defendant's social and/or familial circumstances
may be pertinent for assessing the defendant's chances of rehabilitation. It may also be a
measure by which the sentencer is able to appraise the effects of a severe sentence on the
defendant's dependants, which may also be an element in sentencing.9
With regard to the actual offence in pleas in mitigation, there is no dispute about the
objective 'facts' of the case - that is, what occurred and who did it - these 'facts' have either
been agreed or proved in that the defendant has pled guilty or has been found guilty after
the evidence has been heard in a trial. But what is frequently in contention is whether the
defendant meant to do it in quite the way that it happened or whether the offence occurred
in quite the way that it is construed by the court, and also why the defendant did it. In a
8 Nicholson (1992) 912 - 939, p. 182-192
9 Walker (1985) terms the minimisation of "hardship for innocent members of the public" a 'second order'
sentencing aim, and gives as an example the (exceptional) case in which mothers of young children are
excused the normal prison sentence in order that their children need not be cared for by strangers. 8.46 p. 120
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sense then, some of the information given in pleas in mitigation is not about 'facts' which
are already known by the sentencer as a result of the trial or, in guilty plea cases, as a result
of the details of the offence laid out in the indictment and summarised by the prosecution
in advance of a plea in mitigation, but about aspects of the defendant's motivation and
hence about 'facts' known only by the defendant. Pleas in mitigation also provide an
opportunity for ascertaining the subsequent feelings of the defendant about the offence, for
example whether he is remorseful, whether he realises or accepts that what he did was
wrong. Taken together, this information is intended to mitigate the offence, and the
mitigation speech is an (often blatant) attempt to persuade the sentencer to pass a lenient
sentence. Because a plea in mitigation is an arena in which the defendant's point of view
can be put forward, it can be perceived as a very 'defendant-oriented' process. It is the
thoughts and statements and perspectives of the defendant which are frequently of
significance here (albeit as mediated by the defence), and hence pleas in mitigation are
constructed around information provided by the defendant.
One important point to be borne in mind is that the formal rules of evidence that pertain in
a contested trial do not apply in a plea of mitigation. Mitigating factors are different from
evidential facts which go towards proving or disproving the case. So, for example, there
are no rules for excluding evidence,10 and no real concern about admissibility or relevance.
Essentially this means that the defence is able to muster mitigating arguments and present
them more or less without constraint, and it appears that - subject to judicial discretion -
'anything goes' in mitigation. This freedom to introduce any factor consequently raises the
difficult and thorny issue of the reliability of pleas in mitigation. The defence will derive
most of the information for the plea in mitigation from the defendant (although this may
be revised in the light of evidence which emerged during the trial), and none of this is
subject to any form of proof. In the English context, it has been contended that there is
"wide scope for unchallenged cock-and-bull stories to be put forward in mitigation"11 -
particularly in those cases where the accused has pled guilty and there is no contested trial
and hence no witnesses heard in court. The question of the reliability of the information
provided in mitigation is also something which is raised by Shapland (1981) who points out
that information about the offender's personal circumstances can present difficulties in
terms of reliability. Questions that arise as to the reliability of information about the
offender's personal circumstances concern the correctness of the original information given
by the offender, the manner in which that information is obtained, the time that may have
elapsed between collecting the information and presenting it in court, and the amount of
10 Although the Scottish Law Commission did consider extending the "shield" legislation to cover pleas in
mitigation, it was ultimately rejected by them.
11 Brayshaw, A.J. (1982) 'Guilty, But....' The Magistrate
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original (or new) information that is actually given in court.12 Given the number of stages
of information collection and the range and diversity of possible factors which may affect
what is ultimately said in mitigation, the reliability of the content of mitigation speeches
remains an open question .13 There is a procedure by which prosecutors can object to what
is led in mitigation, but this appears to be followed only where there is a significant dispute
about the mitigating factors. In such cases, which by all accounts are extremely rare, the
matter can be settled only by hearing evidence. No cases were observed in which this
procedure was followed.14
A second important point is that although pleas in mitigation follow a standard procedure,
they are not structured by strict procedural rules which emanate from case or statute law
which govern the format or the order in which information is presented.15 Hence, pleas in
mitigation differ in several respects from contested trials. But there are some similarities
which such pleas share with the trial situation. Frequently, mitigation speeches will
incorporate several lines of argument, encompassing any factors that are considered by the
defence to be extenuating to the case. This mirrors the trial situation somewhat in that
defence lines of argument are often multi-track, incorporating a number of strands.
However, because the defence is able to bring to bear a wide and diverse range of
mitigating factors, pleas in mitigation often have something of a 'rag bag' quality to them.
There is another similarity between pleas in mitigation and contested trials in that what is
stated in mitigation is often a reiteration or re-casting of defence arguments led in criminal
trials, and this can be seen most vividly in those cases where a guilty verdict is returned.
As such, many pleas in mitigation provide a clear 'snap-shot' picture of defence
questioning and argument in contested trials.
As stated earlier, mitigating factors typically relate to the offender - that is, his reasons for
the offence, his attitude towards the offence, his personal circumstances. These factors
provide a context - be it social, familial, or circumstantial - within which the offender and
the offence can be defined and located and hence made more explicable. Shapland (1981)
found that pleas in mitigation typically produced several mitigating factors which could be
grouped together into certain categories. The groups of mitigating factors most frequently
mentioned were :
12 Shapland (1981) p. 123
13 Ashworth, A. (1983) p. 424
14 Furthermore, none of the prosecutors and defence lawyers/advocates interviewed were aware of any case
in which this procedure was used.
13 Shapland (1981) p. 1
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a. the reasons for the offence (i.e. factors such as provocation, suddenness and financial
crisis, or emphasising unusual or atypical circumstances);
b. the gravity of the offence (especially presenting the offence as a relatively minor
manifestation);
c. the defendant's attitude towards the offence (in particular any form of contrition or
remorse);
d. his personal circumstances at the time of the court appearance (especially
employment);
e. future personal circumstances (support from his family), and;
f. past record (emphasising in particular the absence of previous convictions or a long
gap since the last offence).16
Shapland thus organises the mitigating factors identified in her scrutiny of pleas in
mitigation into categories reflecting which aspect of the offender or the offence they were
describing.17 In using this categorisation, she focuses on features of the offender and the
offence rather than the bearing that such features may have on sentence. In analysing the
pleas in mitigation in this study, a different type of categorisation of mitigating factors has
been employed. Whilst the analysis of pleas in mitigation showed a number of strong
similarities to that found by Shapland, there were also some considerable differences, most
notably due to the fact that, first, in this research the offences to which the pleas in
mitigation related were all sexual offences involving young complainers and thus of a
particular 'type', sharing a number of similarities; second, there was a predominant use of
particular mitigating factors in this study; third, the pleas in this study were characterised
by the frequency and explicitness with which the defence related particular factors to the
issues of culpability and seriousness; and fourth, there was much more of a focus on the
victim. These differences necessitated a different type of categorisation from that
developed by Shapland. This categorisation will be described in the following section.
Mitigation In Sexual Offences : The Research Data
Characteristics of the Observed Pleas in Mitigation
Observation of the 71 pleas in mitigation which form the research data discussed here
identified several prevalent lines of mitigation, many of which centred on the perspective of
or conditions personal to the offender. Expositions of the offender's past, and his present
circumstances, such as his physical or mental health or emotional state at the time of the
court appearance and also at the time of the offence were commonly used in an attempt to
16 ibid. p.55-70
17 ibid. p. 55
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offer some explanation or rationale for the offence. Along with other sorts of considerations
such as the role of alcohol and unemployment in the commission of the offence, the
remorse expressed by the offender for having committed the offence, and other factors such
as the wider social contributions he has made in the past (or may make in the future), the
inappropriateness of a custodial sentence, and the probable deleterious effects of a severe
sentence on the offender and/or his family were used as part of a general mitigation
routine. In this way, analysis of the pleas showed strong similarities with those
documented by Shapland (1981). Cited either singly, or in combinations, such factors were
presented as providing a context for locating the crime in relation to the offender. Many of
the factors that were mentioned are generic to all pleas in mitigation, commonly occurring
as explanations or reasons in relation to a wide range of crimes and offences, and not
necessarily confined to those offences with a sexual element. This is perhaps not that
surprising, however, given that mitigation frequently focuses primarily on information
pertaining to the offender, his motivations, his circumstances and his attitude towards the
offence, more so than on the actual offence.
Focus on Complainer
Court observation also suggested that pleas in mitigation in sexual offence cases show
some fairly distinct characteristics, and this is particularly so in relation to the reasons given
for the offence. In addition to the expected offender-specific information, there was in fact
a great deal of information given about the complainer in mitigation speeches given in
relation to the sexual offences. What was particularly interesting was that many of the
arguments put forward by the defence to mitigate the seriousness of the offence, and also
the responsibility of the offender, were reflective of those that appear in the cross-
examination of witnesses (especially the complainer) in contested trials. In these cases,
the 'snap-shot' picture analogy is particularly apt. The mitigation 'snap-shot' provides an
indication of what occurs in defence cross-examination, but without any of the formal rules
of evidence that would be necessary in a trial. Of course, this can only be truly validated
and shown to be the case in relation to the contested trials where the arguments had already
been well-rehearsed, and where the content of mitigating speeches could be 'matched' with
arguments in the trial. But it is argued here that in 'guilty plea' and's. 102' cases where there
has been no trial, and where no evidence has been led prior to mitigation, the defence
arguments and strategies resemble, albeit in a condensed form, how things would have
operated in a trial setting if the defence were similarly unconstrained in the cross-
examination of witnesses. Whilst pleas in mitigation were perhaps not characterised by the
same degree of invective as many defence cross-examinations, less than subtle criticisms
were levelled at the complainer, typically alleging provocation or culpability or some form
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of misconduct by her which precipitated the offence. The young complainer was typically
portrayed by the defence as provocative and precocious, as a sexual being, as someone
who consented to the sexual activity - again more or less replicating the presentation of the
complainer in contested trials. As in the trial situation, factors such as the complainer's
sexual knowledge and physical maturity, her previous sexual experience, her delay in
reporting the offence, lack of injuries and general casting of aspersions as to her innocence
in relation to the offence are all brought up, to imply that the offence was less serious
and/or she was at least partly to blame for what happened.
There was also a very strong focus on the issue of consent. So much so, that the
presentation of the consenting young complainer appeared to dominate pleas in mitigation
in the same way that such presentations dominate contested trials. Pleas in mitigation
resemble contested trials in that there is a focus on the complainer and on specific features
or aspects, particularly the sexuality of the complainer. This was an early indication that in
addition to sharing certain similarities in terms of the type of evidence which receives most
attention, pleas in mitigation and contested trials may also share common purposes. In
Scots law it is competent to lead evidence of mitigating circumstances in the course of the
trial, and the striking similarity between pleas in mitigations and contested trials raises the
question of whether the focus on the complainer in the trial is not in fact a means of
introducing mitigating factors. This possibility will be explored in more detail later in this
chapter.
Offering Alternative Interpretations
The observed mitigation speeches also demonstrated other elements which showed distinct
similarities with defence strategies typically found in sexual offence trials - which appear to
be deployed in order to diminish the culpability of the offender. The defence commonly
offered alternative interpretations of the facts or circumstances of the offence in mitigation.
In cases where guilty verdicts were returned, this was in fact a reiteration of what was
argued in the trial, although in a small number of cases there was some inconsistency in
that the alternative explanation given in mitigation was 'new', as it were. In the 'guilty plea'
cases, the relaying of alternative interpretations was done seemingly in an effort to
convince the court that the offence did not occur in the way that it may have appeared from
the prosecution summary of the facts of the case.
Offender As Victim
Another characteristic of the pleas was an overtly sympathetic portrayal of the offender
Many of the pleas typified the offender as a 'victim' of circumstance, either as someone
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whose troubled past or present was to blame for the offence or, somewhat more frequently,
as someone who was tricked or misled into having sex by the complainer. Although the
focus on the offender is not dissimilar to that found generally in mitigation, in a sense
regardless of the type of offence, these cases were notable for the fact that the complainer
was presented as particularly sexually predatory.
The factors utilised in mitigation in the 71 cases will be described in the following section,
and an attempt made to identify the contexts which these factors represent. As previously
stated, the categorisations of mitigating factors employed here are somewhat different to
those used by Shapland (1981), although essentially they cover very similar territory. The
pleas in mitigation in this research are notable in that typically the defence prefaced any
mention of a mitigating factor by stating the bearing that the factor had on a specific
sentencing issue or consideration - usually the factor was related to the seriousness of the
offence, or to the culpability or responsibility of the defendant, and sometimes both. For
this reason, the factors are categorised in terms of whether they bore on seriousness or
culpability. They were also other factors, which were not directly related to seriousness or
culpability by the defence, but were introduced, usually, to show good character on the part
of the offender. Whilst the overlapping functions of the mitigating factors should be borne
in mind, the following sections attempt to deal, respectively, with those issues which were
used to minimise seriousness of the offence and those which lessen the culpability of the
offender. A third section covers those mitigating factors which are used in a more general
way, to suggest good character on the part of the offender, and to convey the
inappropriateness of a severe sentence for the offender.
Mitigating Seriousness of the Offence
Although the offender has pled or has been found guilty of an offence as charged, it may be
that he feels it to be less serious than depicted by the prosecution. In such cases, mitigating
factors are given in an effort to show the offence to be less severe than it may seem.
Shapland (1981) found that the category of factors relating to the seriousness of the offence
formed a small part of the total number of mitigating factors mentioned. Although there
are significant differences in the methodology employed, the research findings under
discussion here are somewhat different to Shapland's in that factors mitigating severity of
the offence formed a substantial number of total mitigating factors. Whilst there is some
overlap between those factors which apply to the offender's culpability, and those which
relate to the seriousness of the offence, some factors such as the role played by the offender
- or the victim - in the offence, the degree of harm levelled at, and injury sustained by the
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complainer, her relationship with the offender, and her previous sexual experience were
factors which were more regularly used to mitigate the seriousness of the offence.
Frequently - in the guilty plea cases - it was stated that the offence did not happen in the
way that it appeared to from the prosecution summary of the case. Usually it was said that
the offence did not occur in the way in which the complainer described it. Her account of
the offence was said to be inaccurate in some way. It was also common for the defence to
state that the defendant felt the offence to be much more minor than it appeared to be. This
comes close to the manner of dispute in the trial, in that the defence puts forward an
alternative version of events - re-interpreting the prosecution summary and drawing on
factors such as the complainer's sexual character, her relationship with the offender and
other factors to flesh out the alternative version.
Previous Sexual Experience
Present in mitigation is the presumption that the sexual assault of young women and girls
with previous sexual experience is less serious than with those who are sexually
inexperienced. Consequently 'The complainer was 16 and not a virgin ... she was a willing party ...
She had been in hospital for an abortion the week before [the incident]" (case 94 - S.102); "She had
experience of sex" (case 77 - guilty plea); and the somewhat bizarre "[He] had seen the girl sexually
involved with the family dog when he watched her through a hole in the ceiling" (case 72 - guilty plea).
By raising such matters in mitigation the implication is that when a young complainer is
not totally innocent before the offence, then the seriousness of it is somehow diminished.
It was here also that reference was made to the complainer's advanced physical
development or sexual maturity. Implicit within such statements is that sexual maturity in a
victim somehow excuses the offender and reduces the seriousness of the offence.
Delay
Many of the offences, particularly those where the offender was in a position of close
relationship, took place over a number of years. Often several years elapsed before the
offences came to light. As in cross-examination during the trial, in the majority of these
cases the fact that the complainer delayed telling someone about what was happening was
presented as a confirmation of her willingness to participate in the sexual activity. She was
not a hapless victim, but an eager participant and thus the seriousness of the offence is
substantially reduced. "The girl enjoyed it as she didn't report at all and it occurred over a long time"
(case 56 - guilty plea); "It was a social worker who reported the case to the police when her suspicions
were aroused. The girl was unconcerned as she did not report it" (case 69 - guilty plea). In one case
(case 72) where there was a long delay in the offences coming to light, the charges of
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incest, unlawful sexual intercourse and lewd and libidinous practices were described as
being "stale" and as "having taken place in the distant past" and as "having little bearing on the present
relationship between the defendant and his daughters." Interestingly, in none of the guilty plea or
s.102 cases was there any attempt by the prosecution to suggest possible reasons why the
complainer did not tell anyone or report the offence. The literature on child sexual abuse
abounds with accounts of the reaction of children on experiencing sexual assault,
particularly when the perpetrator is a loved one or an authority figure. Keeping quiet about
the abuse is, on the contrary, a 'normal' reaction of children due to their confusion, guilt,
fear or embarrassment about what has occurred. Yet the defence interpretation of delay is
rarely challenged either in the trial situation or in pleas in mitigation.
Physical Injury and Psychological Damage
Physical injury sustained by the complainer is a major determinant in assessing the gravity
of the offence. Lack of injuries is taken to denote lack of violence and thus the offence is
depicted as not as serious as it might have been. Lack or denial of injury in mitigation is
common to many sorts of criminal offences, and not restricted to sexual offences. Yet in
the observed cases, denial or minimisation of injury was very common, given as a factor in
three quarters of cases. It also took a number of forms. Typically, mitigation focused on
the general lack of physical injury, for example 'There was no physical damage to the child" (case
56 - guilty plea); "There was no damage done - no harm to the girl" (case 61 - guilty plea); "No injury
sustained by the complainers" (case 67 - guilty plea), although in a small number of cases,
mitigation focused on lack of specific genital injury, for example 'There was litde damage done
as the penetration was minimal" (case 58); "The girl will not suffer physically in later life as a result of the
intercourse" (case 84 - guilty plea).
Mitigation also frequently focused on the lack of physical violence used by the offender,
for example, in approximately one third of the cases it was said that the offender " ... used
no violence at all". Similarly, in about a quarter of the cases it was stated that the offender
was "not dangerous" because of this lack of violence. The focus on lack of injury, force and
violence is part of a wider problem regarding the status of force and injury in relation to
sexual offences. This has already been discussed in Chapter Seven but still bears repeating
here. There continues to be a pervasive view among some legal practitioners that only the
presence of injuries provides sufficient evidence that a 'real' and serious sexual offence
has taken place. Where there is no injury, then the seriousness of the offence is diminished.
Again, this is something that is not countered or contradicted by the prosecution in
mitigation .
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In six cases, there was a specific denial of long-term psychological damage to the victim.
This was interesting in that there had been no mention of this possibility in either the trial
situation (three of the six cases were contested trials where a guilty verdict was returned)
nor in the prosecution summing up prior to mitigation. It appeared as if this factor was
given in mitigation to repudiate any suggestion or thinking by the judge that the complainer
may have been psychologically scarred by the sexual activity. By pre-empting the judge,
as it were, the defence attempts to clear up any possibility of doubt concerning the
possibility of long-term damage. It is important to note that the basis for the denial of
psychological damage was always unclear as there was never any reference to reports or
assessments undertaken by psychologists or psychiatrists used to back up the defence
statement.
Relationship Between Complainer and Offender
Another factor which was regularly used to mitigate seriousness was the relationship
between the offender and the victim. This was particularly so in non-incest cases. There
appears to be a presumption that where a blood relationship exists then this exacerbates the
offence. In half of the cases which did not involve a blood or affine relationship between
the parties, it was stated in mitigation that there was no close relationship between them,
for example "She was not a blood relation of his" (case 91 - S.102) and the lack of close
relationship made the offence less serious than if there were.
However, the relationship between the victim and offender could be put to use in a number
of different ( and often contradictory) ways. In non-incest cases, the fact that the offender
had known the victim for some length of time was also used to lessen the seriousness of the
offence. Here the implication is that the offence is less serious than if it was perpetrated by
a complete stranger, "He cared for her and did not harm her, they had a close relationship and [the
complainer] wanted it to continue" (case 59 - guilty plea).
Mitigating Culpability
Displacing Blame
The degree of blame, that is how much should be attributed to the offender or other factors,
and how much he accepts blame, featured significantly, in mitigation speeches. In most
of the observed cases, that is, in all of the 'guilty pleas' and 's,102's' and, somewhat
surprisingly given that all evidence had been heard, the majority of guilty verdict cases,
there was always a strong indication given by the defence as to who - or what - was
primarily to blame for the offence. In many ways this bears similarities to the 'techniques
of neutralisation' put forward in a classic sociological formulation by Sykes and Matza
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(1957). These 'techniques' are essentially linguistic constructs which make an appeal to
special mitigating circumstances and at the same time offer justifications for an offence, for
example, the 'denial of responsibility'('I didn't mean it', 'something/someone else was to
blame') and 'denial of victim' ('she had it coming')'18
In the 'guilty plea and's. 102' cases the offender acknowledged guilt by the act of pleading
guilty. However, the degree of culpability is an important consideration for appropriate
sentencing19 and is therefore of consequence in mitigation. Similarly in cases where the
offender was found guilty, culpability is still an important issue. In all cases there was an
attempt to displace at the very least some portion of the blame away from the offender,
although the extent of this differed from case to case.
In general, two distinctive strands of 'blame displacement' emerged from the observation of
cases. On the one hand, there were those cases where blame was, for the most part,
rejected by the defendant and attributed directly to someone else, usually the complainer,
but in some cases this was a significant other person, usually another woman - the
offender's wife, partner or, as in two cases, the offender's mother. On the other hand, there
were those cases where fuller blame was accepted by the offender, although in these cases
there was always additionally present some other strong mitigating factors which combined
to dilute that which was directly attributable to the offender. These additional mitigating
factors were usually social or psychological circumstances in the offender's past history or
situation at the time of the offence.
By looking more closely at the type of offence, it is possible to identify those strands more
clearly. In general, it would seem that blame displacement occurred more frequently in
those cases involving rape, rape-related, and non-incest statutory charges,20 particularly
those involving adolescent complainers. In such cases, the first strand of blame
displacement was more pronounced, in that the pleas in mitigation were more frequently
characterised by a fuller rejection of blame by the offender. Criticisms were levelled more
directly at the complainer's lifestyle and her character, and attempts were made to cite her
behaviour and demeanour as 'causal' factors, either leading directly to, or else contributing
in some way to the offence. Although the offender is legally at fault, metaphorically an
accusatory finger is pointed directly at the complainer, in an attempt to alleviate the
offender of much of the blame. In such cases, although consent was not technically an issue
18 Sykes, G. and Matza, D. (1957) Techniques of Neutralisation : A Theory of Delinquency ' American
Sociological Review vol. 22
19 Walker (1985) p.48
20 As charged under sections of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976
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in relation to the offence, the typification of the complainer as consenting and provocative
was particularly evident.
The second strand of blame displacement was more evident in those cases where there was
a close (or longer term) offender-complainer relationship, that is, in those cases which
involved incest or incest-related offences, and especially those which involved more than
one complainer. In such cases, although the offender publicly (via his defence) accepted
fuller blame for the offence, a range of social and psychological factors were also drawn
upon to explain or justify what occurred. It is important to point out that a high proportion
of incest and incest-related cases involved a plea of guilty by the offender. Consequently
the majority of those cases where the offender accepted fuller blame for the offence did not
involve a contested trial. The finding that offenders accepted fuller blame in cases where a
guilty plea had been given was initially somewhat surprising, as one may expect that -
given the doctrine of 'anything goes' - the relative scope for displacing blame onto the
victim in mitigation would be increased where no evidence had been previously led. This
did not turn out to be the case, and in fact it was in those cases where evidence had been led
that attempts to displace blame onto the complainer were most vociferous (and this issue
will be returned to later in this chapter).
Provocation
The offender's culpability is often regarded as diminished if the victim is regarded as
responsible for provoking the offender into the behaviour which is the subject of the
charge.21 As in Shapland's study, provocation was put forward in mitigation as a reason
for the offence. But whereas the defendants in Shapland's research cited a range of factors
which provoked them into the offence, such as old grievances against the victim, or that
the situation itself offered irresistible temptation, what was noticeable about the cases
described here was the strong emphasis placed on how the complainer had tempted the
offender into the sexual activity. The amount of information proffered about the complainer
in pleas in mitigation was considerable. Mitigation commonly focused on the complainer
as, in the words of the defence, "sexually provocative" or "actively encouraging" and willing to
participate in sexual behaviour. Such depictions of the complainer mirrored those found in
contested trials. Consider the following examples : "She hung around him constandy, and kept
returning to the house ... she was flirtatious in the way that only very young girls can be." (case 11- guilty
verdict); 'The girl's sexual provocation gave encouragement" (case 59 - guilty plea); "She welcomed
his advances and met them all the way " (case 69 - guilty plea); 'The girl began to visit him in his room
21 Walker (1985) cites the case of Wilbourne (1982) 4 Cr App Rep (S) 163 whose daughter seduced him into
incest.
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... she clearly consented and even took time off school to be with him" (case 79 - guilty plea); "She
never resisted ... she actively encouraged him" (case 77 - guilty plea) . Depicting the young
complainer in this way clearly raises the issue of provocation, which is acknowledged to
be favourable for mitigation. The general inference is that the complainer was a willing
party, that in some cases she initiated the sexual activity. Hence, not only does the
description of the tempting, provocative complainer provide a justification or rationale for
the offence, but it also implicates the complainer in the actual commission of the offence -
thus acting as an effective mechanism for the displacement of blame away from the
offender. This issue of provocation also implies that the offender has been provoked or
pushed beyond the limits of endurance, that he lost his self-control as a result of the actions
and behaviour of the complainer.
Defence assertions regarding the complainer's awakening sexuality are followed through
into mitigation, and the notion of awakening sexuality commonly formed a context in
which to suggest that the offence was the result of sexual exploration on the part of the
complainer to which the offender simply succumbed. This also provides a rationale for the
offence, and again, the inference is that the complainer is to some extent responsible.
'Wantonness' is often combined with 'deviousness', hence the 13 year old teenager whose
mother cohabited with the offender "initiated the behaviour and insisted that it continue ... she said she
would make a better mother for his children than her own mother" (case 91 - S. 102).
'That Kind ofGirl'
There was a clear focus on the sexual character of the complainer and also the issue of
consent. The presentation of the complainer as 'that kind of girl' was also frequently given
in pleas in mitigation (12 cases). Statements such as "The girl has long caused problems to her
family ... she associates with young men ... she has indulged in sex play with boys from school" (case 77 -
guilty plea) were used to connote a strong image of the complainer as someone whose
behaviour demonstrates a generalised tendency to (indiscriminate) consent. Of course, this
kind of mitigating factor is used to lessen seriousness of the offence as well as the
culpability of the offender. This sort of depiction of the complainer is markedly similar to
that put forward in contested trials, although of course no previous evidence concerning the
complainer's character had been led. It is perhaps unsurprising that similar arguments and
rationales about the event and what occurred between the offender and the complainer
which had been aired earlier by the defence during the trial were reiterated in mitigation. It
was however, those cases where there had been no trial which proved particularly
illuminating. In such cases, the consenting young complainer was presented 'ready made'.
Stories about the events, and characterisations of the complainer as a 'sexual being', as
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provocative, as consenting to the sexual behaviour very closely resembled those found in
contested trials. The same sort of sexual and non-sexual indicators of consent are stated, as
a way of demonstrating that the offence is less serious and/or the offender is not entirely to
blame.
Similarly, as in contested trials, information that casts the complainer in a detrimental
light was frequently drawn upon. The following provides an example of this, "The
complainer is a troublesome child, she has a history of truancy from school and a history of theft.. she has
been up before the Children's Panel ... she has been to many community carers and foster parents ... all of
these factors affect her reliability" (case 77 - guilty plea). Of course, in this example, by
additionally commenting on the complainer's questionable reliability the defence is also
suggesting that her account of what occurred may not be accurate. The 'wild child' figure
appeared in almost a quarter of cases (16) displaying a variety of behavioural defects,
ranging from drug-taking, glue-sniffing, truancy, thievery, street-fighting, bicycle-stealing,
trouble-making, bullying, and general dishonesty. At the same time as casting the
complainer's character in a dubious light and thus raising the question of her general
reliability and the accuracy of her account of what occurred, this type of mitigating factor
also provides a means of displacing blame away from the offender, and reduces the
seriousness of the offence - the implication being that sexual activity is just another part of
her repertoire of disreputable behaviour. There is also the unavoidable implication that
uncontrollable bad girls are less worthy of the law's protection than those who are good
and innocent and chaste.
As previously mentioned, there was a strong focus on the issue of consent. Very commonly
it was explicitly stated by the defence that the girl had consented to the sexual activity. Of
course, in guilty plea cases there has been no evidence led, and often this statement was not
backed up by any other information. Where other 'substantiating' information was given,
this was commonly along the lines that the complainer was sexually active, sexually
experienced, had been 'in trouble', was sexually or physically mature etc.. In several cases,
although it was not specifically stated that the complainer had consented, the defence
offered the more oblique "she is close to the age of consent". This is intended to convey to the
sentencer that the complainer was almost of the age in which she could consent - indeed
she may well have consented. In the words of the defence this reduces the seriousness of
the offence. Yet, the presentation of the consenting, provocative complainer is often used to
diminish the offender's culpability.
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Personal Circumstances : The Past
Information about the offender's past history and/or domestic situation at the time of the
offence was frequently used to explain the offence and also to lessen his culpability. In all
cases there was some (albeit in some cases very brief) discussion of the offender's past. A
common line used was what Shapland calls the 'hard luck tale'22 where adverse personal
circumstances are given as reasons for the offence. An unhappy childhood, a deprived
family background, a history of abuse as a child, are contexts within which the offender is
presented as suffering from effects and influences which led to him committing the
offence(s). Seemingly, implicit within this form of mitigation is a loose reliance on the
tenet that a problem background can account for problem behaviour. This was widely used
in the construction of a history for the offender. A broken home, parental neglect, physical
and sexual abuse, material deprivation and emotional stress leading to insecurity and social
withdrawal were, on the one hand, cited as sources of anxieties or needs forming the
context within which the offender (and the offence) is better understood , but were also
used, on the other hand, as a means of detracting from the culpability of the offender.
These accounts provide reasons for the offence. For example, "[He] had a tragic background ...
was subject to frequent batterings ... spent seven years in a Children's Home ... has always stayed in
temporary accommodation ... is unable to form relationships with people" and " [He] was abandoned as a
baby in a bus station in Glasgow ... he has been fostered 20 times and has never had a stable home" (case
75 - guilty plea). The unhappy past of the offender is presented as somehow to blame for
the offence. In mitigation, the story is one where the cruel circle of childhood deprivation
takes its toll in later years, manifesting in offending behaviour. But, as Shapland points
out, a bad social history is not considered by the law to provide any defence to a criminal
charge and so is no excuse for an offence.23 The reason for this is that difficult
circumstances not present at the time of the offence or court hearing are thought by law not
to affect the individual's responsibility for the offence. However, where Shapland
expressed some surprise that in her study there were so few mentions in court of the broken
homes and turbulent marital relationships of offenders, in this research, these sort of
adverse personal circumstances were among the most frequently mentioned to mitigate
culpability, despite them not really carrying any weight in terms of the offender's
responsibility for the offence. There may be several explanations for this. One may be that
the defence does not know in advance what the sentencer will take into consideration.
Another explanation may be that such factors are considered to have a bearing because of
22 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 68
23 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 68
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the specific nature of sexual offences involving young complainers. The use of such
factors is indicative also of the licence that the defence has in mitigation.
Accounts of childhood deprivation were frequently coupled with a history of sexual abuse.
For example, "[He] lived as a beggar in Spain ... there is a history of such [sexual] behaviour in his family
... he was a victim of it himself" (case 74 - guilty plea). This presentation of the offender as a
victim is not uncommon. It implies a breaking down of the distinction between victim and
offender. In the next example, the mitigation speech consisted of a long narrative account
of the appalling past history of the offender, of which the following is just a small excerpt.
'The explanation for the offence is a combination of bad relations with his wife and his past history with his
father, who [sexually] abused him from a young age. He envisages his father as the source of his problems.
The behaviour of his father continued until he was 27 years old. He thought it was the correct way to
behave." (case 89 - s.102) In this case, the defence systematically and quite skilfully
interspersed the story of past abuse and deprivation with named individuals who were
apparently indirectly responsible for the current offence. These individuals, in particular
the offender's wife and father, and the two young victims, but also his mother and his
brothers and sisters, and his primary school teacher were all seen as blameworthy.
Throughout the mitigation speech the defence shifted blame for the offences away from the
offender, and dispersed it among a wide range of significant others in the offender's life.
This type of scatter-gun approach was fairly rare in the observed cases, in that the
displacement of blame was usually a much more focused affair - pinpointing the
complainer or sometimes the offender's wife as ultimately responsible.
Personal Circumstances : The Present
The offender's domestic situation at the time of, or just prior to, the offence were frequently
used as an explanation for the offence. Abnormal, fraught or difficult family circumstances
were used as part of the denial of total responsibility. Sometimes the implication is that the
criminal offence was a temporary aberration, that the offender would never normally
behave in such a way, that he would never have committed the offence but for pressure
stemming from his immediate domestic situation, that he had temporarily "gone off the rails."
This type of argument is also indicative of the wide licence available to the defence in
mitigation, as it is often in direct contradiction to other factors - particularly when the
sexual activity had taken place over a number of years.
Breakdown of marital or cohabitee sexual relations was given in mitigation in 15 of the
cases in which the offender had pled guilty and in seven of the cases where a guilty verdict
was returned. Here, the sexual activity with the victim was said to have been initiated
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because of the stresses and strains of a rocky relationship "when his wife moved out to live with
another man" (case 90 - S. 102) ; "when his marriage had broken down and he was at the lowest ebb of
morale and self-respect" (case 70 - guilty plea); "[He] was a very unhappy individual, upset and
emotional at the time as his marriage had broken down" (case 73 - guilty plea).
Particular emphasis was given to those circumstances where sexual relations within the
marital or cohabitational relationship had ceased. This was presented as the time when the
illegal sexual activity commenced, for example, "when his wife went in to hospital for a
hysterectomy" (case 92 - S. 102) "when his wife developed gynaecological problems and sexual relations
between them deteriorated" and "when his wife gave birth to their first child." In one notable case the
defence addressed the judge thus: "You have heard of' the expression 'she is like a refrigerator' - well,
he maintains that his wife was like a deep-freeze, and so he turned to his daughters for comfort" (case 89).
In other cases, the burden of single parenthood after bereavement 'The behaviour commenced
just after the tragic death of his wife" (case 93 - s. 102), or the pressure of single-handedly having
to care for the children whilst his wife was at work "leaving him at home with the girls" were
depicted as factors in mitigation. The suggestion here is that unloving, frigid or
preoccupied partners are responsible for 'pushing' the offender into the offence. It is their
'unloving' behaviour or attitude towards the offender that is said to have triggered off and,
in some cases, caused the sexual activity to be sustained, thus explaining the offence and
enabling part of the blame to be shifted from the offender.
Social inadequacy on the part of the offender was cited in several cases as a reason for the
offence. In case 65 the offender was just 17 years old, and the mitigation speech focused
primarily on his sad childhood, how he had been bullied at school, became increasingly
socially withdrawn, had never had a relationship with a member of the opposite sex, and
had difficulty making friends. He had been charged with chasing after two 12 year old girls,
abducting and then assaulting them with the intention of raping them. He was armed at the
time and so was also charged with two contraventions of the Firearms Act, as well as with a
contravention of his bail order from a previous offence. He pled guilty to the firearms
charges and to assault only (which was accepted by the prosecution). In mitigation the
defence attributed the offences to his "extreme social inadequacy", stating that he had chased the
complainers spontaneously because he wanted to ask them to help him shoot at targets, and
he attacked them out of fear when they started screaming, and that there was no sexual
motive in the attacks at all.
There appears to be an assumption that age is an important factor in the consideration of
leniency. The defence made much of the age of younger offenders, who were generally
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presented as less responsible for their behaviour than older offenders. Certainly in those
few cases where there was in fact only a relatively slight difference between the offender
and the complainer, there were pronounced assertions by the defence that the offender's
immaturity was a contributory factor.
It was at first somewhat surprising to find that an uncontrollable sex drive on the part of
the offender was given in mitigation in only a very few cases. Given the popular
mythology surrounding sexual assault - which tends to place a rampant and indiscriminate
sexual urge on the part of the offender high on the list of motivating factors, it would not be
unreasonable to expect offenders to instruct their defence advocates that this in fact was a
reason for the offence. In her study of rape trials at the Old Bailey, Zsuzsanna Adler (1987)
found it to be a main mitigation factor. 24 One explanation for its omission here may be that
the offences all involved young complainers, and mitigation tended towards an emphasis
on the roles of past or present social and domestic factors, and/or on provocative overtures
by the complainer. In general, a predatory predisposition on the part of the offender was
denied. In the two cases where sexual drive was overtly mentioned, it was introduced as
part of a deeper psychological problem of the offender which manifested itself in sexual
difficulty. In both cases the offenders were over 60 years old, and had a long history of
such offences and a lengthy list of previous analogous convictions. Both had previously
received psychiatric treatment, including drugs to reduce their sex drive, and mitigation
focused on their loneliness, depression and bewilderment as to why they behaved in such a
way.
In other cases, although sexual drive was not mentioned explicitly, it was implied. For
example, in the case cited above where the offender's wife was described as a "deepfreeze"
(case 89 ), and in those cases cited earlier where the offender had turned towards the
complainer when 'normal' sex with a wife or girlfriend was thwarted.
Mental and Physical Impairment
Although a bad social history is no excuse for a criminal offence, a bad mental or physical
history may well be.25 The reason for this appears to be that information on such matters
may enable a sentencer to select a sentence as one which is more likely than another to
curb or inhibit future criminal behaviour by the offender, or, where a custodial sentence
is being contemplated, to consider a non-custodial one instead.26 Low or below average
intelligence was offered as a form of justification for the offence(s) in 12 of the cases in




which the accused pled guilty and in six of the cases in which a guilty verdict was returned.
Frequently it was said, in mitigation, that the offender's low intelligence resulted in him
having only a rudimentary moral judgement. In such cases, the offence was explained as
merely a sign of his social inadequacy. Low intelligence impairing judgement was also
used to apply to cases where the offender 'misread' social cues or 'mistakenly believed' that
the complainer was sexually interested in him, as in the following case "Due to his lack of
intelligence he mistook her friendliness for something more" (case 60 - guilty plea). (Somewhat
atypically, in one case, the defence stated that the offender was "highly intelligent, articulate and
pleasant" (case 57 - guilty plea). This was followed immediately by a request for probation
which, incidentally, fell on deaf ears as the judge passed a sentence of 10 years.) There
appears to be a thin dividing line between the portrayal of the offender as someone who is
able to be an acceptable member of society and a complete inadequate. Too much emphasis
on the latter may well have an adverse effect.
In seven cases, some form of "personality disorder" was cited as the root cause of the
behaviour which constituted the offence. In none of these cases was there any definition
given concerning this term, rather it was used as a catch-all phrase to denote generalised
abnormal behaviour of which the offence was but an example. In two cases, the mental
disorder was said to have a physical cause, "An old head injury caused his behaviour. That and his
being abused as a child resulted in him suffering from a personality disorder" (case 86 - S. 102); "He was
a Siamese twin, joined at the head, and separated when he was a toddler. He still suffers headaches and
nightmares as a result... he is an epileptic .. he has a deep-rooted personality disorder" (case 83 - guilty
plea). In such accounts, the offender's are depicted as suffering and troubled. In none of
the cases where "low intelligence" or a "personality disorder" was cited, was there any
professional verification from 'expert' sources such as psychiatrists or psychologists . In
fact in the two cases in which a Psychiatric Report was available, mental illness was ruled
out. There were three cases in which suicidal tendencies were mentioned, only one of these
accounts were substantiated by Social Enquiry Reports made available to the court. This
was a case where the offender was described in mitigation as "extremely immature, although he is
22 years old he behaves as one would expect an early adolescent to behave ... he shows suicidal tendencies ...
He slashed his wrists a week before this hearing ... he has been assaulted three times whilst on remand"
(case 80).
Physical illnesses or disabilities suffered by the offender were cited in several cases. In
many instances it was not at all clear whether this was given as an explanation for the
offence, or in an effort to avert a custodial sentence. Physical ailments ranging from
stomach ulcers, deafness, back or head injuries, old war wounds, to epilepsy were offered
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in mitigation. If the offender was also in receipt of invalidity benefit this argument was
made more forcefully. In one vivid case, the offender had a vast repertoire of physical
ailments, of which the defence gave an extremely detailed account. The 63 year old
offender was described as having lost one leg in a mining accident, and suffered from a
painful stump, an ill-fitting artificial limb, a trapped nerve in his left wrist, kidney stones,
severe diarrhoea, prostate gland problems, food allergies, cataracts, a long-time viral
infection for which he was on antibiotics, excema, and deep depression (case 84 - guilty
plea).
Drink And Drugs
Alcoholism and, to a lesser extent, drug-taking, was stated in mitigation in 15 cases,
generally conveying the idea that alcohol or drugs were contributory or causal factors
leading to the offence. Drink is a commonly-used mitigating factor in other offences in
Scotland,27 so it was not surprising to find it used so frequently to lessen the culpability of
the offender. In most cases, it was said that the offender had a long-term history of
alcoholism. For example, "He has a drink problem and he drank the proceeds of the sale of the
matrimonial home" (case 74 - guilty plea); "Over the years he has been a very heavy drinker, he accepts
he has a drink problem. His daily consumption is 18 pints. He was drunk at the time [of the offence]" (case
63 - guilty plea); There were, however, a few cases where the offender was presented as
being uncharacteristically drunk at the time of the commission of the offence, "He had never
abused drink or drugs before" (case 62 - guilty plea) ; "He was drunk on the occasion [of the offence].
This was unusual for him. He cannot remember what happened. He came out of the toilet and entered the
wrong room. He had forgotten to do his flies up. He fell onto the bed, not realising [complainer] was in it. A
struggled fumble ensued, that's why he pled guilty" (case 66 - guilty plea). A history of alcoholism
or being drunk at the time of the offence provides a context within which the offence is
made more explicable. The implication is that the offender would not have committed the
offence if he was sober. Alcohol or drugs had lessened or removed his normal inhibitions.
The offence was not premeditated, as the offender was not in full possession of all of his
faculties at the time.
Interestingly, there were a small number of cases involving a guilty verdict, where
information concerning the complainer's alcohol and/or drug use both at the time of the
offence and in general was given in mitigation. This was surprising as one may expect that
such information regarding the complainer's state at the time of the offence would amount
to aggravating circumstances, in that the offender may be seen to have taken advantage of
her whilst she was drugged or drunk. However, this obviously was not the intention of the
27 Nicholson (1992) 9-29 - 32, pp!89 - 190
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defence in giving such information. Rather, it appeared that, as well as showing bad
character on the part of the complainer, such information was given as an indication that
her drunken or drug-induced behaviour had provoked or precipitated the offence by
creating a situation conducive to its commission. Admittedly this is a somewhat
convoluted piece of logic, but there appears to be no other explanation.
Good Character and the Offender
By raising the issue of the character of the offender in mitigation, the defence is not only
able to present the offender in a more favourable light, but this also provides another
opportunity in which to put across the defendant's attitude towards the offence. Shapland
(1981) found that there appears to be two totally different types of character which are
mitigating - the mature good worker and the immature drifter with problems.28 The latter
character has been discussed at various points in both of the previous sections, appearing
variously as the social inadequate, as someone who has never been able to hold down a job,
as someone who has a bad social history. In the following section, I want to focus on the
presentation of the former type of character, the 'good man'. But first I want to draw
attention to that which was the most frequently used mitigating factor in guilty plea and
s.102 cases, and which prefaced other mitigating factors. This mitigating factor is used as
the first step in portraying the offender as a decent and honourable person who has other
things going for him which should be taken into consideration by the sentencer. The
defence commonly suggested that this information is important in relation to sentence, in
particular as an indication of the offender's prospects for rehabilitation.
Sparing the Child -
In general in offences where a child or young person is the victim, 'sparing the child' from
the ordeal of giving evidence is often cited as a major mitigating factor. Indeed that the
victims were "spared the trauma of giving evidence in court" was the most endemic mitigating
factor in all of the 41 'guilty plea' and's. 102' cases, and was cited most forcefully in those
which involved a close relationship between the victim and the offender. In most cases the
defence prefaced mitigation with some reference to the fact that the offender had "spared"
the child, for example "He saved the complainer from the ordeal of a trial" (case 57 - guilty plea);
"He has not subjected the complainers to the trauma of the trial" (case 67 - guilty plea); "He didn't put
the victims through the trauma of the court" (case 75); "His actions have saved the complainer from giving
evidence" (case 86 - guilty plea); "By pleading guilty he has ensured that the girls did not have to be
brought in" (case 64 - guilty plea). This rather protective gesture functions to demonstrate
not only an acceptance of blame, but also a willingness on the part of the offender to avoid
28 Shapland (1981) p.64
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subjecting the complainer to further distress. Whether used to convey genuine evidence of
remorse, or represented as a self-sacrificial gesture on the part of the offender, a concern
with the welfare of the complainer is a first step in displaying the offender in a more
positive light, and as such is an important precursor to other mitigating factors. Yet despite
this , concerted attempts to shift some of the blame on to the complainer at a later stage in
mitigation are not uncommon.
It has been well-documented in child sex abuse literature that the trauma of the legal
process has the potential to incur further damage to the child.29 In particular a
confrontation in court between parent (or carer) and child is seen as detrimental to the
child's welfare. During the 1980's there was increasing public concern about the difficulties
being experienced by children who were required to give evidence in open court,
particularly when this involved speaking about distressing or embarrassing events, not only
in front of the judge and lawyers and other court officials, but especially in the presence of
the accused. Of course, a concern with the protection of young complainers is a general
principle applying to all offences, and an increasing awareness of this has led to the
development of special innovative procedures in court, such as the erection of screens in
court, the use of recorded interviews and the use of live television links30 for alleviating
the stress to the child in contested trials. It is perhaps interesting to note that, in five cases,
the defence in mitigation made specific reference to the fact that "research" (unspecified)
had shown how potentially damaging the giving of evidence can be for the girl or young
woman, and how the offender was keen to ensure that he did not cause her any further grief
in this regard.
"A Good Family Man"
It is somewhat ironic that in mitigation in 'guilty plea' and's. 102 cases' the offender is
represented as having perpetrated the offence, yet also, by pleading guilty and
circumventing a trial, he is simultaneously accredited with having protected the complainer
from the ordeal of giving evidence in a trial situation. But this rather odd dualism is
noticeable with regard to other mitigating factors. Statements that the offender is otherwise
a decent sort of hard working and caring man are common, particularly when the offence
took place within the family. References to his employment record are also drawn upon in
this regard. For example, one offender was described as having "always been employed ...
always brought up his family conscientiously ... the allegations came as a shock, although he has always been
worried and anxious about his behaviour" (case 67 - guilty plea). Another offender "always worked
29 See, for example, Viinikka, S. 'Child Sexual Abuse and the Law' in Driver, E. & Droisen, A. (eds.)
(1989) Child Sexual Abuse : Feminist Perspectives; Herman, J. (1981) Father-Daughter Incest;
30 Murray, K. (1995) Live Television Link The Scottish Office Central Research Unit
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hard to care for his family ... he struggled to give his children a decent upbringing" (case 55 - guilty
plea), another "worked all of his hfe to provide for his family" (case 64 - guilty plea), another had
"a background of respectability" (case 61 - guilty plea), yet another had "always set store by family
life" (case 70 - guilty plea). The argument which underpins such statements is that the
offender is a good parent in other respects, the sexual abuse which he inflicted on his
daughters should be weighed up in the light of other factors which show him to be a good
and caring parent. The use of parental care as a mitigating factor is well illustrated by one
memorable case where "the matter came to light because of [the offender's] concern for his daughter's
welfare" (case 56 - guilty plea). Here, the offender was concerned that his 15 year old
daughter was being sexually abused by their lodger and, whilst in a state of drunken anger,
rushed down to the local police station to report his suspicions. On being interviewed by a
woman police officer as to the truth of her father's allegations, the girl revealed that it was
not the lodger, but her father who had been abusing her since she was 11 years old. The
representation of the offender as a good family is also used as a fundamental mitigating
factor in other, non-sexual offences. In her study of a magistrates' court Eaton (1986)
found that for the majority of defendants the pleas in mitigation were based on their family
circumstances, and the defence would emphasise the part played by the defendant in the
family life.31
Another characteristic of such cases are statements given in mitigation concerning the
opportunity for sexual activity that is afforded by the close relationship between the
offender and the complainer. For example, "It was only one incident when he had the opportunity
for many more" (case 55 - guilty plea); "[Sexual activity] took place on 3 or 4 occasions at most,
although there were other opportunities" (case 67 - guilty plea); "Intercourse was not on a regular basis"
(case 92 - s. 102). This was presented in terms of the offender having the strength of
character to resist further temptation, even though he was in very close and continuing
contact with his daughter. The use of this mitigating factor was not just restricted to cases
involving a parent or close relative of the girl, but could be found in cases where the
offender was a neighbour or family friend or someone with whom she was in regular and/or
close contact. For example, in a case where the offender was a family friend, "Apart from the
one incident, he always desisted when [complainer] asked him to play with her" (case 93 - S.102). In
other words, the offender did not do all that he might have done in the circumstances.
The possibility that a prison sentence would lead to a family break up was also used in
mitigation. In 18 cases, it was stated that the offender's family relationships were at risk if
he received a custodial sentence. In 10 of those cases it was explicitly stated that the
31 Eaton, M. (1986) Justice For Women ?: Family Court and Social Control p. 45-46
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consequences for the offender's wife and/or children would be particularly bad. In three
cases it was stated that the offender wished to marry and that prison would prevent the
marriage occurring. As noted earlier, it is common in mitigation to introduce what the
consequences of a severe sentence would be on an offender's dependants. The focus is
usually on the emotional and/or economic harm that may befall members of the family
should the offender end up in prison on a long sentence. This was particularly so in three
cases where the offender's partner was pregnant. What was particularly interesting,
however, was the emphasis given in mitigation to the fact that the offender's wife or
girlfriend had stated that she would "stand by" or "take back" the offender. Representing the
offender and his partner in this state of togetherness, indicates that they have already begun
to work at solving problems (particularly in those cases where the offence was attributed
to a breakdown in their relationship), that the offender is trying to become an approved
member of society, and that the future of their relationship is in jeopardy should a custodial
sentence ensue.
No Danger To The Public
Related to the notion of resistance from the constant temptation that is embodied by the
complainer, is the representation of the offender as someone who does not pose any danger
or threat to the wider community. In case 61 which involved a father and daughter, it was
stated that because the sexual acts involved only his own daughter and no other young girls,
"He constitutes no danger to the public." Similarly, 'The acts were not of a predatory nature - they were
confined within the family" (case 87). The offender is thus presented as someone who poses no
threat to any young girl who is not a member of his immediate family. Presumably this is
used as a mitigating factor because one of the objectives of sentencing is to seek to secure
that the public will be protected from the criminal activity of a particular offender, 32
which may suggest the need for a custodial sentence. If the 'wider public' is not under
threat, then the implication is that a non-custodial sentence may be an appropriate
disposal. This, of course, does not deal with the protection of the victim within her family,
but rarely is this issue dealt with at the sentencing stage.
This depiction of the offender who is not a source of danger to the public was also used in
non-incest cases. In these cases, there was a denial of his indiscriminate sexual activity with
young girls, but rather the girls with whom the sex took place were presented as
provocative and actually encouraging, and therefore it was 'that girl' rather than any other
who was the focus of the offender's intentions. The important point for mitigation is that the
offence is not a random act, but focused in a specific way. The complainer is either a
32 Nicholson(1992) 9-05 p. 179
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specific type of girl - provocative and encouraging - or, in incest cases, a proximate source
of comfort. These explanations are used to facilitate the argument that the offender is not a
danger to the public in a way that a reliance on an explanation of indiscriminate sexuality
could not manage.
Useful Employment
Although references to the offender's employment record are commonly made in the
context of the offender being a 'good family man', they are not restricted to the category of
married offender who sexually abuses his children. Employment record and, equally,
future employment prospects are common mitigating factors featuring in relation to several
different types of offence. There were several cases in which employment or lack of it was
specifically mentioned in mitigation. For the most part, employment was brought out to
show that the man was hard working, reliable and making a useful contribution to society
and/or the damage that a custodial sentence would cause to his employment or financial
prospects, for example "He has been employed in the Ministry of Defence for over 20 years, if he is sent
to prison he will lose his pension rights". This constitutes a form of 'double jeopardy' in terms of
excess punishment.
Past Good Deeds
In a small number of cases, efforts were made in mitigation to show that the offender had
a high degree of moral worth by citing good deeds that he had carried out in the past.
Sometimes these good deeds were quite spectacular, for example, in case 67 it was said that
the offender, who had been a Royal Navy engineer for a number of years had been
instrumental in saving a fellow seaman's life. In case 77, it was said that the offender had
served with the Royal Scots regiment and had received a bravery medal. In three other
cases, the fact that the offender had 'served his community' in some capacity was also given
in mitigation. This meritorious conduct obviously has nothing to do with the offence, but it
does give the offender more moral credit, as it were. It is unclear, however whether it has
any effect on the sentencer's decision.
Regret and Remorse
The offender's attitude towards the offence is very important, and a statement by the
defence that the offender deeply regretted the offence was certainly very common in the
observed cases. Apologising for the offence, admitting that he has done wrong, and trying
to make amends in some way are treated as mitigating factors. It has to be said that an
expression of remorse or contrition by the offender was somewhat easier to believe in those
cases where the offender had pled guilty rather than in those cases where he had pled not
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guilty. Nevertheless there were a small number of cases where, even though the offender
had pled not guilty and fought the case, it was stated in mitigation that he was apologetic
and remorseful !
In virtually all of the incest-related offences or those where there was a close relationship
between the offender and victim and where there was a plea of guilty, there was some
statement to the effect that the offender admitted doing wrong, accepted (some)
responsibility for his actions, realised that he faced a severe sentence, and was deeply
regretful, for example "He is extremely ashamed of his behaviour, and has asked me to convey his
profuse apologies to the girls and the family" (case 58 - guilty plea); "He asks to say he is sorry ... he
accepts the seriousness of the charge' (case 63 - guilty plea). The majority of non-incest guilty
pleas also contained similar statements. There were however a small number of cases
where it was stated that the offender had not appreciated the seriousness of the offence(s)
although this was usually given in conjunction with a depiction of the offender as a social
inadequate.
The act of pleading guilty, whether as libelled, or to a lesser charge, was described as a
brave and courageous act on the part of the offender. (This may have more to do with the
proving of cases and the probability of conviction in contested trials than bravery, but was
nevertheless given in over half of the guilty plea cases.) The defence would beseech the
sentencer to acknowledge that it "requires courage to plead guilty to such a charge" or to "take into
account this man's bravery in admitting the charge." It appears to be the opinion of defence lawyers
that to display the offender as "remorseful", as "guilt ridden" as "profusely apologetic" and to state
that the offender "acknowledges his problem and is sorry" can be extremely favourable for
mitigation.
Statements of remorse were usually a preliminary matter in mitigation, and typically
preceded statements about how the offender had tried to harm himself; had tried to
compensate for his actions to the complainer and/ or her family; how he requires help and
would be willing to undergo any sort of treatment. In eight cases, a suicide attempt by the
offender was interpreted as an indication of the level of his remorse. An extreme example
was the offender who was "deeply ashamed and remorseful" and "willing to undergo medical treatment,
drug therapy, sterilisation, and even castration" in an effort to show his contrition (case 75 - guilty
plea).
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As in Shapland's study, the factors given in mitigation in the observed cases in the main
demonstrated the sequence and structure of apologies as defined by Goffman (1972).33
Factors which indicate that the offender realises he did wrong ("accepts his guilt"; "admitted
his guilt from the start"; "and must face punishment ("realises he faces prison as a result of his actions";
"is facing up to his responsibility") prefaced expressions of embarrassment and shame ("is deeply
ashamed"; "expresses deep regret") and were followed by expressions of action taken by the
offender after the offence ("he has attempted suicide"; "he has taken an overdose of tranquillisers"; "he
has voluntarily attended a clinic"; "he has assisted the police in the recovery of the stolen articles") .
Requests For A Specific Penalty
A discussion of the penalty already paid by the offender frequently appeared penultimately
in mitigation, before a request for a particular sentence. The 'penalty already paid' is
usually along the lines that he has already paid quite a price in terms of punishment. "The
court cannot punish this man as much as he has punished himself. He has alienated himself from his family
because of his shame at implicating them in all of this" (case 87 - guilty plea). Ostracised by his
family, undergoing a divorce, a social pariah in his community, forced to resign from his
job, the offender is depicted as having already suffered enough, without the prospect of a
lengthy prison term. At this stage in mitigation, the sentencer was implored to exercise his
or her discretion and "give this man some hope for the future."
As previously mentioned, any previous convictions are initially brought up by the
prosecution. If the offender has no previous convictions, then the offence is presented by
the defence as a "one-off" offence and the lack of record is presented as boding well for the
future. If there are convictions, but of a non-analogous nature, the "one-off" argument will
be similarly used - that the sexual offence is totally out of character. However, even the
presence of a number of previous convictions can be turned around as a mitigating factor.
In one case, the fact that the offender had a string of previous convictions for similar
behaviour was used to suggest that the complainers in the case were aware of this and
viewed the offender as an "easy touch". Where there are similar convictions, arguments to
show the offender as an otherwise reliable, stable or decent person are not uncommon.
Hence the depictions of the offender as hardworking, involved in community good works
and conscientious and diligent in his efforts to bring up his family.
Typically the defence will close mitigation with a request for a non-custodial sentence.
Prison is an unpleasant place, much more so for the sex offender whose victim is young.
Frequently in mitigation it was said of those offenders who had spent some time in custody
33 Goffman, E. (1972) Relations in Public pp!43 - 145
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awaiting a trial or a hearing that they had already been assaulted or had received threats
from other prisoners outlining the treatment that awaits them, "He has been assaulted three times
since he has been in custody" (case 80 - guilty plea); "He has received a number of death threats from
other prisoners" (case 57 - guilty plea ) : "He is in fear of his life from other prisoners" (case 93 -
S.102).
Request for non-custodial sentences were also made on the grounds that a prison is an
unsuitable place for the offender, because it cannot offer suitable treatment for the
offender, or because it is an inappropriate disposal given the offender's particular needs.
There were five cases where the offender's disabilities (physical and psychological) were
cited as specific reasons why he should not be awarded a prison sentence. For example "A
prison has no provision for this man. He requires to be able to draw for his therapy." (case 65). Shapland
(1981) found that there was a tying of personalised accounts to specific types of sentence.
This was attributed to a growth in the number of different types of sentence available and
the principle of individualisation of sentence - that the sentence should 'fit' the offender. 34
This fitting of the offender to the sentence appears to remain the case, and such efforts
characterised the observed pleas in mitigation. Not only were lengthy details concerning the
offender's personal circumstances given, that is, whether the offender is employed, is in a
stable relationship, has children, has a 'solvable' problem - but a sentence
'recommendation' was put forward by the defence, matching the offender's circumstances to
an 'appropriate' sentence. In the main, where the defence was able to cite a range of
socially approved characteristics of the offender in mitigation - remorse, employment,
attempt to make amends, stable relationships, indication of moral worth - and in particular,
an indication that the complainer was partly responsible - then the recommendation for
leniency including, sometimes, a specific request for some form of community sanction
was more frequently made.
It was common at this end stage for there also to be a brief summing up of all mitigating
factors which had been given. Although these factors had already been cited as reasons for
the offence or to reduce the seriousness of what occurred, these were re-presented at this
stage as specific considerations why a more lenient sentence should apply.
The Use Of Stories In Mitigation
Mitigation speeches sometimes consisted of a collection of (sometimes unrelated and even
contradictory) mitigating factors or arguments assembled by the defence but much more
commonly, consisted of whole narrative accounts or stories about the offender and his
34 Shapland (1981) p 66 - 67
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circumstances in which were woven some or all of the factors cited above. In those cases in
which stories were given a fairly detailed verbal picture of the offence from the offender's
point of view emerged. This was perhaps to be expected in those cases in which the
offender had pled guilty. Because no trial had taken place, the offender had not had the
opportunity to put his side of the case and hence the plea in mitigation provided (possibly
the only) opportunity for him to do so. Shapland (1981) suggests that the use of the
narrative account or story is a more effective mitigation method than simply trying to
dispute (often necessarily disjointedly) some of the elements or circumstances of the
offence as relayed by the brief prosecution account of the 'facts' of the case. This is
because the story method allows the offender to rely on the competence of the sentencer as
a member of everyday society to "realise that the scene could have been perceived by the
offender as he describes it in his story."35
Shapland goes on to argue that this method is not open in the same way to an offender who
had pled not guilty but was subsequently found guilty. The reasons for this, she suggests,
is that an offender in a contested trial has already had his say, as it were, and any change in
his story at that stage will be no more than an indication of inconsistency.36 However,
similarly lengthy story-like accounts also appeared to be the norm in those cases in which a
guilty verdict had been returned and in which evidence had already been led. Although
some pleas were little more than re-iterations of what had been already stated during the
trial - particularly concerning the culpability of the complainer - with some added personal
details concerning the offender's domestic or past circumstances, in other pleas the
information given in mitigation was often introduced for the first time. Some of this was
grossly inconsistent to that which had been argued in the trial. For example, in case 18, it
was stated in mitigation that the offender's daughters who he had been sexually abusing
over a very long period retained a high degree of affection and loyalty towards their father
and did not want him to go to prison, whereas it had been argued by the defence in the
trial that the daughters had conspired against their father by falsely alleging the sexual
abuse in order to get him out of the house. Similarly, in case 8 it was alleged in mitigation
that the offender's wife desperately wanted him kept out of prison and that his relationship
was in jeopardy should he receive a custodial sentence, when it was argued in the trial that
he had turned to sex with the young complainers (aged 5 years and 11 years ) when
relations with his wife had irretrievably broken down and she had moved out of the marital
home.
35 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 73-74
36 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 74
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All of the mitigating factors cited in the previous sections were used to convey that
although the offender did in fact commit an offence, he was not altogether reprehensible.
His behaviour is explicable in terms which minimise his responsibility and/or negate the
seriousness of the offence. Very often, the same factors were brought into play to fulfil
both of these functions. By locating the offender and the offence in a context, and using
that context in explanation and rationalisation, the defence is able to offer some
justification for a more lenient sentence. Characterisations of the offender as morally,
psychologically , educationally or socially deficient were common, but so were
typifications of the culpable complainer. Both of these strategies enable blame to be
respectively diffused or displaced.
As previously mentioned, many of the arguments used in mitigation appear to directly
contradict each other. A strong impression is given of the defence treading a fine line
between a number of issues - if one mitigating factor is pushed too far, then this may
inadvertently damage the case for other mitigating factors. If, for example, too much is
made of the fact that the offender is a product of a 'problem' background and hence prone to
'problem' behaviour, does that not indirectly refute the fact that he is 'no danger to the
public' ? How can someone who has pled guilty to incestuous sexual intercourse with his
children taking place over a protracted period of time be simultaneously described as a
'good family man' ?
Many factors proffered in mitigation are clearly multi-purpose. Whilst it is often explicitly
stated by the defence that a particular factor, for example, the lack of injuries sustained by
the complainer, reduces the seriousness of the offence, it is often the case that some
factors are used to different ends. For example, information concerning the offender's
family circumstances may be used to show that he is a 'good family man' but may also be
used as a means of pointing out the distress and difficulty that his family would face if a
severe prison sentence was imposed. This of course does contribute to the perception,
mentioned earlier, that pleas in mitigation have a somewhat 'rag bag' quality. But equally,
such pleas could be seen as being extremely densely-textured, multi-layered and more
complex than they at first appear.
Ironically, the defence in mitigation is attempting to represent a study of human conduct
by citing a wide range of factors as relevant to an understanding of the offender and the
offence. Yet this is typically done in an extremely narrow way without, for example, any
recognition of current rhetoric or research findings regarding the behaviour of sexually
abused children. Of course, the defence in mitigation is under no obligation to do so. But
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rather there is a strong reliance on a range of presumptive statements and a set of easily
falsifiable assumptions and stereotypical notions about the behaviour of young victims of
sexual offences.
The question of the reliability of the content of pleas in mitigation has already been raised
earlier in this chapter. The use of social enquiry reports which may provide some form of
verification of the offender's personal circumstances was relatively rare. Such reports were
drawn on in only a small number of cases, approximately 10% of the sample. Whilst it is
unclear whether it is actually the case (and beyond the scope of this research to establish
whether it is in fact so), it does not seem unfeasible that some of the defence lawyers may
well have been somewhat selective, if not creative, in the presentation of mitigation
information. The key fact, however, and as pointed out by Ashworth (1983) is that the
defence in mitigation is merely doing his or her duty. In a mitigation speech the defence
must, unless he or she knows for sure that the information provided by the defendant is
definitely false, put forward as persuasively as possible the explanation proffered by the
defendant in an attempt to influence the sentencing decision in a way that is favourable for
the offender.
Mitigation : The Views of Practitioners
The issue of the role of the defence in mitigation was discussed with the interviewees. All
interviewees stressed that, in a plea in mitigation, all possible mitigating factors must be
brought out by the defence. All considered it the duty of the defence to do so. However,
they also suggested an additional - more pragmatic reason - why all possible mitigating
factors should be stated, and that is because it is not known in advance which factors the
sentencer will accept as being important or relevant in determining sentence. Hence, all
possible information is given, and this may go some way to account for the somewhat 'rag
bag' quality of pleas in mitigation alluded to earlier.
There was a consensus amongst the defence lawyers interviewed that it was in their client's
best interests for them to bring up anything and everything in mitigation which could be
considered to influence the sentencing decision. However, as one explained, whilst defence
lawyers do take instructions from their client concerning his point of view of the offence,
and they do try to represent that point of view as accurately as possible, they often have to
"prune" some of what is said by their client, particularly in relation to the offence. This does
infer that the defence are sometimes selective in what they present in mitigation. One
reason for this is, as another defence lawyer said "sometimes [accuseds] go over the top" and
consequently their accounts "lack realism". Realism is, as Shapland (1981) found, an
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important component of mitigation.37 Defence lawyers that she interviewed maintained
that being realistic was essential in mitigation, and that it applied both to the types of
mitigating factors that are used, particularly in how they relate to any aggravating factors,
and to sentencing suggestions.
There is also another reason for 'pruning' the accused's account and that is because the
defence lawyer has a much better idea of what may be favourable for mitigation and
acceptable to a sentencer, and what may not. Shapland (1981) found substantial differences
when she compared the content of pleas in mitigation given by defence lawyers with those
given by unrepresented offenders.38
Defence lawyers interviewed for this research maintained that they would exercise their
discretion in those cases where the offender puts forward a blatantly unrealistic account of
the offence. There appear to be two reasons for this. The first concerns the duty of the
defence towards their client. On the one hand, the defence should put forward all points
favourable for mitigation and, as a legal practitioner, has a better idea of what may 'work'
in mitigation. As a defence lawyer, he or she is much better placed to give advice to an
offender as to what may or may not be acceptable, and what may ultimately be considered
by the sentencer to be an aggravating, rather than a mitigating factor. Obviously this would
depend on the facts of the case, but one defence lawyer cited drink as "one of those [factors]
which could go either way". Experienced defence lawyers, he explained, would be able to judge
when some factor should be presented as mitigating. On the other hand, the defence lawyer
also has a duty as an officer of the court and, although somewhat complicated in practice,
the defence lawyer should not deliberately mislead the court by giving false information in
mitigation when they know it to be not true. One defence lawyer stated also that he would
feel justified in 'pruning' an offender's 'unrealistic' account if he felt that his own credibility
as a professional legal practitioner would be put in jeopardy by stating everything that the
offender had said.
All interviewees considered that factors concerned with the actual nature of the offence, the
gravity of the offence, the offender's attitude (in particular signs of remorse and contrition)
and his personal circumstances, both past and present were always relevant for mitigation.
As previously stated, these sort of factors, which offer a context and a rationale for the
offence, are generic to pleas in mitigation, appearing in many different types of offences.
37 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 82- 83
38 Shapland, J. (1981) p. 145-146
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The Issue Of Consent And Mitigation
It was put to the interviewees that a considerable amount of information concerning the
complainer was given in the observed pleas in mitigation, and that such pleas, in many
ways, provided a clear 'snap-shot' picture of common lines of defence questioning and
argument in contested sexual offence trials. All but one of the interviewees, a judge, were
not surprised about this research finding. Information concerning the complainer, in
particular that relating to her possible provocativeness was considered to be entirely
legitimate for mitigation. Similarly, only two interviewees, a sheriff and a judge, felt that
the presentation of the complainer as consenting was unusual in mitigation. There was
little surprise at the research finding concerning the strong emphasis given to the issue of
consent in mitigation. Such information is considered as providing a fuller picture of the
circumstances of the offence and the offender's reasons for committing the offence, and
therefore was centrally important for the proper consideration of sentence. As one sheriff
said:
'To have a narration that a man of fifty was having sexual intercourse with a thirteen year old girl,
it is perhaps thought that, stated baldly, it would reflect very much worse on the accused, than if
perhaps the circumstances of perhaps incitement on her part, or consent, show the whole
circumstances. "39
Interviewees were of the opinion that the issue of consent was a proper matter for
mitigation. Such information may be important for mitigating both seriousness of the
offence and the culpability of the offender. As one defence lawyer maintained:
"the criminality element or the severity of the offence might be very much reduced where the
girl is close to the age of consent"
This view was further borne out by informal conversations held with defence lawyers in the
court room following some of the observed pleas. Information about the complainer's
lifestyle, her previous sexual experience, her sexual reputation, and the question of consent
were all considered to be relevant factors for mitigation and all defence lawyers that I spoke
to informally were convinced that this sort of information would be considered relevant by
the sentencer, even though, in the 'guilty plea' and's. 102' cases this was put forward in the
absence of any 'proof' other than being something told to them by their clients.
What became increasingly clear from the formal interviews and the informal conversations
was, first, that the issue of consent was perceived to be a proper issue for mitigation.
39 It should be noted that this, and some of the other excerpts from the research interviews that follow in this
section appear in Brown et al (1993) chapter 8, p. 120-122. Whilst mitigation, as such, is not discussed in the
book, some of the interview material is drawn on in relation to the issue of consent.
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Despite consent (or, more accurately the lack of consent) not being part of the definition of
the offences under consideration in mitigation, and despite the fact that the consent of a
young women under the age of 16 years is technically irrelevant, consent was nevertheless
considered by legal practitioners to be an important consideration for sentencing in such
offences. Second, it became clear that contested trials and pleas in mitigation do share a
number of characteristics. This in turn implied that they share a common aim. It has been
suggested throughout this chapter that pleas in mitigation of sexual offences involving
young female complainers resemble some aspects of contested trials, particularly in relation
to the issue of consent. But discussion with interviewees revealed that, in fact, some
aspects of contested trials are themselves forms of mitigation. It is in this regard that
discussions with the interviewees cast more light on the puzzling phenomenon of the
predominance of consent-based rape-model type of arguments in contested trials involving
young complainers.
It was stated at the end of the last chapter that there were a second set of reasons for the
seemingly paradoxical dominance of consent-based arguments in the contested trials, apart
from the chance that such arguments may affect the adjudication decision made by the
jury. To return to this, the second set of reasons concerns the relationship between the
suggestion of consent and the mitigation of the offence. It is often the case in a criminal
trial that factors which mitigate the offence may have already emerged in the course of the
trial in advance of the verdict being returned.40 This may be due to any one of a number of
reasons, for example, factors relevant for mitigation may have emerged in the narration of
events by the prosecution or defence witnesses, in the cross-examination of the complainer,
or in the substance of reports made to the court. It will also be recalled that, in Scots law, it
is entirely competent to lead evidence concerning mitigating factors during the course of
the trial. In the cases observed for this research, it appeared that evidence on the issue of
consent was being pursued and seeded during the trial specifically for the purposes of
mitigation.
Interviewees largely concurred in their recognition that the issue of consent in trials
involving young complainers, whilst not technically relevant in terms of the age of the
complainer or the nature of the offence, may indeed be raised throughout the trial as a kind
of 'early plea in mitigation' seeking to lessen the sentence should the accused be found
guilty. This is because as one judge put it:
"One normally expects the trial to bring out everything to do with mitigation - even if much of it is
not relevant to guilt.
40 Nicholson (1992) 7-12, pi 18
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The judge was implying that the question of consent, whilst of little relevance to the
question of guilt because of the age of the complainer may be of central relevance to the
consideration of sentence. A second implication of this pronouncement is that the judge
considers the trial to be an arena in which all possible information concerning the events,
the relationship between the complainer and the accused, the relative seriousness of the
offence and the culpability of the offender should be aired. He justified this, firstly, in
terms of the 'right' of members of the jury to the full picture, and secondly, in terms of the
right of the sentencer to hear all information concerning the case.
One of the defence lawyers raised a second reason why mitigating factors were introduced
in the trial setting. He pointed out that, often, the thinking behind the introduction of
mitigating factors was essentially tactical, particularly in cases where :
"the trial were going against you ... then ... from a mitigation point of view it would be relevant to
at least investigate whether or not it was of consent.
There was yet another important issue concerning the relationship of consent-based
arguments and mitigation that was raised by another defence lawyer. This concerned the
practice which he termed as "going to trial on mitigation". That is, the process whereby
"one brings out facts during the course of the case that cannot be properly pled before a court if
you just plead guilty, but can be elicited from a witness during the course of them giving evidence.
And it might be the case that defence agents do this because they are going to trial on mitigation,
on the basis that if they can get that out dining the course of cross-examination, whilst they know
very well that it's not a defence, they are also aware that if [the sentencer] believes for instance that
there was consent involved here, that he may, when he's coming to sentencing, view it more
leniendy than he did or would do if that wasn't brought out."
This kind of tactic may be employed when it is felt that there are facts pertaining to the case
which may affect sentence and which it may not be possible to air fully in the opportunity
availed by a plea in mitigation following a guilty plea by the accused. In fuller explanation,
the defence lawyer went on to say that:
"it's very difficult when you're submitting to a sheriff in mitigation, having pled guilty, it's very
difficult indeed to impress upon a sheriff the fact that the complainer consented, in the same way
that one would be able to do , if you actually had the complainer in the witness box and put that to
them. It's much more convincing if you can get that from the complainer in the witness box."
This view was confirmed, this time by a prosecutor who explained that:
'The purpose of a criminal trial is not always to establish guilt or innocence. Sometimes a trial is
effectively a plea in mitigation."
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This of course means that young complainers are exposed to the same testing ordeal as that
encountered by adult complainers in rape trials and as such, 'early mitigation' must be
viewed as an abhorrent, albeit potentially effective, method of advocacy. The
distastefulness of the practice was recognised by one prosecutor, who stated
"Now, it may be that the defence are hoping for a sympathy verdict, or hoping to just hammer
home the fact that this was something done consensually, albeit that technically that's not a
defence. Clearly ... that is a gross abuse of a witness's presence in court ...it's just a sad legal fact"
In addition, conducting a full trial in the knowledge that a guilty verdict will inevitably
result, even though it may be justified by defence lawyers in terms of being in the best
interests of their clients, can also be said to be in blatant disregard of current directives
concerning the need to reduce the pressure of court business.
The seemingly paradoxical appearance of the issue of consent in contested trials thus does
appear to be, partly, a form of 'early mitigation'. That what is in fact happening is that
throughout the trial, the issue of consent is raised strategically in advance and applied
pragmatically by the defence to mitigate seriousness of the offence and/or culpability of the
offender should a verdict of guilty be returned. Certainly the parallels between mitigating
arguments following a guilty verdict or a 'guilty plea' and the way that evidence is used to
suggest consent in contested trials are very strong. Defence lawyers, during the course of
their performance in the trial and at the mitigating stage appear to deploy the same
arguments to influence both adjudication and sentencing decisions. This of course raises
the question of whether such early mitigation arguments are recognised as such by the
prosecution and the judiciary during the trial and, further, whether such arguments,
although not relevant to guilt, are considered to be relevant to the sentencing decision.
Interviews with legal practitioners suggest that some defence arguments in the trial are in
fact recognised as 'early mitigation'. As one prosecutor said :
"It may be that I have agreed in advance with the defence that this sort of information will be
introduced and, whilst not relevant to guilt, may well be an issue in the case, and therefore useful
formitigation"
This point of view was backed up in an informal conversation with a prosecutor following
a trial which was dominated by consent-based arguments, the prosecutor (who was not
involved in the trial in any way) ventured the possibility that this may be a reason why
prosecutors do not object to the use of such evidence in the trial.
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Of course, the deploying of possible mitigating factors throughout the trial raises a further
question concerning the use which is made of such information in the sentencing decision
that is reached by the sentencer. This is not all that clear. The investigation of this
particular question is , however, way beyond the scope of the present study, and would




In this final chapter, the various strands of the thesis are drawn together and the initial
research questions set out in the Introduction are also returned to. Up until now, the thesis
has described, in parts in great detail, the procedures and processes taking place in the
court room. This chapter reflects on these processes and looks at some of the implications
of what takes place, both at the level of criminal justice and also at the level of what can be
called here social justice.
Images of Sexuality
Throughout this thesis, the issue of young female sexuality is examined through the lens of
the sexual offence case. It will be recalled that one set of research questions outlined in the
Introduction concerned the construction and use of images of young female sexuality in the
court room. At one level I have tried to document the ways in which images are invoked
and the focus on sexuality takes place. Court observation of contested trials and guilty plea
cases reveals that (several) images of young female sexuality pervade the court room in the
criminal justice processing of such cases, and I examine the way in which information
about the complainer is used in the construction of these images. Images are conveyed
through the use of evidence in contested trials and drawn upon in mitigation speeches.
Whether explicitly articulated or implicitly invoked, images resonate throughout the
processing of sexual offence cases.
In addressing the question of the images, I have also tried to demonstrate how they are
grounded in a construction of difference between (stereo) types of girls. These are, on the
one hand, innocent, chaste and asexual 'good' girls, and on the other seductive,
promiscuous and sexual 'bad' girls. These form the basic stereotypes which inform much of
the legal rhetoric deployed within the court room. Gender stereotypes and their symbolic
use appear prevalent in the arena of the court room, underpinning and infusing the trial
process. Within these stereotypes are embedded a mesh of ambivalences and contradictions
about the sexuality of young women and girls, which, in turn, are perpetuated within and by
the court process. These ambivalences in relation to the sexuality of girls, where they are
perceived as either sexually vulnerable or sexually threatening, appear well established
within the context of legal (and social) discourse. This may be traced back (at least) to the
last century where ideas about youthful sexuality were incorporated within the framework
of legislation which formulated new and distinct categories of sexual offences and
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simultaneously raised the female age of consent. In many ways, the legislative formulations
appear to be premised upon this dualistic notion of competing and opposed sexualities.
The prevailing nineteenth century legal, moral, social and welfarist discourses concerning
the sexuality of girls were reflected and reinforced in the extensive public and
parliamentary debates which preceded the 1885 Act. The Act appears to be founded on
welfarist principles, having as an aim the protection of young girls from sexual
involvement with older men. It was for this reason that the resultant legislation extended
the legal prohibition on sex with girls under puberty to girls up to the age of 16 years. By
supplementing the older common law prohibition (based on the doctrine of non-
competency) with a statutory prohibition based, ostensibly, on protectionist principles, the
legislation effectively rendered the consent of older girls irrelevant, and by so doing
effectively implemented a degree of social and legal control over the sexual autonomy of
young women. Yet despite its preoccupations with protecting girls, this piece of legislation,
the cornerstone of today's statutory sexual offence legislation, made a clear policy
distinction between saveable and non-saveable girls. Young girls were perceived largely
in terms of whether they are saveable/deserving 'good' girls or non-saveable/undeserving
'bad' girls, defined in relation to their sexuality and sexual behaviour. The protectionist
element of the legislation was clearly aimed at those girls seen to deserve the law's
protection, excluding from the law's protection those considered undeserving. By so
doing, the 1885 legislation had the effect of sustaining the categories of deserving and
problem girls in the eyes of the law using sexuality as the basis of differentiation.
The study tries to reveal how this social construction of difference between types of girls
which emerged initially out of welfarist/protectionist concerns in the last century gets re¬
shaped by law and articulated in legal mode in the contemporary court room. It is argued
that in the processing of sexual offence cases, legal rhetoric constantly reproduces this
dualistic (and somewhat crude) frame of reference of 'good' and 'bad' girls. One effective
way of conveying this difference in a court room is through the use of stereotypical images
of female sexuality which are used to characterise the complainer as an undeserving 'bad'
girl and hence differentiate her from the ideal 'good' girl, the innocent and deserving victim.
Quite simply, the complainer is located by the defence in terms of her sexuality.
Throughout the trial, she is referred to and depicted by means of (sometimes a series of)
'bad' girl images, with the ultimate aim of discrediting her as a credible and reliable
witness.
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the appearance and use of these images of female
sexuality which are deployed in the court room, and the ways in which they are conveyed,
their rather complex relationship to legal-evidential issues that pertain in a criminal trial are
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examined. As a first step, the legal concept of 'character' is identified as a fulcrum of the
sexual offence trial. Sexuality is a major component used in the construction of sexual
character and the thesis plots the way in which the young complainer's sexual character is
invoked and built up by a variety of explicit and rhetorical methods over the course of a
trial. It also plots how sexual character is inferred in the process of mitigation in guilty
pleas. On the one hand, the ascription of sexual character operates as a means of
identifying and categorising the complainer as a type of girl. Yet, on the other hand, sexual
character is also the main conduit through which images of sexuality are pinned down,
channelled and applied to other evidential issues such as the reliability and credibility of the
complainer.
Sexual Evidence and the 'Shield' Legislation
A second set of research questions which the study addresses cluster around the Scottish
'shield' legislation and, specifically, whether evidence which constitutes undue questioning
about complainers' sexual lives is in fact being used in sexual offence trials involving
young female complainers and, if so, what form the sexual evidence takes in such trials.
On the basis of the cases observed, there appears little doubt that sexual evidence is being
used. Indeed, such evidence is utilised in trials involving young female complainers in
ways not too dissimilar from older women, although there are some marked differences
that, specifically, cohere around the concept of sexual character, which will be reiterated
below. It will be recalled that sexual character was one of the main problematic concerns
of the Scottish Law Commission in the 1980's when they were devising the Scottish 'shield'
legislation. Their extensive deliberations on the question of sexual character informed the
drafting and design of the legislation, which contains a general 'sexual character' exclusion.
Court observation of cases reveals that the defence often display an intense preoccupation
with the sexual character of the young complainer, This is not too different from the focus
on the sexual character of adult complainers documented by Brown et al (1993) and Adler
(1987). However, the main difference is that, in the case of a young complainer, the
defence will focus on any evidence which shows her to be a 'sexual being', rather than as is
the case with older women, where the defence focus is on any evidence which specifically
suggests 'bad' sexual character. In the quest to establish the complainer as a sexual being,
the emphasis is on portraying her as sexually aware, sexually interested, in other words it is
a quest which aims at demonstrating her sexuality. In a young girl, evidence of her
sexuality is sought on both a physical and a cognitive basis. For example, a physically
developed body and the onset of menstruation are taken to indicate burgeoning sexuality.
Equally, a premature awareness of sexual matters, such as knowledge of sexual terms, is
used to demonstrate sexuality; as is the fact that she likes to dress up, wear make-up, or
has an interest in boys. All of these factors are treated as indicators of sexuality, and are
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used to show the complainer to be a 'sexual being'. Sexuality in turn is equated with sexual
character. Characterising the complainer as a 'sexual being' is a powerful invocation, as it
calls into play the images of threat and danger which so disturbed nineteenth century
sentiment concerning female sexuality and appropriate sexual behaviour and which, it is
argued, continues to inform much of contemporary legal rhetoric.
Excluding sexual character evidence is difficult to achieve because of the ease with which
such evidence can be introduced by means of connotation and inference during the course
of the trial. Brown et al (1993) show how the suggestion that the (adult) complainer is
promiscuous and therefore also a liar can be made quite easily through the deployment of
evidence that is not even sexual in itself, but can be elicited through questions such as "You
are often out late?"; "You drink regularly ?"; "You are an unmarried mother?" and used in
the construction of a 'bad' sexual character.1 In cases involving young complainers, a
similar process can be observed to take place. However, the manner in which this is done
is again slightly different from that documented by Brown et al. In the case of younger
complainers, information concerning contraception and of course, virginity, can have a
similar effect to questions about drinking habits and unmarried motherhood asked of adult
complainers. Sexual character can be conjured through references to the complainer's
general lifestyle, her choice of friends, or her preferred leisure activities. Similarly,
questions concerning dates of past pregnancy and/or abortions which may not be directly
sexual in themselves, but the inferences that can be drawn - particularly if the complainer
is young - can be potentially damaging in terms of her character.
Another key objective of the Scottish legislators was to sever the implied link between
sexual immorality and credibility. That is, they wished to exclude the use of evidence
which aims to show that because someone is sexually promiscuous or of easy virtue then
they are also a liar. In the cases observed here, the tying together of immorality and lack
of veracity can be seen to occur, although this is done largely through seizing on aspects of
the young complainer's sexuality in order to show her lack of credibility. The way that this
is done again owes much to prevailing cultural stereotypes, which depict young girls as
typically untruthful and unreliable in relation to most things, but particularly with regard to
sexual matters. This stereotypical image of the young girl who does not tell the truth is
drawn on in the court room, wherein young girls are portrayed by the defence as prone to
sexual fantasising, and apt to make things up out of guile or artfulness or pure
maliciousness.
1 Brown, B. et al (1993) Sex Crimes on Trial p. 205
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The Scottish Law Commission also aimed to exclude evidence introduced on the basis of a
sexual character construction of a predisposition to consent. In other words, they wished to
exclude evidence introduced on the basis that because a women has consented with man A
and man B in the past, she can be presumed to have consented with man C. The study
shows that in trials involving young complainers, the construction of sexual character is in
fact an important precursor to introducing the issue of consent which, even though
technically not an issue, is nevertheless a characteristic of such trials . Yet the way that the
issue of consent is invoked and used in trials involving young complainers does not map
exactly that envisaged by the law reformers. They were concerned primarily with the
imputation of indiscriminate consent on the basis of past consent. In the trials observed
here, the ascription of sexual character does appear to aid the presentation of the
complainer as consenting to the sex which is the subject matter of the charge. However, the
focus is on presenting the complainer as someone who is likely to consent to the offence,
not on the basis of past consent (although sometimes that does appear to be an issue), but
more on the basis of her burgeoning sexuality, her awakening sexual interest, her sexual
curiosity which is routinely associated with her young age. In other words, characterising
the complainer as a 'sexual being' sets up the imputation of consent.
The Appearance of Consent
This leads me to the third set of research questions set out in the Introduction, that is those
which cluster around the appearance of consent in the trials and the dominance of consent-
based arguments put forward by the defence. It has been argued that rape-model
arguments, with their strong emphasis on, and ways of defining and proving consent on the
part of the complainer, albeit usually associated with rape trials involving adult
complainers, are a common characteristic of sexual offence trials involving young
complainers. This is despite the fact that consent is technically not an issue in such trials,
ruled out on the basis of one or the other of the two rationales which underpin the non-
consent of young women and girls. This study documents how throughout the trial, the
defence are able to systematically manipulate and re-interpret evidence in ways that are
designed to suggest that the complainer consented. It shows how the story of the
consenting young complainer is built up through challenging and re-interpreting the signs
of the crime and the complainer's account of what occurred, whilst consistently searching
for evidence which can be construed as indicating consent.
Further, the question of consent haunts the plea in mitigation process in much the same way
as it does the trial situation. There is a focus on the complainer, and the defence
incorporate a suggestion of consent within the content of the plea which is used to shift
blame away from accused and/or attribute responsibility on to the complainer. Similar
sorts of issues to those that are used to show consent in a contested trial situation, such as
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delay in reporting, and signs of force and resistance are drawn into pleas in mitigation.
Such pleas, in many ways, provide a clear 'snap-shot' picture of common lines of defence
questioning and argument in contested sexual offence trials.
Taken together, these similarities go some way to suggest that the paradoxical appearance
of the issue of consent in contested trials is in fact there for a specific set of reasons. By
raising the issue of consent at an early stage (that is, during the trial) its mitigating potential
becomes more firmly realised should a guilty verdict ensue, and it may influence the
sentencer to decide on a more lenient sentence. According to most of those legal
practitioners interviewed, for that reason alone, raising the issue of consent is entirely
justifiable. Of course, focusing on the issue of consent may, equally, raise enough doubt
that it has the effect of destabilising the prosecution case, which in turn leads to an
acquittal. Either way, the implication of consent may have a desired effect in terms of the
defence case. Thus consent is an issue, not solely because of its relevance to the guilt of the
accused, but also because it is thought by practitioners to mitigate seriousness of the
offences and potentially reduce sentence.
Criminal Justice Implications
I address the use of sexual evidence (which it is argued is underpinned by a set of
presumptions informed by a particular view of young female sexuality) within the context
and logic of the adversarial system. In trying to draw together all the various strands of the
thesis, however, much remains unanswered in terms of the effects and implications that
this focus on young female sexuality may be having. In trying to redress this situation and
seek some explanation, it is perhaps fruitful to turn again to the general principles of
advocacy within the adversarial system and re-examine the logic of what goes on in a trial
situation.
Constructing the Defence Case
It was stated in Chapter Three that advocacy is more about constructing and arguing a case
than about ascertaining the truth of what may have occurred. As McBarnet (1981) argues,
success or failure in court depends as much on the construction of the case as on the 'actual'
case (that is, the original events).2 At a superficial level essentially what one encounters in
a criminal trial are a set of competing stories about what did or did not happen, and also -
crucially in the cases documented here - differing stories about the complainer and the
accused and their part in what (allegedly) occurred. These stories are used in the
construction of the (prosecution or defence) case as a way of reconstructing and making
explicable what happened. They are composed of, for example, statements drawn from
2 McBarnet, D. (1981) Conviction
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witness testimony, items of physical evidence, and statements by the complainer, that is,
pieces of evidence which are introduced and examined over the course of the trial. But the
content of these stories (and hence the constructed cases) are often fairly fluid and open to
differing interpretation, and hence a key source of contention and argument. The relative
strength, in evidential terms, of these (invariably conflicting) stories about events and
individuals is really at the heart of the trial. However, to paraphrase Sanders (1987) who
was writing in relation to the construction of the prosecution case, constructing a case is
not entirely due to available evidence and the interpretation of that evidence, it owes much
to the complex interplay between the respective roles of prosecution and the defence, the
witnesses (particularly the complainer), the events in question, and the interpretation of
those events. 3
It was also stated in Chapter Three that adversarial demands are placed on the prosecution
in terms of the burden of proof and the criteria for evidential sufficiency in terms of
corroboration. On the other hand, the defence do not adhere to a criteria of evidential
sufficiency nor do they have to 'prove' their case in the same way as the prosecution. They
do not have to do anything more than 'put' their case. However, the 'duty' of the defence is
to argue his or her client's case, and as such the adversarial demands upon the defence,
although somewhat different from those placed upon the prosecution, are nonetheless fairly
influential. The defence are necessarily creative in building up and interpreting their cases.
Building up the defence case usually entails trying to dismantle the prosecution case. This
is done in a number of ways; for example, by disputing the source or interpretation of
evidence as was the case in some observed cases where the defence disputed that a lack of
or damaged hymen was indicative of sexual behaviour; by putting forward an alternative
explanation of the prosecution evidence, as in those cases where the defence suggested that
marks of injury were a result of play rather than sex; by injecting ambivalence and hence
confusion as, for example, in case 21 cited at length in Chapter Seven where the defence
version of the complainer's hysteria and incoherence after an attempted rape was part of an
elaborate plan to explain to her parents why she was late home after a night out with
friends. This is all part of the 'logic' of the role of the defence, who will always be looking
for any ambiguities and inconsistencies in the prosecution case and, because the complainer
is usually the prosecution's key witness, in her account of what occurred. A main reason for
this is that, since the truth or the falsity of what is said to have occurred can rarely be
directly established, due to inherent difficulties of corroboration in this type of offence,
then arguments in court frequently concern the credibility and veracity of the complainer.
3 Sanders, A, (1987) 'Constructing the Case for the Prosecution' Journal of Law and Society vol.14
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The essence of some defence cases is a set of interpretations of 'facts' which have to be
created. This is largely done through defence questioning of witnesses, but also through
alternative interpretations of physical evidence. Such questioning is designed to cause
damage to the prosecution case, but at the same time convey the defence version. The way
that questions are posed and the order in which they are asked can be very influential.
Moreover, the way that witnesses answer defence questions in court can be substantially
affected by the context and order of the questions put to them. This is particularly so in
relation to the complainer. Often in the cases observed here the complainers were young,
frightened and intimidated, and ill-equipped to avoid the pitfalls set by the defence line of
questioning, let alone engage in the appropriate legal discourse to counter defence
imputations of consent, unreliability and lack of credibility.
Sanders (1987) makes the point in relation to the case for the prosecution that although
'facts' are often far from concrete, cases do not emerge out of thin air.4 This logic can also
be applied to the construction of the defence case. Obviously, a number of different
interpretations of 'fact' could arise from a particular situation or piece of evidence. For
example, the presence of semen/injuries/ vaginal swelling in many cases cannot be denied
- but the reasons for its presence can be debated endlessly. Cases are built out of what
people say or think or remember about these 'facts' - which all can be shown to have
competing or overlapping meanings, something which the defence try to capitalise upon.
Similarly, it has been reiterated throughout this thesis that one piece of evidence can be
used by the defence to perform a variety of functions, sometimes overlapping with other
pieces of evidence which substantiate the defence case (or weaken the prosecution case).
For example, the suggestion that the complainer is a sexual fantasiser is multifunctional in
that it serves as an explanation for the allegation, whilst at the same time adds to the picture
of the complainer as unreliable, and lacking in credibility. Similarly, a lack of hymen can
be interpreted by the defence as evidence of consensual sex in relation to the subject of the
charge. It may also be used to suggest evidence of past sexual behaviour. This in turn sets
up a picture of the complainer as a sexual being, and hence she is cast as a 'type' of person
about whom all sorts of assertions may be made. Evidence concerning any situation can
provide the basis of a number of different arguments (although many seem to cohere
around the notion of the consenting complainer). Several (diverse) lines of questioning
may also lead to a particular construction of events.
Through a process of disputing, reinterpreting, recasting and confusing the defence attempt
to reconstruct the prosecution case (and in particular the complainer's testimony) in a
different way. All of these, fairly typical, 'reconstructivist' defence strategies are carried
4 ibid.
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out with the aim of casting doubt on the prosecution case. The point about a defence case
is that, as part of its construction, the prosecution case is ruled out, or shown to be
inappropriate. Some writers have maintained that precisely because the ultimate aim is to
raise doubt about the prosecution case, then the defence case is necessarily reactive.5 But
observation of cases here suggest that this is not always so. The defence is required to put
forward the story of events as told to him or her by the accused. Often what is deployed by
the defence in this regard is not so much alternative interpretations of evidence - but
sometimes evidence which is entirely 'new' or unrelated to that put forward in the
prosecution case. Sometimes this stretches to implicitly or explicitly disregarding or
discounting the prosecution case altogether - and presenting another altogether different
'story' or version of events. For example, those cases where marks or injuries were turned
around into 'normal playground injuries, and those cases where the girl's account is
reconstructed of into a defence story about a motive for false allegation. The defence aim
is to derail the prosecution case by raising doubt. Presenting an alternative story introduces
an element of speculation into the minds of the jury which may raise that doubt.
Similarly, it is also the case that evidence may be introduced by the defence during the
course of the trial which appears to contradict other parts of the defence case. The
apparently deliberate use of what could be called 'red herrings' are also understandable
within the context of the 'logic' of the defence role. The introduction of red herrings
injects ambiguity and causes confusion, and can be as effective at raising doubt as the
reinterpretation of evidence.
All of these strategies are really a reflection of institutional practice. The defence have little
choice - given their adversarial role - but to dispute 'facts', draw inferences, make
assumptions, and offer alternative interpretations. However, on the basis of the observed
cases some additional strategies used in the construction of the defence case can be
identified. One aim appears to be to muster as much evidence against - as opposed to
about - the complainer as possible, for example, by bringing in other witnesses who testify
against her by referring to her past habits or behaviour; by attacking her credibility through
the introduction of sexual evidence. Observation of cases revealed that the defence
routinely try to undermine young complainers, to call them liars, and to seize on any aspect
of their sexuality in an attempt to discredit them. Furthermore, and again on the basis of
cases observed in this research, another defence strategy appears to be to bring in elements
and components which are not strictly part of the charge at hand - but which are part of
the general defence routine of other charges. This is most noticeable in relation to the issue
of consent which, although not technically part of the charge in trials for statutory sexual
5 ibid.
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offences, is part of the defence routine in rape trials involving adult women. This finding
is somewhat at odds with the view that cases are constructed specifically to refute the
charge at hand.6 Because the defence are not tied down in the same way as the prosecution,
they have much more scope to creatively address the available evidence. Although power
appears vested in the prosecution, as Sanders (1987) points out, in open court, the defence
has all of the advantage.7
But the construction and presentation of the defence case does not always end with the
demolition of the prosecution case. In several instances the defence were at pains to
present a detailed alternative version of events which appeared plausible. This was
somewhat surprising given that the role of the defence is merely to cast doubt on the
prosecution case. Sometimes what seemed to be happening was an attempt by the defence
to make their version 'fit the facts' - rather than, as one may expect, a sole focus on
undermining the prosecution case. Giving a fuller version of a case - a more forceful and
plausible reconstruction of the events - may have the effect of being more believable. The
stronger the defence case, the better for defence purposes. On the other hand, one could
also surmise that this is again an example of leading 'early mitigation' in a way similar to
that discussed earlier in relation to the issue of consent. A defence case which proposes a
full alternative may well offer more potential for mitigation than a defence case based
solely on raising doubt in the prosecution case. Certainly, some interviewees felt that the
fuller and more plausible the defence version of events, the more likely the jury would be
swayed in favour of the defence case. But equally, they felt that the fuller the account, the
more scope for seeding mitigating factors.
It is submitted that, in sexual offence cases involving young complainers, the construction
of a defence case commonly entails some specific components. These include a focus on
the sexuality of the complainer, a preoccupation with the complainer's sexual character, the
deployment of images of female sexuality to convey sexual character, and the use of
arguments to show consent. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this project to show how
the jury or the court come to be swayed, let alone satisfied by the defence case. Some cases
succeed in their objectives of acquittal, but clearly, not all cases result in acquittals. Some
cases are very strong evidentially, and not all defence lawyers are that skilled at what they
try to do. Looking at the resolution in terms of verdict reached at the end of the observed
contested trials, it can be seen that 30 (that is, 57% ) of the trials involved a guilty verdict.
However, it will be recalled from Chapter Five that this does not mean that the accused was
found guilty on all of the charges which formed the case. In 10 of these trials, the guilty
verdicts were returned for reduced or less serious charges than the original charges. Whilst
6 McBarnet, D. (1981)
7 Sanders, A. (1987)
192
an analysis of returned verdicts in terms of the use of images and an emphasis on sexual
character and consent is also way beyond the scope of this thesis, one may hazard (purely
at the level of speculation) that they may well be having some effect on the decisions
reached by juries.
Constructing a defence case does not in itself contravene any legal rules, on the contrary
the defence are fulfilling their duty to the accused by laying out the defence case. However
it is clear that some constructions constitute breaches of the 'shield' legislation. The general
stated aim of the legislation is to prevent gratuitous and unnecessary questioning into
aspects of complainer's sexual lives. Clearly this is not being adhered to, in that prohibited
sexual evidence is led without reference to the legislation. In many ways this is
unsurprising. Other research has shown how impervious rape and child sexual abuse are to
legal reform.8 The thesis provides further substantiation of this imperviousness and, at the
same time, further lays bare the way in which female victims of sexual offences, both
young and old, are treated in the courts. That such practices appear impervious to effective
reform has undoubted policy implications. It raises serious questions concerning whether,
within the context of the present system, there are any legislative means which would avoid
the hostile treatment of complainers in the witness box, or unsubstantiated allegations about
the complainants sexual character in a plea in mitigation.
Social Justice Effects
At the level of sociological analysis, this overt preoccupation with young female sexuality
has effects both inside and outside of the criminal justice system. To turn now to look
across the wider social landscape at what some of those other effects and implications may
be at the level of what can be called social justice. I have repeatedly suggested that sexual
offence cases are thoroughly imbued with images of female sexuality that are used both to
characterise and depict the complainer, and also as a means of explaining the sexual event.
This is a problem, not least because the use of such imagery is not good for the equality of
young women and girls before the law. But also, and importantly, because it carries with it
the presumption that the sexual assault is a result of (hetero)sexual passion and desire.
From this perspective, the assault can be presented within criminal trials and also within a
wider social context, as an inevitable event. This is not new in that feminists have for a
long time been making similar arguments concerning the position of adult women in rape
trials.9 There is however, a slight difference of emphasis in that what is being deployed by
the defence in these cases (that is, in both contested trials and guilty plea cases) is not the
usual argument concerning uncontrollable male sexual urges that have precipitated the
8 Adler, Z. (1987) Rape On Trial ; Temkin, J. (1987) Rape and the Legal Process ; Brown, et al (1993) Sex
Crimes On Trial;
9 Smart, C. (1995) Law, Crime and Sexuality
193
offence, but rather the offence is depicted as the fault of the young complainer's irresistible
sexual curiosity and 'natural' sexual urge. The focus on her sexuality and associated
evidence are used to substantiate the sexual act which forms the charge as one of
(consensual) sexual passion (usually precipitated by the complainer). This in turn leads to
an understanding and an explanation of the act as a result of sexual passion. This is
damaging to women and girls because, not only does it ignore any possibility of harm and
denies the coercive element involved in non-consensual sex, but it also situates rape and
other forms of sexual assault within the context of 'normal' sexual behaviour.
This focus on the complainer's sexuality also means that the entire trial process is imbued
with sex. It is a discourse of sex. The evidence is sexualised, as is the complainer. Smart
(1995), writing about adult women describes the rape trial situation as "a specific mode of
sexualisation of a woman's body".10 At the same time, the complainer simultaneously
invokes the natural/sexed women who is known to be emotional, irrational, and
unreliable. This aptly describes the situation with young complainers. Within the trial, the
young complainer constantly invokes, albeit unwittingly, cultural stereotypes of young
female sexuality, and the related stereotypes of unreliability, subjectivity and mendacity
that are associated with young girls. A particular identity, based on sexuality is
constructed and ascribed to the complainer that has implications far beyond the courtroom.
The correlation of sex and sexuality in the court room is problematic for another reason. It
has been argued here that young women and girls are constructed - and differentiated - in
terms of their sexuality. Not only does this reek of essentialism, but it also has implications
in terms of the social control and positioning of 'good' and 'bad' girls within a social and
legal context. 'Good' girls are seen as deserving and saveable, 'bad' girls are constructed as
the problem. By so doing, special classes of young women and girls are created, and
responded to differently. Imposing differentiation on the basis of sexuality has implications
in terms of young women and girls' recourse to law when alleging sexual assault.
Currently, invoking the law can bring with it a whole set of further problems and
difficulties for the complainer which exacerbate rather than ameliorate the original ordeal.
In-court practices which equate sexual assault and sexuality and construct 'good' and 'bad'
girls not only constitute highly distressing ordeals for the young complainer, but they can
also potentially corrupt the system. Fear of the witness box may result in not reporting the
sexual assault. Despite concerns with the unnecessary questioning and under-reporting
being two of the reasons behind the Scottish law reforms, the testing procedure of giving
evidence nonetheless remains a problem for those alleging sexual assault and desiring
'justice'.
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APPENDIX II
LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) ACT 1985
S.36(l) After section 141A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 there shall
be inserted the following sections :
S.141A (1) In any trial of a person on a charge to which this section applies,
subject to section 141B, the court shall not admit, or allow questioning
designed to elicit, evidence which shows or tends to show that the complainer:
(a) is not of good character in relation to sexual matters;
(b) is a prostitute or an associate of prostitutes; or
(c) has at any time engaged with any person in sexual behaviour not forming
part of the subject matter of the charge.
S141A (2) This section applies to a charge of committing or attempting to
commit any of the following offences, that is to say:
(a) rape;
(b) sodomy;
(c) assault with intent to rape;
(d) indecent assault;
(e) indecent behaviour (including any lewd, indecent or libidinous practice or
behaviour);
(J) an offence under section 106( l)(a) or 107 of the Mental Health (Scotland)
Act 1984 (unlawful sexual intercourse with mentally handicapped female or
with patient);
(g) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences
(Scotland) Act 1976:
(i) section 2 (procuring by threats, etc.);
(ii) section 3 (unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 13);
(iii) section 4 (unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16);
(iv) section 5 (indecent behaviour towards girl between 12 and 16);
(v) section 8 (abduction of girl under 18);
(vi) section 9 (unlawful detention of female); or
(h) an offence under section 80(7) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act
1980 (homosexual offences).
S.141A (3) In this section 'complainer' means the person against whom the
offence referred to in subsection (2) above is alleged to have been committed.
S. 141A (4) This section does not apply to questioning, or evidence being
adduced, by the Crown.
S.141B (1) Notwithstanding the terms of section 141A, in any trial of a
person on a charge to which that section applies, where the court is satisfied
on an application by that person:
(a) that the questioning or evidence referred to in section 141A (1) above is
designed to explain or rebut evidence adduced, or to be adduced, otherwise
than by or on behalf of that person.
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(b) that the questioning or evidence referred to in section 141A (l)(c) above:
(i) is questioning or evidence as to sexual behaviour which took place on
the same occasion as the sexual behaviour forming the subject-matter of
the charge; or
(ii) is relevant to the defence of incrimination; or
(c) that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to exclude the
questioning or evidence referred to in section 141A (1) above, the court shall
allow such questioning or, as the case may be, admit such evidence.
S.141B (2) Where questioning or evidence is or has been allowed or admitted
under this section, the court may at any time limit as it thinks fit the extent of
that questioning or, as the case may be, admit such evidence.
S.141B (3) Any application under this section shall be made in the course of
the trial but in the absence of a jury, the complainer, any person cited as a
witness and the public.
S.346A and S.346B cover summary procedure. The difference from S.141A and
S.141B (above) which cover solemn procedure is only in the offences covered.
S.346A (2) This section applies to a charge of committing or, in the case of




(c) assault with intent to rape
(d) indecent assault;
(e) indecent behaviour (including any lewd, indecent or libidinous practice or
behaviour);
(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences
(Scotland) Act 1976:
(i) section 2 (procuring by threats, etc.);
(ii) section 3 (unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 13);
(iii) section 4 (unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16);
(iv) section 5 (indecent behaviour towards girl between 12 and 16);
(v) section 8 (abduction of girl under 18);
(vi) section 9 (unlawful detention of female); or
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